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MILITARY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
RULE-MAKING UNDER THE APA 
Arthur Earl Bonfield* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HERE is an obvious need to conduct our governmental affairs effectively. expeditiously. and inexpensively. No administrative 
rule-making procedure is acceptable unless it fairly takes account of 
this consideration. Consequently, procedural requirements that 
unduly fetter agency action. or frustrate its purposes. are obvious!} 
unwise. What is needed, therefore. is a system of rule-making that 
will strike a sensible balance between the need for adequate public 
participation in that process. and the need for efficient government. 
In striking that balance. society's interest in involving affected mem-
bers of the public in administrative rule-making at an early stage is 
not so slight that it should be set aside solely on the basis of minor 
inconvenience or expense to government. 
Schemes meant to assure public participation in administrative 
rule-making guarantee interested persons an opportunity to com-
municate their views and information to the relevant government 
officials before the latter take final action on rules.1 This is desirable 
for a number of reasons. Such participation helps to elicit from 
those who are in the best position to provide it. the information 
necessary for intelligent action by the agency making rules. A single 
agency's accumulated knowledge and expertise are rarely sufficient 
to provide all the data upon which rule-making decisions should 
be based. Even if it has the relevant factual information. an agency's 
view may be so myopic that outside feed-in is necessary to put the 
information properly in perspective and to give it meaning. 
Public participation in rule-making is important for another 
• John Murray Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1956, Brooklyn College; 
J.D. 1960, LL.M. 1961, Yale University.-Ed. 
This Article is based upon a report prepared by the author under the auspices 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The Conference, how-
ever, does not in any way approve it or evaluate its content, which is the sole respon• 
sibility of the author. The Administrative Conference has not yet taken action of any 
sort on this subject. The Conference was established by Congress in 1964 to study the 
efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of federal administrative practices and procedures. 
It is empowered to make recommendations for improvements in those procedures by 
which the administrative bodies of our national government determine private rights 
and obligations. See 5 u.s.c. §§ 571-76 (1970); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZA-
TION MANUAL 1970-71, at 394-95. 
I. On the following three paragraphs, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How of 
Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 527-30 
(1972); Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Government Contracts: The Procurement 
Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv. 171, 261-62 (1971). 
[ 222] 
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reason. Because agency staffs must synthesize the varying interests 
and competing policies that are related to the scheme they are 
charged with implementing, they cannot usually be relied upon to 
present forcefully, on their own motion, the views of environmental, 
consumer, minority, or other inadequately represented groups. And 
some agencies may not be trusted to vindicate the public interest 
without outside input because they may have been captured by those 
whose interests they regulate or represent. Furthermore, absent an 
ability of the concerned public to participate in the rule-making 
process and thereby prod the agencies, officials satisfied with the status 
quo may neglect to re-examine their positions in light of new views 
or information that becomes available. 
Through public participation, individuals can attempt to defend 
themselves against an exercise of rule-making power that may be 
detrimental to their interests and unwarranted or unnecessary. It 
also is one of the most effective ways by which such decision-making 
may be kept responsive to the wishes of the citizenry. Administrators 
will probably be more responsive to commonly felt needs and de-
sires if they must give interested people an opportunity to present 
their views before rules are finally promulgated. After all, agencies 
have an inducement to respond to the articulated needs of those who 
provide input into the process. Response to those needs will earn 
agencies the approbation of individuals or groups whose interests 
may be advanced or protected by such official action. Moreover, in 
some cases people may be less likely to sabotage a rule they dislike 
if they have had an adequate opportunity to present their objections 
to the relevant officials prior to its promulgation. 
According to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (AP A)2 
the term "rule-making" means "agency process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule."3 Another provision of the AP A 
provides: 
"[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general 
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the 
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or 
financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, ap-
pliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or 
accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.4 
2. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324-, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 
(1970). 
3. 5 u.s.c. § 551(5) (1970). 
4-. 5 u.s.c. § 551(4-) (1970). 
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The breadth of this statutory definition means that much may be 
swept within the compass of the terms "rule" and "rule-making" 
that might not, at first blush, ordinarily be deemed to constitute a 
"rule" or "rule-making." That fact should be kept in mind through-
out the remainder of this Article. 
For example, whether or not they affect the public in any way, 
day-to-day internal agency planning, operations, and administration 
that culminate in a fixed policy of any sort, contingent or otherwise, 
may be deemed "rule-making." The all-encompassing open-ended 
language defining a "rule" as "an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization" 
suggests the propriety of this conclusion. Nevertheless, much internal 
agency planning, administration, or operations of this sort may not, 
in the end, be treated as "rules" under the AP A despite this very 
broad language, for a large portion of these activities would not tra-
ditionally have been considered "rule-making."5 Indeed, a large part 
of the internal activities described above could, instead, constitute a 
sui generis species of unlabeled function not defined by the AP A and 
not meant to be within its ambit. The scope of the term "rule" used 
in the AP A may, therefore, be somewhat unclear at its fringes. 
This Article, however, will proceed on the assumption that all 
internal agency planning, administration, and operations culminating 
in a fixed policy of any sort, contingent or otherwise, would be 
deemed "rule-making" within the Act's literal language whether or 
not they substantially affect the public. In subsequent discussion, 
then, some things which arguably may not be "rule-making" will be 
treated as such because of the open-ended, broad definition of "rule" 
in the AP A, and the negative implications that can be drawn from 
existing exemptions in the rule-making section such as that for "gen-
eral statements of policy" and that for "rules" relating to "agency 
management or personnel."6 By clearly assuming that all such plan-
ning, operations, and administration resulting in a fixed policy of 
any sort are "rule-making" for purposes of this study, several possible 
objections to, and difficulties with, the ultimate point of this entire 
exercise may be avoided. As noted, however, this will be done with 
5. Despite the breadth of language in section 551(4), that provision was not in-
tended to convert into a rule anything not considered a rule prior to adoption of the 
APA. The traditional distinction between rule-making and adjudication is, therefore, 
continued under this provision despite the inclusion of the "or particular applicabil-
ity" phrase or the potentially limitless scope of the definition. See generally 1 K. 
DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.02 (1958). 
6. 5 U .S.C. §§ 553(a)(2), (b)(A) (1970). 
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the full recognition that, despite the broad statutory definition of 
"rule," much of this kind of internal agency planning, operations, 
and administration may be neither "rule-making" nor "adjudication" 
and, therefore, entirely outside the intended scope of the AP A. 
To assure adequate public participation in rule-making, section 
4 of the original Act, now section 553, provides mandatory pro-
cedures to be followed in all rule-making to which it applies. How-
ever, section 553(a) makes these procedures inapplicable "to the 
extent that there is involved-(!) a military or foreign affairs func-
tion of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency manage-
ment or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts." The categorical exclusions from section 553 for rule-
making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts," have been investigated and found to be unjustified,7 
with the result that the Administrative Conference of the United 
States8 and the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar 
Association9 have recommended that they be repealed. A bill has 
been introduced in Congress to accomplish this result.10 In the 
meantime, many federal agencies have voluntarily bound themselves 
to ignore the exemptions from usual rule-making procedures for 
rules relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or con-
tracts. "11 No comprehensive study, however, has yet been undertaken 
7. See Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recom-
mendation No. 16, in I ACUS, R.EcoMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 306 (1970). 
8. Recommendation No. 16, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA 
Rulemaking Requirements, in I ACUS, supra note 7, at 29 [hereinafter Recommenda-
tion No. 16]. 
9, Resolution No. 2, in Crowther, et al., Report to Council of Administrative Law 
Section of Special Committee on Revision of Administrative Procedure Act S (ABA 
1972) [hereinafter Crowther]. See also 95 ABA, REPORTS 548 (1970), in which the House 
of Delegates approved the recommendation that 
amendments should be enacted to the AJ! A in order to assure: Broadening the 
coverage of provisions for notice and opportunity for public participation in 
rulemaking where formal procedures are not required by limiting, in appropri-
ate instances, exemptions now included in the Administrative Procedure Act so 
far as it may be done without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to 
the public interest. 
10. S. 1413, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also 116 CONG, R.Ec. 6478-79 (1970) (re-
marks of Senator Kennedy). 
11. See 29 P. &: F. Ad. L. Newsletter, 2d Ser., No. 2, Sept. 21, 1971, at l (Department 
of the Treasury, Department of Labor, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 36 Fed. Reg. 
2532 (1971) (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); id. at 4291-92 (Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development); id. at 8336-37 (Department of the In-
terior); id. at 1!!804 (Department of Agriculture); id. at 16716 (Small Business 
Administration); letter from Donald Johnson to Senator James Eastland, Jan. 24, 
1972 (Veterans' Administration). See also 30 P. &: F. Ad. L. Newsletter, 2d Ser., No. 2, 
Feb. 22, 1972, at 91 (Veterans' Administration). See generally ACUS, 1971-72 R.EPoRT 
(1972): "About 20 departments or agencies have published rules or policy statements 
which commit the agency to the use of notice and comment rulemaking procedures 
in these areas." 
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with respect to the other section 553(a) categorical exemptions from 
the rule-making provision of the federal AP A-the exemption for 
rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs function," and 
the exemption for rule-making "relating to agency management or 
personnel." Only the former exemption will be the subject of this 
Article.12 
The question that will be considered here is whether the particu-
lar exemption from section 553 for rule-making involving a "military 
or foreign affairs function" is justified and should be continued. 
As noted earlier, strong reasons favor public participation in the 
administrative rule-making process. This exemption may, therefore, 
be justified only insofar as it is narrowly tailored to preserve, in a 
degree related to their comparative importance, other important 
conflicting public interests. Exemptions from an obligation other-
wise imposed on agencies to implement public participation in 
rule-making should be countenanced only to the extent to which 
they are necessary to preserve other values of equal or greater 
significance. 
II. THE EXEMPTION AND SECTION 553 
Section 553(b)-(d) attempts to assure that the public has an 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rule-making process. 
More specifically, section 553(b) requires that an agency contemplat-
ing the issuance of a substantive rule13 must publish a notice in the 
Federal Register of the proposed rule-making, indicating the time, 
place, and nature of the public rule-making proceedings, and a 
statement of the specific legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed.14 The agency must include either the actual provisions 
12. The desirability of the various exclusions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970) would 
seem most feasibly and wisely ascertained by a separate analysis of each. The exclu-
sions of section 553(a)(l) will, therefore, be examined as isolated, operable entities in 
order to determine whether they are independently justified. In doing so, this Article 
will proceed as if the "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" exclusion 
had been repealed, and as if the elimination of subsection (a)(l) would automatically 
subject that rule-making now excluded by it to the strictures of section 553, subject 
only to other existing exemptions found in that provision. 
13. Section 553(b)(A) expressly exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from the notice re-
quirements. See DEl'T. OF JusnCE, ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE AnMINISTRA• 
TIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r 30 (1947) [hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL], which states 
that this restricts the application of the notice and participation requirements in what 
is now 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1970) "to substantive rules issued pursuant to statutory 
authority," citing SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AnMINI5rRATIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r: 
LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1947) [hereinafter LEG-
ISLATIVE HisroRY]. 
14. The House Report on the AP A stated: "The required specification of legal 
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of the proposed rule, or a summary statement of the subjects or 
issues to which they relate. The notice "must be sufficient to fairly 
apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may 
present responsive data or arguments relating thereto" as they are 
entitled to do under section 553(c).15 The agency also has the option 
of dispensing with such publication if the notice requirement is 
functionally satisfied because all "persons subject thereto are named 
and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof 
in accordance with Iaw."16 
After giving notice, agencies are required by section 553(c) to 
accord interested persons a chance to participate in the particular 
rule-making "through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." In prac-
tice the procedure utilized 
may take a variety of forms: informal hearings (with or without a 
stenographic transcript), conferences, consultation with industry com-
mittees, submission of written views, or any combination of these . 
. . . In each case, the selection of the procedure to be followed will 
depend largely on the nature of the rules involved. The objective 
should be to assure informed administrative action and adequate 
protection to private interests.17 
It must be reiterated, however, that the statutory opportunity to 
submit "written data, views, or arguments with or without opportun-
ity for oral presentation" states only "the minimum requirement ..• 
of public rule making procedure."18 
An agency must review the materials presented to it in the course 
of public rule-making proceedings, and include in any rules resulting 
from this process a statement of their basis and purpose. "The agency 
must analyze and consider all relevant matter presented. The re-
quired statement of the basis and purpose of rules issued should not 
authority must be done with particularity. Statements of issues in the general statutory 
language of legislative delegations of authority to the agency would not be a compli-
ance with the section." LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra note 13, at 258. 
15. Id. at 200, 258. See also California Citizens Band Assn. v. United States, 375 
F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1967) (notice of rule-making is sufficient if it provides a de-
scription of subjects and issues involved, and agency is not required to publish every 
precise proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a rule). 
16. 5 u.s.c. § 553(b) (1970). 
17. ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31. The legislative history in-
dicates that section 553(c) "leaves agencies free to choose from the several common 
types of informal public rule making procedures, the simplest of which is to permit 
interested persons to submit written views or data •••• " LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra 
note 13, at 19. 
18. LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 259 (emphasis added). 
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only relate to the data so presented but with reasonable fullness 
explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule.''19 Nevertheless, it 
is clear that the statute "does not require the formulation of rules 
upon the exclusive basis of any 'record' made in informal rule-mak-
ing proceedings.''20 However, where statutes require a particular 
kind of rule to "be made on the record after an opportunity for an 
agency hearing,"21 other provisions of the AP A outlining more 
formal hearing requirements will govern that proceeding instead 
of these informal section 553 provisions;22 and in such a case, the 
rule must be made on the formal "record" so adduced. 
According to section 553(b)(B) neither the advance notice nor 
public participation requirements outlined above apply in those 
cases where "the agency for good cause finds ( and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules 
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." This provision will 
be discussed in more detail later in this Article. 
In addition to general notice of proposed regulations, and an 
opportunity for interested persons to communicate their views 
thereon to the relevant government officials, adequate public parti-
cipation in the rule-making process also requires that the exact terms 
of a new rule be published a reasonable time before its effective date. 
Otherwise, even if the public has participated in the preliminary 
formulation of a rule, the final details of its text may not be known 
to interested parties until the date of its promulgation as law. As a 
result, a procedure for delayed effectiveness is necessary "to correct 
error or oversight in regulations before, rather than after, they 
become effective.''23 Such a safeguard will "afford persons affected 
a reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule or rules 
or to take any other action which the issuance of the rules may 
prompt."24 
A further requirement may, therefore, be found in section 553(d) 
relating to the time period that agencies must allow between the pro-
19. Id. at 201, 259. 
20. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31, citing Hearings on S. 674, 
S. 675 and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 444 (1941) [hereinafter 1911 Hearings], which is limited authority for 
the otherwise sound conclusion of the Manual on this point because the testimony 
referred to is that of only a single person, Commissioner Aitcheson of the ICC. 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 55!1(c) (1970). 
22. 5 u.s.c. §§ 556-57 (1970). 
23. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMI'ITEE ON .Al>MINISl'RATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 
114 (1941). 
24. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 201, 259. 
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mulgation of a substantive rule and its effective date. It states that 
the required publication of a substantive rule under section 552, the 
freedom-of-information provision of the Act, must be made at least 
thirty days prior to its effective date.25 It is clear that the thirty-day 
notice provision is applicable even where the public rule-making 
procedures of section 553(b)-(c) are not because they are found to 
be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."26 
Exceptions are provided to this time requirement, however, for 
those situations in which the substantive rule "grants or recognizes 
an exemption or relieves a restriction."27 An exemption is also 
provided where the agency decides, "for good cause found and pub-
lished with the rule,"28 that a minimum thirty-day period between 
the time of a rule's publication and its taking effect is unnecessary. 
This last exemption will also be discussed in more detail later in 
this Article. 
All of the above requirements-advance public notice of rule-
making, opportunity to submit views, and delayed effectiveness of 
rules-are applicable only to substantive rules and not to rules of 
agency procedure.29 Nor are any of the above requirements applicable 
to "interpretative rules [or] general statements of policy."30 A report 
written under the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States examined the justification for the latter two exemp-
tions and found their continuation justified.81 The Conference itself, 
however, has taken no official action on the subject of that report. 
Meaningful public participation in the rule-making process would 
25. See AlTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 36: 
The discussion on section [553(d)l in the reports of both the Senate and House 
Committees on the Judiciary makes clear the phrase "The required publication 
or service of any substantive rule" does not relate back or refer to the publica-
tion of "general notice of proposed rule making'' required by section [553(b)]: 
rather it is a requirement that substantive rules which must be published in the 
Federal Register (see section [552(a)(l)(D)]) shall be so published at least thirty 
days prior to their effective date. 
The language of section 553(d) does, of course, lend itself readily to the opposite con-
struction, but it seems to have been construed only in the manner suggested by the 
Attorney General's Manual. See, e.g., Lansden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948). 
See also CoMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, 
TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 160 (1955). The congressional 
discussion referred to may be found in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 201, 259. 
26. LEGISLATIVE HISToRY, supra note Ill, at 200-01, 259. 
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l) (1970). 
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1970). 
29. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A), 553(d) (1970). 
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970). See also 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2) (1970). 
31. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of 
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L 
REv. 101 (1971). 
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also seem to demand recognition of another administrative obligation 
and private right. Interested parties should be able, on their own 
motion, to induce a reasoned consideration of the propriety of the 
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule by those authorized to make 
and modify rules. Otherwise, administrators satisfied with the status 
quo might neglect to re-examine their position in light of new views 
or information that becomes available. A right to petition is not only 
valuable as a protection for private interests, but is also necessary 
to assure sound government. It forces agencies to reconsider their 
position on existing or proposed rules in light of petitioners' objec-
tions, and therefore makes it more likely that wise policies will be 
pursued. 
Section 553(e) insists, therefore, that even if the notice, public 
participation, and delayed effectiveness requirements of section 553 
(b)-(d) are not applicable because they come within the "good cause" 
exceptions noted earlier, every agency must give interested persons 
"the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule"-substantive or otherwise. It seems clear, however, that the 
filing of such a petition does not itself require an agency to engage in 
a public rule-making proceeding on that subject.82 All the agency 
must do is to act on the petition in accordance with the procedures 
it has promulgated under other provisions of the AP A.88 The agency 
may, of course, either grant such a petition, undertake public rule-
making proceedings in relation to it, or deny the petition. The chief 
practical significance of this express right-to-petition requirement 
seems to be that the denial of a section 553(e) petition calls into play 
the provisions of section 555(e),84 which insist that 
[p]rompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of 
a written application, petition, or other request of an interested 
person . . . . Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial 
is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief state-
ment of the grounds for denial. 
No mention has yet been made of the exemptions contained in 
section 553(a) for rule-making that involves "a military or foreign 
affairs function," a "matter relating to agency management or per-
sonnel," or a matter relating to "public property, loans, grants, 
benefits, or contracts." The language of section 553(a) operates to 
32. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 38; LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra 
note 13, at 201, 260. 
33. 5 u.s.c. §§ 552(a}(l}(B)-(C) (1970); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 260. 
34. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 39, citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 13, at 201, 260, 
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exclude entirely, and without qualification, all rule-making in the 
categories enumerated therein from every provision of section 553 
(b)-(e). Consequently, in no case are any of the requirements imposed 
on administrative agencies by the provisions previously discussed 
applicable to these specifically exempted classes of rule-making. This 
means, for example, that unless some other statute specifically directs 
the contrary,35 agencies making rules involving a "military or foreign 
affairs function" of the United States are never obliged as a matter 
of law to (I) publish notice of proposed rule-making in the Federal 
Register according to the specifications of section 553(b); (2) give 
interested persons a chance to participate in the formulation of 
rules through submission of views or data, according to the terms of 
section 553(c); (3) publish substantive rules at least thirty days 
before their effective date as required by section 553(d); or (4) give 
interested persons "the right to petition for issuance, amendment or 
repeal of a rule," according to the terms of section 553(e).36 
The blanket section 553(a) provisions make no allowance what-
soever for the possibility that rules involving the excluded subjects 
may differ in their need to be exempted from one or more of the 
requirements of subsections (b)-(e). That is, section 553(a) does not 
recognize the possibility that certain rule-making involving a "mili-
tary or foreign affairs function" may need to be exempted from some 
of the subsection (b)-(e) requirements, and not from others. Simi-
larly, this exclusionary provision does not recognize that certain 
rule-making within its terms may need exemption from all of those 
requirements and other such rule-making from none of them. 
The exemptions currently found in section 553(a) obviously pro-
ceed upon the assumption that as to the exempt categories of subjects 
one can make an across-the-board judgment. The policies favoring 
public participation in rule-making are outweighed by the conse-
quences of subjecting these particular categories of rule-making to 
the requirements of subsections (b)-(e), or by the consequences of 
utilizing a more flexible approach to determine whether in any 
given case rule-making in these categories should be subjected to 
those requirements. In this Article, the validity of the assumption 
35. Another statute will control if it directs that certain kinds of rules relating, 
for example, to loans, grants, or benefits be made in accordance with the requirements 
of section 553(b)-(e). See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970). This conclusion is supported by a 
statement made during the congressional hearings on the AP A: "These exceptions 
would not, of course, relieve any agency from requirements imposed by other stat-
utes." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 199. 
36. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 39; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 13, at 199, 257. 
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underlying section 553(a) must be carefully examined and tested with 
respect to the particular section 553(a)(l) exemption for rule-making 
involving a "military or foreign affairs function." As noted earlier, 
such an assumption has already been rejected with respect to rule-
making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or con-
tracts." 
When rule-making is excepted from the requirements of section 
553(b)-(e) by section 553(a), agencies may use any rule-making pro-
cedure they please unless, of course, another statute specifies other-
wise. This means that with respect to rule-making involving a 
"military or foreign affairs function," it is completely up to the 
agency to decide whether there shall be any public participation in 
rule-making at all. And if the agency decides that some such partici-
pation is desirable, it may determine the form or extent of that 
participation. 
The legislative history of the AP A indicates that none of the 
blanket introductory exemptions from the section 
is to be taken as encouraging agencies not to adopt voluntary public 
rulemaking procedures where useful to the agency or beneficial to 
the public. The exceptions merely confer a complete discretion upon 
agencies to decide what, if any, public rulemaking procedures they 
will adopt in a given situation within their terms.87 
In practice, however, most agencies do not usually exercise their 
discretion to follow the requirements of section 553(b)-(e) when 
they are not bound to do so because the rule-making involves a 
"military or foreign affairs function." A survey distributed under 
the auspices of the Rulemaking Committee of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States during the summer of 1969 asked 
each federal agency: 
Does your department or agency follow the procedures specified by 
§ 553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking exempted from those provisions by 
§ 553(a)(l)-(2)? If it does, list the particular kinds of rulemaking 
exempted by § 553(a)(l)-(2). Explain. Also list the frequency with 
which it voluntarily follows those requirements for such exempted 
rulemaking, and the specific circumstances under which it does so. 
Responses to this question by those agencies reporting that they 
make rules involving a "military or foreign affairs function"88 reveal 
37. LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 199, 257. 
38. Agencies that responded to the 1969 Survey and indicated specifically that they 
made rules of the sort covered by the "military or foreign affairs function" exemption 
were the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Agriculture, Department of Com-
merce, Department of Defense, Federal Power Commission, Post Office Department, 
December 1972] Rule-Making 233 
a pattern with respect to such rule-making. The subsection (a)(l) 
exclusion of these specified types of rule-making from the mandatory 
procedural terms of section 553(b)-(e) means that most rule-making 
of this sort will not be conducted according to these procedures.89 
And while a number of agencies indicated that they engaged in a 
contrary practice with respect to some rules involving a "military 
or foreign affairs function,"40 such rule-making seems to account for 
only a small portion of the regulations of this type. 
The procedures actually utilized by administrators with respect 
to regulations involving a "military or foreign affairs function" are 
usually inadequate substitutes for those found in section 553(b)-(e). 
The I 969 Survey asked reporting agencies: 
What rulemaking procedures does your department or agency use 
in those cases where its rulemaking is exempted by § 553(a)(l)-(2) 
from the requirements of § 553(b)-(e) and it does not choose, in its 
and Treasury Department. The State Department must obviously be added to this 
group, but a questionnaire response from that agency has not yet been received. 
39. Consider, for example, the following responses: Atomic Energy Com.mission-
"The AEC does not follow the procedures specified by [section] 553(b)-(e) for the rule-
making described above, which is exempted from such procedures."; Department of 
Agriculture (Food for Peace Program)-"[TJhere is no formal published procedure for 
such rulemaking."; Department of Commerce (Domestic and International Business 
Bureau)-"No."; Department of Defense-"No."; Post Office Department-does not 
follow those procedures with respect to rules relating to international mail service 
or military mail service; Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control) 
-"does not follow the procedures specified by section 553(b)-(e) for any rulemaking 
exempted from those provisions by section 553(a).''; Department of the Treasury 
(Bureau of Accounts and Treasurer's Office)-"No.'' 
See also HOUSE COMM. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., Isr SESS., SURVEY 
AND STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRAcrICE IN THE FEDERAL 
AGENCIES (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter 1957 HOUSE SURVEY], pt. 3 (Department of 
Defense), at 267, 277, 324, 332, 3.47; pt. 9 (Department of State), at 931 ("The Education 
Exchange Service does not afford direct public participation when not required by 
statute.''), 944 (The Office of Special Consular Service "has not afforded public par-
ticipation in rulemaking when not required by statute to do so.'), 946 (The Passport 
Office "does not use advisory groups or invite public participation in rulemaking.'), 
951 ("Inasmuch as the publication of visa regulations is considered to be a foreign 
affairs function and, therefore, to be exempt from the requirement of general notice 
of proposed rulemaking, this Office has not established any procedure whereby inter-
ested parties may formally present their views and briefs.'). 
40. The following agencies responded with respect to the indicated programs that 
they usually did not rely on the section 553(a)(l) exemptions: Department of Agricul-
ture (Regulatory Division)-Regulations under the Defense Production Act of 1950, 
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970), and Regulations under the plant and auimal 
quarantine acts; Department of Commerce (Office of Direct Foreign Investments)-
Regulations under Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-39 (1970); Fed-
eral Power Commission-Regulations relating to export and import of electricity and 
natural gas, and construction, operation, or maintenance of certain energy facilities on 
the borders of the United States; Department of the Treasury-Regulations under 
treaties or the Internal Revenue Code dealing with international tax affairs. See also 
1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engi-
neers), at 286. 
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discretion, to follow§ 553(b)-(e)? Be as specific as possible. Include a 
concrete example of each of the different kinds of rulemaking pro-
cedures utilized by your department or agency when it does not fol-
low § 553(b)-(e) because the rulemaking involved is exempted by 
§ 553(a)(l)-(2). 
Responses indicate that substitute procedures are not always consis-
tent and frequently do not assure adequate notice to affected parties 
and a sufficient opportunity for their participation. In some cases 
involving rules of the type under consideration here, the agencies 
simply determine the rule they think appropriate and promulgate it, 
without first notifying or consulting with anyone outside of govern-
ment.41 In other such cases agencies give notice to, and engage in 
informal consultation with, whomever they deem appropriate under 
the circumstances.42 
41. E.g., Atomic Energy Commission-"AEC staff recommendations are presented to 
the Commissioners. These recommendations are then approved, disapproved, or ap• 
proved with modifications. If approved, they are promulgated as rules."; Department 
of Commerce (Domestic and International Business Bureau)-The Bureau simply 
"[p]repares the rule or regulation in the form prescribed by the Federal Register and 
has it published in the register."; Treasury Department (Bureau of Accounts and 
Treasurer's Office)-
When rulemaking involving one of the parts under consideration is exempted 
by [section] 553(a)(l)·(2), the Department publishes in the Federal Register the 
text of the revision or amendment of the part, prefaced by an introductory state• 
ment of the purpose therefor and of the specific exemption under which it has 
been determined that notice and public procedure thereon are unnecessary, with 
a statement of the immediate or soon impending effective date of the revision or 
amendment and the authority therefor. The foregoing procedure is used in all 
cases of rulemaking exempted by [section] 553(a)(l)-(2). 
See also 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292 
(Administration of the Resettlement Acts: "Public participation in the formulation of 
these regulations is not considered necessary or desirable."); pt. 9 (Department of 
State), at 946 (The Passport Office "does not use advisory groups or invite public par-
ticipation in rulemaking."). 
42. For example, the Department of Defense responded that "in the writing and 
coordination of [exempted] regulations affecting a segment of the public the suggestions 
and views of that segment are sometimes sought." Elsewhere it noted with respect 
to exempted regulations: 
[Such] regulations are promulgated in the Department of Defense in accordance 
with a concept of staff responsibility. Therefore, responsibility of initiating, draft-
ing, and issuing regulations lies with the staff agency primarily concerned with the 
subject matter of the proposed regulation. Almost all proposed regulations are 
staffed internally for comment by any organizational entity within the Department 
of Defense that has an official concern with its subject matter. On appropriate 
occasion, the views of other Executive Branch departments are also obtained. 
Modifications in the proposed "rule" are made to meet objections and suggestions 
for improvement. Unresolved disagreements between staff elements on the content 
of a regulation are normally forwarded to the approval authority for the regula-
tion, with recommendations for the resolution of the disagreement through a policy 
decision on the point or points in issue. 
The initiation of a regulation or a regulation change is frequently stimulated 
by criticism, objections, or suggestions by members of Congress, the information 
media, or the public at large. 
Responses from other agencies include: Department of Agriculture (Foreigu Agri-
culture and Special Programs Divisions)-"The Department, in connection with such 
rulemaking, seeks advice from advisory committees composed of representatives of 
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Of course, some credit should be given to the appropriate agencies 
for those cases in which they do utilize section 553 procedures for 
the exempted rule-making, or use substitute procedures that in fact 
assure adequate notice to affected parties and a sufficient opportunity 
for their participation. However, the procedures actually utilized for 
much of the rule-making involving a "military or foreign affairs 
function" often result in the following undesirable consequence: per-
sons who should be apprised of such proposed rule-making, and be 
given an opportunity to participate therein, are not so apprised, or 
afforded an adequate chance to communicate their views. To the 
extent that this occurs without a justification sufficient to warrant 
that result, it should not be tolerated. As noted previously, the rea-
sons supporting the section 553(b)-(e) requirements for public par-
ticipation in rule-making are very compelling. The potential damage 
to sound government policy formulation and to private rights is great 
in any case where such participation is not assured. The scope and 
importance of the subsection (a)(l) exemption under examination 
here and the specific reasons advanced for its existence must, there-
fore, be examined with special care. 
III. THE SCOPE AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF 
THE SECTION 553(a)(l) EXEMPTION 
A. Generally 
A few general comments should be made about the linguistic 
form in which subsection (a)(l) is cast. By its terms, section 553(a)(l) 
only excludes rule-making from section 553(b)-(e) "to the extent 
that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States." The legislative history emphasizes the "to the ex-
tent" language, stating that section 553(a) exemptions "apply only 
various segments of the public affected by specific programs and, on occasion, consults 
with representatives of affected members of the public."; Post Office Department-
"Rulemaking by negotiation [with foreign governments] is used most frequently in 
international postal matters, [and with the Department of Defense] in developing reg-
ulations for postal service to the Armed Forces."; Department of the Treasury-
"Wherever possible, it is the practice of the Office of Foreign Assets Control to hold 
informal consultations with interested groups or persons before the issuance of rules 
changing aspects of the Control." 
See also 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 951 (In 
lieu of adherence to section 553 procedures "it has been the practice of the [visa] office 
to confer with representatives of other public agencies as well as private voluntary 
agencies, and to solicit their comments on proposed regulations. In addition, repre-
sentatives of the Visa Office meet periodically with representatives of the private volun-
tary agencies for the purpose of discussing specific visa problems and procedures."), 
931 (In lieu of adherence to section 553 the Education Exchange Service consults with 
the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the Advisory Commission.). 
236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:221 
'to the extent' that the excepted subject matter is clearly and directly 
involved."43 This suggests that where an agency makes some rules 
that come within these introductory exemptions and some rules 
that do not, it may ignore the procedures of subsections (b)-(e) 
in the former cases but must follow them in the latter. Even a single 
scheme of proposed regulations must abide by this principle if it is 
practically divisible into particular provisions that involve the ex-
cluded functions and ones that do not. The report of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary on the bill that was to become the 
Administrative Procedure Act stated that the proposed legislation 
has avoided the mistake of attempting to over-simplify the measure. 
It has therefore not hesitated to state functional classifications and 
exceptions where those could be rested upon firm grounds. In so 
doing, it has been the undeviating policy to deal with types of func-
tions as such and in no case with administrative agencies by name. 
Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, hut not the 
War or Navy Departments in the performance of their functions.44 
Every federal agency is, therefore, exempted from the usual 
section 553 requirements to the extent that it performs the listed 
functions. Drafters of the statute stated that "[w]here one agency has 
shmvn that some particular operation should be exempted from any 
particular requirement, the same function in all agencies has been 
exempted."45 Moreover, the particular purpose or effect of the rules 
involving either of the excepted functions under examination is 
irrelevant since all such regulation-making is excepted from section 
553 by subsection (a)(l). 
On the other hand, rule-making is arguably not exempt under 
subsection (a)(l) unless it "directly" or "clearly and directly" relates 
to the excluded subject matter.46 This language drawn from the 
43. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 257. See also id. at 199. 
44. Id. at 191. See also id. at 13, reporting a comment made on an earlier draft 
of the APA: 
It is suggested that all functions of the War and Navy Departments as well as of 
the Army and Navy should be exempted. However, since the bill relates to func-
tions rather than agencies, it would seem better to define functions. All depart-
ments may, and often do, exercise civil and regulatory powers which should be 
subject to an administrative procedure statute. 
This seems to be the position adopted by Congress when it finally enacted the APA. 
45. Id. at 250. 
46. Id. at 199, 257. "Directly" is the language from the Senate Report on the APA, 
and "clearly and directly'' from the House Repon. See also AnoRNEY GENERAL'S MAN• 
UAL, supra note 13, at 26: 
The exemption for military and naval functions is not limited to activities of the 
War and Navy Departments but covers all military and naval functions exercised 
by any agency. Thus, the exemption applies to the defense functions of the Coast 
Guard and to the function of the Federal Power Commission under section 202(c) 
of the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C. § 824a{c) (1970)]. 
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statute's legislative history suggests that rule-making only indirectly 
or tangentially related to the exempted functions is not to be treated 
as within the exemptions, and that close cases should be treated as 
outside the exemption. There are additional strong reasons to con-
strue the introductory exceptions narrowly, and to resolve close 
cases by treating them as outside the intended scope of the "military 
and foreign affairs function" exclusion. Most important is the fact 
that the subsection (a)(l) exemptions are cast in the form of broad, 
unqualified exceptions to provisions implementing an important gen-
eral governmental policy favoring public participation in rule-
making. Each of these usually operative provisions individually 
contain special, detailed exemptions for peculiar cases. In addition, a 
principal reason for the enactment of the AP A was to secure some 
standardization of administrative procedure.47 Exceptions from any 
of its provisions should, therefore, usually be construed narrowly to 
achieve that result. 
Narrow construction of these exemptions is further supported by 
the statute's legislative history. The Senate and House Reports on 
the AP A specifically stated that the "foreign affairs function" exemp-
tion, for example, "is not to be loosely interpreted. "48 This led one 
commentator to suggest that "Congress intended general application 
of the AP A, subject only to individual instances of exemption when 
foreign affairs functions become implicated in particular proceed-
ings. "49 Our prior discussion may also suggest that despite the usual 
presumption of administrative regularity, 50 the burden of proving 
that particular agency rule-making is exempted from section 553 
because it involves a "military or foreign affairs function" should be 
on the agency. That this is so as a matter of law, however, is less 
than clear. We will return to this subject again later. 
Significantly, this exemption from usual rule-making require-
ments only attaches "to the extent there is involved . . . a military 
or foreign affairs function." This seems a narrower exemption than 
that found in section 553(a)(2) for rule-making wherein "there is in-
volved ... a matter relating to agency management or personnel or 
47. McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in THE 
FEDERAL ADMINISl'RATIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 16, 22 (G. 
Warren ed. 1947) [hereinafter G. WARREN]. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 
33, 41 (1950). See also LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 187, 249. 
48. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 199, 257. 
49. Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Direct Foreign Invest-
ment, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1970). 
50. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 11.06; I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 355, 
360 (1965). 
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to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." An attempt 
to minimize the significance of the additional "relating to" language 
in subsection (a)(2) of the statute can be made by arguing that there 
is little if any difference between rule-making where there is "in-
volved" a certain stipulated matter and rule-making where there is 
"involved ... a matter relating to" that stipulated matter. Since there 
is ordinarily a difference in meaning between these phrases, and the 
inclusion of the phrase "relating to" in subsection (a)(2) is unneces-
sary except as a contrast to subsection (a)(l) in which it is omitted, a 
conclusion that the usage only constitutes a choice of style and does 
not affect content seems difficult to accept. The lesson to be drawn 
from this would seem to be in accord with the legislative history 
referred to earlier. Only rule-making "directly" and intimately in-
volving a "military or foreign affairs function" is meant to be ex-
empted from usual rule-making procedures. 
Nevertheless, the language of the section 553(a)(l) exemption is 
very broad. The functions excluded are written in terms easily 
susceptible to wide application. The following discussion will, there-
fore, attempt to state the main thrust of each of the section 553(a)(l) 
exclusions and to provide examples of rule-making they may be 
deemed to exclude. 51 One last point is relevant, however, to any 
effort to define the scope of these exemptions with precision. 
Rule-making exempted by the "military and foreign affairs 
function" provision of section 553(a)(l) overlaps to a considerable 
extent with the rule-making also exempted from section 553 by the 
"agency management or personnel, or public property, loans, grants, 
benefits, or contracts" provision of section 533(a)(2). Consider, for 
example, rule-making with respect to Department of Defense prop-
erty used in military functions. Rule-making of that sort is exempted 
from section 553 by both the "military function" exclusion of section 
553(a)(l) and the "public property" exclusion of section 553(a)(2). 
An overlap also exists between the "military function" exemption 
51. Data with respect to the manner in which administrators actually construe these 
exemptions in their everyday affairs have been obtained from the 1969 Survey. One 
question asked: 
What rulemaking does your department or agency engage in that is exempted 
from the requirements of §§ 553(b)-(e) by §§ 553(a)(l)-(2)? Be as specific as possible 
by listing the particular programs you administer whose rulemaking is exempt, and 
for each such program the particular part or parts of §§ 553(a)(l)-(2) under which it 
is exempted. Where some rulemaking for a particular progam is exempt and some 
not, indicate which kinds of rulemaking for that program are exempt and which 
kinds are not. Very briefly describe the purpose of each such exempted or par-
tially-exempted program and provide citations to the statutes under which it 
is administered. 
Most of the illustrations of exempted rule-making used in the following section are 
drawn from the questionnaire responses. 
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and the "foreign affairs function" exemption, since many military 
operations of our government are intimately related to, and a part 
of, the nation's foreign affairs program. A consequence of this over-
lap is that there has been little pressure on the agencies concerned 
or on the courts to define the precise scope of the "military function" 
exemption, for example, as an exclusion with operative effect dis-
tinguishable and distinct from the exemptions for "agency manage-
ment or personnel," "public property," "contracts," or "foreign 
affairs." 
When the Department of Defense was asked what proportion of 
its procurement regulations came under each separable exemptive 
portion of section 553(a)(l)-(2), it replied: 
It would be very difficult to allocate the proportion of procurement 
regulations assignable to each of the categories of this question. In 
a fundamental sense [however] all regulations and directives of the 
Department are incident to its essentially military function of na-
tional defense.62 
The Department answered in this manner despite the fact that such 
procurement regulations are also obviously exempt from section 553 
as a "matter relating to public ... contracts" under subsection (a)(2). 
Similarly, the United States Navy Judge Advocate General has stated 
with respect to the Department of the Navy that "matters of agency 
management and personnel are, in the case of this Department, 'mili-
tary functions'" and that "[t]hose regulations specifically commanded 
of the Secretary of the Navy by Statute fall easily into either the 
exception for military functions or the one for agency management 
or personnel .... "63 
Since the overlap between the various section 553(a) exemptions 
has resulted in a conspicuous absence of authoritative constructions 
of each of them as separate entities, the following effort to state 
the main thrust of the "military function" exemption and the 
"foreign affairs function" exemption is to some extent speculative. 
After an examination of the legislative history and the language of 
each exemption, some possible rules of construction will be suggested 
by which their individual scope may be defined. Illustrations of rule-
making arguably within the ambit of each exemption will then be 
supplemented by an analysis of the exclusion's significance, measured 
in terms of its practical exemptive impact. For definitional purposes 
the following discussion will assume that the particular exemptions 
52. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 278. 
53. 1969 Smvey Response (Department of Defense). 
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under examination are exclusive; their scope will be examined with-
out regard to the fact that some rule-making within their ambit 
may also be exempt under other portions of section 553(a). 
B. "Military Function" 
Rule-making is exempted by subsection (a)(l) from the require-
ments of section 553(b)-(e) "[t]o the extent that there is involved ... 
a military . . . function of the United States." It should be em-
phasized that section 553(a)(l) does not exempt all rule-making to 
the extent the "military" is involved. What is exempted, rather, is 
rule-making that implicates "military functions." Rule-making in-
volving any "function" that is "military" is entirely excluded from 
the requirements of the rule-making provision. Whosoever performs 
the "function" that is "military" is exempt to the extent of that 
performance. Obviously, there is a substantial difference between an 
exemption for rule-making "clearly and directly" involving the "mili-
tary," and an exemption for rule-making "clearly and directly" 
involving a "military function." As noted earlier, the legislative 
history of the statute demonstrates that this distinction was fully 
understood and relied upon in drafting the AP A. The drafters in-
tended to deal with "types of functions as such and in no case with 
administrative agencies by name. "54 
The term "military" is defined by Websters as "of or relating 
to, soldiers, arms, or war ... belonging to, engaged in, or appropriate 
to the affairs of war ... performed or made by armed forces."155 
Random House defines military as "of, for, or pertaining to the 
army, armed forces, affairs of war, or a state of war" or "of or per-
taining to soldiers . . . performed by soldiers . • . befitting, charac-
teristic of, or noting a soldier."56 The term "function" may be 
defined as "the action for which a person or thing is specially fitted, 
used, or responsible or for which a thing exists: The activity ap-
propriate to the nature or position of a person or thing." "Function" 
signifies the "acts, activity, or operations expected of a person or 
thing by virtue of his or its nature, structure, status, or position. "51 
The definitional problem comes to this. The term "military 
function" might encompass rule-making "clearly and directly" in-
volved in (I) matters specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected 
54. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 191. See also id. at 13. 
55. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1433 (1966) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER'S]. 
56. R.ANnoM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 909 (1966), 
57. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 920-21, 
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of the armed forces in light of their peculiar nature and qualifica-
tions, or (2) matters specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected 
of war and preparation for war generally; or it might encompass 
both. Some things "clearly" expected of, appropriate to, or specially 
fitted for war or preparation for war would not be "clearly" expected 
of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the armed forces as such; 
and some things "clearly" expected of, appropriate to, or specially 
fitted for the armed forces would not be considered as such for war 
or preparation for war. For example, it may be argued that national 
rationing is "directly" involved in, specially fitted for, and ap-
propriate to the waging of war. Yet, the armed forces are not specially 
suited, by their peculiar nature and qualifications, to create or 
administer such a program; nor is it "clearly" an appropriate activity 
for the armed forces as such. 
There is some reason to argue that the term "military function" 
was used exclusively in the first sense noted above. Congress could 
have, had it so intended, used the term "war function" or "national 
defense function," rather than "military function," if it wished to 
indicate unambiguously a broader range of rule-making activity to 
be exempted than that usually expected of, or deemed peculiarly 
appropriate to the armed forces. Furthermore, the more colloquial use 
of the term "military" probably denotes something related to the 
armed forces rather than something related to war or preparation for 
war generally. 
In construing the term "military function," of what relevance, if 
any, is the fact that section 551(1) (F)-(H) specifically exempts from 
the entire AP A "courts martial and military commissions," "military 
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied terri-
tory," and functions conferred under a number of enumerated 
statutes relating to war and national defense matters?58 Do these ex-
press exclusions from the entire Act suggest anything about the pre-
cise scope of the exemptions for matters involving a "military func-
tion" found in both the rule-making and the adjudication provi-
sions?59 Some clues may be drawn from a more complete excursion 
into the legislative history of the AP A. 
A provision in an earlier draft of the AP A would have expressly 
excluded from almost the entire Act "war and defense functions" 
arising out of the Second World War, and scheduled to terminate 
shortly thereafter. The provision (section 13) stated: 
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 55l(l)(F)·(H) (1970). 
59. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (1970). 
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Except as to the requirements of section 3 [the freedom of in-
formation section], there shall be excluded from the operation of 
this Act war and defense functions which by law expire on the ter-
mination of present hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, 
or before July I, 1947, as well as those conferred by the following: 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940; Contract Settlement Act 
of 1944; Surplus Property Act of 1944 [and so forth].60 
This section was to be in addition to the specific "military function" 
exemptions from the rule-making and adjudication provisions.61 It 
was suggested, however, that section 13 should be deleted. As a 
substitute, the definition of "agency" in section 2(a) of the proposed 
act should be amended to expressly exclude from the Act's coverage 
"war and defense functions which by law expire on the termination 
of present hostilities," and "courts martial, military or naval author-
ity exercised in the field in the time of war or in occupied territory, 
and the functions conferred by the following statutes." The purpose 
of this suggestion was "to remove any question of the application of 
the [ entire AP A] to purely military functions." 62 
The result of the above suggestions with respect to an earlier 
version of the AP A was that proposed section 2(a) was amended so 
that, when finally adopted by Congress, it provided: 
Except as to the requirements of section 3 [the freedom of informa-
tion section], there shall be excluded from the operation of this Act 
•.. (2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) military or naval 
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory, 
or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present 
hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before July 1, 1947, 
and the functions conferred by the following statutes: Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940; Contract Settlement Act of 1944; 
Surplus Property Act of 1944.63 
The addition of section 2(a)(2) relating to courts martial not "exer-
cised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory" might have 
been the result of doubt about whether the term "military function" 
used later in the Act would clearly cover such tribunals in those 
cases. A suggestion had been made with respect to an earlier draft 
of what has now become section 553(a)(I) that "[t]he phrase 'military 
60. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 43. 
61. See id. at 17, 21. 
62. Id. at 43-44. 
63. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 2(a), 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 
5 u.s.c. § 551(1) (1970)). 
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functions' should be clarified, particularly for the purpose of includ-
ing within it all proceedings relating to court martial."64 
It may be contended that the exclusionary term "military func-
tion" that appears in the rule-making and adjudication provisions of 
the AP A is congruent with the much more specific exemptions that 
were finally included in AP A section 2(a)(2)-(4) "to remove any 
question of the application of the [entire APA] to purely military 
functions." There are, however, serious objections to this approach to 
construing the term "military function" as it is used in section 
553(a)(l). The legislative history relied on is at best muddy in mean-
ing and small in quantity. There is no evidence that the several 
specific exclusions from the entire AP A found in its section 2(a)(2)-(4) 
were intended to constitute an exclusive and exhaustive catalogue of 
"military functions." Any effort to confine the meaning of "military 
function" to those functions excluded by section 2(a)(2)-(4) is also 
at odds with the normal meaning of the former term. Most things ex-
cluded from the AP A by section 2(a)(2)-(4) are clearly "military 
functions"; but it is equally clear that the term "military function" 
has a broader connotation than, for example, merely courts martial 
and orders of military commanders in the field in time of war. 
In addition, if the enumerated section 2(a)(2)-(4) exclusions were 
meant to be exhaustive of all "military functions," why include the 
more generally phrased, therefore potentially broader scoped, "mili-
tary function" exemptions in the rule-making and adjudication pro-
visions of the same act? Those latter exclusions would have been 
superfluous if section 2(a)(2)-(4) already excluded from virtually the 
entire Act, including the rule-making and adjudication provisions, all 
that the term "military function" was meant to exclude. The term 
"military function" must, therefore, have been intended to encom-
pass more than the specifically enumerated functions listed in AP A 
section 2(a)(2)-(4), but not necessarily to include all those functions. 
The most likely reason for adding the courts martial and military 
field authority in time of war exclusions to the definition of "agency" 
in section 2(a) was that the drafters deemed it necessary to exclude 
those particular "military functions" from all provisions of the AP A 
except section 3-the freedom-of-information provision. Standing 
alone, the "military function" exemptions of AP A sections 4 and 5 
would have excluded those particular enumerated functions from 
64. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 17. See also id. at 22, to the same effect 
with regard to the same exemption in the adjudication section of the APA. 
244 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:221 
only the rule-making and adjudication provisions of the Act but not, 
for example, from the judicial review provision, section 10.65 
A further point should be made with respect to the exclusion of 
other war-related functions from virtually the entire Act by AP A 
section 2(a)(4)-functions that would expire at the termination of the 
Second World War, or soon thereafter, and functions conferred by 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Contract Settlement 
Act of 1944, and Surplus Property Act of 1944. It is certainly not 
apparent that when the exemptions for these enumerated subjects 
were added to the proposed AP A section 2(a) definition of "agency," 
they were all deemed to be "military functions" as such. Despite the 
one shred of evidence to the contrary, 66 the legislative history is not 
clear that every function that would expire at the termination of the 
Second World War or within any fixed period thereafter, or every 
function conferred by the specifically enumerated war statutes, was 
viewed as a "military function." 
Not all "war or defense"67 functions of the type listed in 2(a)(4) 
are necessarily "military functions," since many may be only in-
directly or tangentially linked to a mission specifically fitted for, 
appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces. Was civilian price 
control and rationing administered by the OP A during the Second 
World War, and scheduled by law to expire at its termination or at 
a specified date thereafter,68 a "military function"? Probably not, if 
we resort to the more probable meaning of "military," because it did 
not "clearly and directly" involve activities normally deemed within 
the special capacity and expertise of the armed forces because of their 
peculiar attributes or nature. 
The real reason for the exemption of these particular functions 
in section 2(a)(4) appears to have been something other than a con-
cern that all "military functions" should be exempted from the Act. 
"[I]t would take at least a year for any adequate [Administrative 
Procedure Act] proposal to be placed in operation."69 As a result, 
65. Section IO of the original APA did not separately define "agency" as does its 
current codification, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). The definition found in section 70I(b)(l) 
includes an identical reproduction of that found in section 55l(l)(F)·(H). 
66. See text accompanying note 62 supra. 
67. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 43. Section 13 of the proposed Act used 
the term "war and defense functions" to describe the specific functions later exempted 
by APA§ 2(a)(4). 
68. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. 
69. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 43. See also Freedman, supra note 49, 
at 6: "Prior to 1966, the AP A excluded from its reach 'functions which by law expire 
on the termination of present hostilities.' • • • ['T]he revision of the AP A in 1966 
resulted in the deletion of the phrase 'functions which by law expire on the termina-
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"war agencies" could not comply with the requirements of this 1946 
statute, or it was believed that they should not be put to the expense 
of complying with it in carrying out these particular enumerated 
functions, since these functions would expire shortly. A decision was 
made on this basis, therefore, to exempt the specific functions in 
question from virtually the entire Act-without any implication that 
they were or were not "military functions." 
In light of this discussion, it appears that section 2(a) of the AP A, 
now section 551(1), does not help to define, in any more precise 
way, the scope of the term "military function" as it is used in section 
553(a)(l). It might also be worth considering, however, whether lan-
guage used in the 1967 revision of the freedom-of-information pro-
vision of the AP A,70 section 552, is relevant to the construction of 
"military function" in the rule-making provision. The new freedom-
of-information provision contains an exemption for matters that are 
"specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of the national defense or foreign policy."71 This provision 
was enacted subsequent to the AP A and, therefore, is not of direct 
relevance to any original congressional intention with respect to the 
scope of the term "military £unction" used in the rule-making and 
adjudication provisions. It may, however, indicate Congress' more 
recent impression as to the meaning of that term. 
Why, for instance, did Congress exempt from section 552 matters 
that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret 
in the interest of national defense"? I£ section 553(a)(l) language were 
used, Congress would have exempted from the new freedom-of-in-
formation provision matters that are "specifically required to be kept 
secret by Executive order in the interest of the proper performance 
of military functions." Did Congress consider what, if any, difference 
in scope inhered in the term "military function" as compared to the 
term "national defense" or "national defense function"? Nothing has 
been found in the legislative history to suggest that this particular 
question was even considered.72 
Indeed, it seems reasonably clear that in choosing language for 
the above exemption from the freedom-of-information provision, 
Congress was exclusively concerned with assuring some conformity to 
tion of present hostilities.' The Reviser's Notes explain that the phrase was omitted 
'as executed.'" See 5 U.S.C. § 551, Historical and Revision Notes (1970). 
70. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(1970)). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970) (emphasis added). 
72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
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a pre-existing Executive Order-more precisely, Executive Order 
10501 of November 5, 1953, entitled "Safeguarding Official Informa-
tion in the Interest of the Defense of the United States."73 This Order 
stated that government information requiring "protection in the 
interests of national defense" was to be limited to three classification 
categories: top secret, secret, or confidential. It went on to provide: 
"No other designation shall be used to classify defense information, 
including military information, as requiring protection in the inter-
ests of national defense, except as expressly provided by statute."74 
This seems to suggest that "national defense," as used in the Execu-
tive Order, was understood to be broader in scope than the term 
"military." Further possible corroboration exists in the context of 
this Executive Order for the notion that "national defense" con-
noted a broader range of matters than the term "military." The in-
formation described in the Order as requiring protection in the 
interests of "national defense" included information the disclosure 
of which might lead to "a war, or the compromise of military or 
defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological 
developments vital to national defense."75 
Since the "national defense" exclusion from the freedom-of-in-
formation provision was based upon the above Executive Order, there 
is reason to assume that when Congress enacted section 552, it used 
the term "national defense" in the same way-as a broader notion 
than "military," the latter, however, being assumed to be included 
within the former. Webster's defines "defense" as "capability of re-
sisting attack ... practice or manner of self protection."76 The provi-
sion of grants to educate college students in fields that are helpful to 
the capacity of our country to protect itself and resist attack involves 
a "national defense" function; but it is not likely to be considered 
as involving a "military function" within the meaning of section 
553(a)(I). Similarly, construction of the interstate highway system 
or the general stockpiling of strategic raw materials may be viewed 
as part of the "national defense" function but should not properly 
be deemed to involve a "military function." These examples do not 
"clearly" involve an activity expected of, appropriate to, or specially 
suited for the armed forces because of their peculiar attributes or 
qualifications; they do, however, "clearly" involve our capacity to 
resist attack and our manner and practice of self protection. 
73. Id. at 9-10. 
74. Exec. Order No. 10501, § 1, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1972) (emphasis added). 
75. Exec. Order No. 10501, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 306. 
76. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 591. 
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This discussion seems to suggest two things. First, as a matter 
of common usage and understanding, the term "national defense" 
may easily be applied to a broader scope of governmental activity 
than the term "military function." Second, Congress probably did 
not directly consider the relationship between the term "national de-
fense," which appears in the freedom-of-information provision, and 
the term "military function," which is used in the rule-making and 
adjudication provisions. Its use of a term in section 552 that is incon-
sistent with that used to exempt some related matters in the rule-
making and adjudication provisions seems, therefore, to be of little 
significance when viewed in isolation. However, in adopting section 
552 Congress probably did intend the term "national defense" to be 
broader than the term "military function" because it desired to adopt 
the principles embodied in an existing executive order which 
seemed to have recognized such a distinction. This indicates that in 
1967, when Congress amended the already recodified APA, it would 
probably have read the section 552 term more expansively than the 
section 553(a)(I) term. 
This conclusion is, of course, not mandatory. Both at the time 
the APA was adopted in 1946 and at the time the new freedom-of-
information provision was added in 1967, Congress might have be-
lieved the terms "national defense" and "military" function to be 
fungible. Certainly a number of federal agencies have thought that 
these terms are synonymous;77 and there is no authoritative judicial 
construction of the terms to the contrary. 
In this connection it should be noted that the precise exemptive 
language used in the rule-making provision of the original AP A, 
section 4,78 and in the adjudication provision, section 5,79 was any 
"military, naval or foreign affairs function." The AP A was recodi-
fied in 1966 without any intention of changing its substance.80 At that 
time the word "naval" was omitted in both provisions because it was 
considered to be included within the term "military."81 In omitting 
the term "naval" on this basis Congress obviously meant to reject any 
notion that the word "military" meant "of or related to the army-
distinguished from naval."82 Obviously, also, Congress believed 
77. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 90-93 &: II0 infra. 
78. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 4, 60 Stat. 238, as amended, 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (emphasis added). 
79. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. 239, as amended, 5 
U.S.C. § 554 (1970) (emphasis added). 
80. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383. 
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 553, Historical and Revision Notes (1970). 
82. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1433. 
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that the term "naval" used in section 4 of the original AP A and 
deemed by it to be included within the term "military," was in-
tended solely in its military sense-"of, relating or belonging to, 
connected with or used in a navy,"83 and not in its general maritime 
sense-"of or relating to ships or shipping" generally.84 
It has been asserted that since "the statutes governing the Coast 
Guard constitute it a military organization ... the authorized rules 
for its governance would clearly fall in the first category" of section 
553(a)(l)-rules involving a "'military function."85 Similarly, a: 
"special notice" or rule issued by the Coast Guard that restricted 
access to a portion of a harbor during the launching of a Polaris 
missile firing submarine of the United States Navy was held to be 
"within the exception to [section 4 of the AP A] for 'any military, 
naval, or foreign affairs function of the United States.' "86 These 
examples seem to be consistent with a construction of the term 
"military function" that is narrower than the term "national de-
fense" function. However, in a statement regarding a draft of the 
proposed AP A section 4, the Attorney General of the United States 
stated: "The term 'naval' in the first exception clause is intended to 
include the defense functions of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of 
Marine Inspection and Navigation.''87 This seeming equation of 
"defense function" with "military function" may be of no signifi-
cance, or it may suggest that any attempt to distinguish between 
these terms here is improper. 
Of interest in this connection is the holding of McBride v. Ro-
land.88 It suggests that a denial by the Coast Guard Commandant 
of a special validation endorsement of the plaintiff's merchant 
mariner's documents on the grounds that his presence aboard a 
civilian ship would be inimical to the national security was not 
governed by the AP A because this decision came within the excep-
tions of sections 4 and 5 for "naval or military affairs."89 The func-
tion being performed by the Coast Guard in this circumstance was 
a "national defense" function. But did it "clearly and directly" in-
83. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1508. 
84. Id. 
85. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 10 (Department of the Treasury), at 1017. 
See also United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1962) (Coast Guard is a 
military service). 
86. 310 F.2d at 348 n.3. 
87. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 225 (emphasis added). 
88. 248 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
89. 248 F. Supp. at 465. 
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volve an activity specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of 
the armed forces as such, because of their peculiar nature, attributes, 
or qualifications? Is the exclusion of seamen from civilian ships in 
the interest of national security really an activity of this type? Per-
haps so, in light of the fact that both the Navy and the Coast Guard 
must be considered armed forces. But if this conclusion is wrong, 
McBride would suggest that the scope of the term "military func-
tion" may be congruent with the potentially broader term "defense 
function." 
A number of agencies seem to have taken the view that "military 
function" is synonymous with "national defense function" or "war 
function." Agencies have read the section 553(a)(l) term "military 
function" as applying to anything involving, and not necessarily 
"clearly and directly," activities expected of, appropriate to, or 
specially fitted for war or preparation for war generally, as well 
as activities expected of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the 
armed forces as such because of their peculiar nature, structure, or 
capacity. In addition, agencies have sometimes construed "military 
function" to mean anything involving or affecting the armed forces, 
rather than as anything "clearly and directly" involving an armed 
forces "function." Consequently, there is no general agreement as to 
the precise scope of the "military function" exemption. The follow-
ing examples demonstrate, however, that in practice section 553(a)(I) 
is construed in a number of different ways-and frequently very 
broadly. 
For instance, the Federal Power Commission reported in 1969: 
The Commission's functions which appear to come within the 
"military function" exemption of 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(I) include: (I) its 
emergency power pursuant to section 202(c) of the Federal Power 
Act to order temporary connection of electric facilities and to re-
quire generation, delivery, interchange or transmission of electric 
energy; (2) those under section 16 of the Federal Power Act which 
authorizes the United States to take temporary possession of licensed 
hydroelectric projects for the purpose of manufacturing nitrates, ex-
plosives or munitions of war; (3) to the extent that a war emergency 
is involved, the Commission's authority under section 7(c) of the 
Natural Gas Act to issue temporary certificates of public convenience 
and necessity to construct and operate facilities of a natural gas 
company. With respect to these "military functions", the Commission 
would agree that the present policy of the Administrative Procedure 
Act exempts it from the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553 
(b)-(e), since in time of war, the public interest may require the use 
of certain hydroelectric facilities for military purposes, the alloca-
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tion of electric or natural gas energy to meet emergency demands 
and/or the reestablishment of disrupted utility services with the ut-
most dispatch.90 
Similarly, the Department of Agriculture has noted that "the only 
rulemaking [in which it engages] that might involve a 'military 
function' as mentioned in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(l), would be, possibly, 
regulations under the Defense Production Act [ of 1950]" dealing 
with expansion of civilian productive capacity to provide for "na-
tional defense."91 In 1969 the Post Office Department claimed that 
in the "implementation of the statutes relating to postal services for 
the Armed Forces," its rule-making was exempt from section 553 by 
the subsection (a)(l) "military function" exclusion.92 And the 
Atomic Energy Commission stated that its "rulemaking relating to 
permits for Access to Restricted Data . . . insofar as Category C-24 
'Isotope Separation-Gas Centrifuge Method' is concerned ... [is] 
exempt under § 553(a)(l) as involving 'a military ... function.' "93 
Of more importance is the Department of Defense's position as 
to the meaning of the term "military function." Obviously that 
exemption has its most practical relevance to the activities of this 
particular agency. Recall that the legislative history of the AP A sup-
ports the assumption that some of the functions performed by the 
Department of Defense are not "military functions" within the 
meaning of section 553(a)(l) and, therefore, are not excluded on 
that basis from section 553.94 Such a nonmilitary function per-
formed by this Department might be the domestic flood control and 
protection of navigable waters activities conducted by the Army 
Corps of Engineers.95 The domestic activities of this sort under-
taken by the Corps do not "clearly and directly" involve activities 
expected of, appropriate to, or specially fitted for the armed forces 
as such96 because of their special nature, qualifications, or attri-
butes. In 1957 the Department of Defense tacitly admitted that not 
all activities of the Corps of Engineers were "military functions.'' It 
stated: 
90. 1969 Survey Response. The statutory authorizations to which the Commission 
referred are codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 809, 824a(c), and 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970) respec-
tively. See also 1941 Hearings, supra note 20, pt. 2, at 502-03. 
91. 1969 Survey Response. The Defense Production Act of 1950 is codified at 50 
U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970). 
92. 1969 Survey Response. 
93. 1969 Survey Response. Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.905 (1972). 
94. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
95. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-09a (1970). 
96. Most of the personnel of the Corps are not even members of the armed forces. 
The ex.emption, however, is for "military functions" and not "the military." 
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Many of the rules considered herein [relating to the Corps of En-
gineers] are of military or naval significance. Since the procedures 
in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act are followed in 
all cases, there has been no need to characterize particular rules as 
involving or not involving military or naval functions.97 
Of course, there is no doubt that if strategic military planning 
constitutes rule-making within the meaning of the AP A, it is ex-
empted from section 553 as a "military function" under subsection 
(a)(l). Nothing is more plainly adapted to, specially fitted for, or 
appropriate to the armed forces because of their peculiar qualifica-
tions or attributes than planning "battlefield" strategy in the event 
of armed hostilities. So, too, any rules concerning the organization, 
deployment, or use of the armed forces as such are plainly "military 
functions." 
Beyond this, it has been alleged, however, that in light of the 
mission of the Department of Defense as a whole, "the rule-making 
provisions do not apply to the usual functions of the [Defense] De-
partment"98 or to the "typical" functions of that Department.99 The 
Department has also maintained that in "a fundamental sense all 
regulations and directives of the Department [ of Defense] are inci-
dent to the essentially military function of national defense."100 
Therefore, the Department of Defense would probably take the 
view that, for example, all of the following regulations involve 
"military functions" and are consequently exempt from section 553: 
(1) The Armed Services Procurement Regulation; (2) claims and 
litigation procedures; (3) distribution of surplus property; (4) the 
correction of military records; (5) support of military dependents 
and paternity claims; (6) labor surplus area set-asides; (7) indebted-
ness, financial transactions, and commercial affairs of military per-
sonnel; (8) payments under the Missing Persons Act and death bene-
fits; and (9) standards of conduct for civilian employees.101 
While section 553(a)(2) now provides exemptions for most, if not 
all, of the above activities, repeal of those exemptions for rules re-
lating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" 
would almost surely induce the Department of Defense to rely on 
the "military function" exclusion in an effort to reach a result it 
97. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 286. 
98. Reich, Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in G. WARREN, 
supra note 47, at 492, 498 (emphasis added). 
99. Reich, Administrative Procedure Act: Analysis of its Requirements as to Rule-
making," 33 A.B.A.J. 315, 317 (1947). 
100. See text accompanying note 52 supra (emphasis added). 
101. 1969 Survey Response. 
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desires-the continued exemption of all such rule-making from 
section 553. 
Indeed, the Department of Defense already appears to have taken 
this view. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recently queried 
that Department with respect to its attitude toward a bill-S. 1413102 
-that would have repealed the section 553(a)(2) exemptions for 
rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts." The Department's reply indicates a belief that virtually 
all of its rule-making is exempted from section 553 by the "military 
function" exemption. It commented: 
Since S. 1413 would leave intact the current exemption in 5 U.S.C. 
553(a)(l) for "a military or foreign affairs function of the United 
States," it appears that the Department of Defense would not be 
affected by the proposed legislation .... If, however, notwithstanding 
5 U.S.C. 553(a)(l), S. 1413 should be so intended and construed as to 
apply to rulemaking concerning contracts and the other enumerated 
matters of this department, the Department of Defense is strongly 
opposed to S. 1413.10s 
More specifically, the Department has stated that the subsection 
(a)(l) "military function" exemption excludes from usual pro-
cedures 
the issuance of regulations governing such ·widely diverse military 
functions as the operation of the Reserve Officers' Training Program 
in civilian education institutions, the determination and designation 
of vital industrial facilities in support of military mobilization pro-
duction programs, the implementation of the defense scientific and 
technical information program, ... [and] the choice between com-
mercial or military transportation facilities for military supplies or 
personnel.104 
It went on to note that "[s]uch regulations govern military func-
tions which do not appear to fall within the exception for 'any 
matter relating to internal management or personnel of an 
agency.' "105 
The Defense Department has taken the position that rule-making 
relating to discharge review boards and boards for the correction of 
102. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text. 
103. Letter from Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to 
Senator James Eastland, Jan. 18, 1972. 
104. Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1964) [herein-
after S. 1663 Hearings]. 
105. Id. at 493-94. The present language of section 553(a)(2) is "agency management 
or personnel." The language quoted is from an analogous provision that was to be 
included in S. 1663. 
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military records involves "military functions."106 Similarly, the De-
partment has stated that all rules relating to the administrative 
settlement of personal injury and property damage claims are ex-
empt because they "involve military functions in the sense that the 
claims are generated by personnel of the military departments within 
the scope of their employment."107 The Department has also main-
tained that all rules relating to administration of the Resettlement 
Acts governing purchase and acquisition of land for the military, and 
resettlement of previous owners, are exempt from usual rule-making 
requirements because "[t]hese rules involve military and naval func-
tions in that the rules apply to certain acquisitions of land by the 
military departments."108 
Similarly, it has been suggested that rule-making concerning 
property owned by the Department of Defense and used in the 
performance of military functions, and rule-making involving "vir-
tually all contracts for military procurement," would be excluded 
from section 553 under the "military function" exemption of sub-
section (a)(l).109 The Department of Defense has specifically stated 
that it would be "difficult to allocate the proportion of procure-
ment regulations assignable" to each of the categories specifically ex-
empted by section 553(a)(l)-(2) because all regulations of the Depart-
ment are "incident to its essentially military function of national 
defense."110 It has also been asserted that rule-making dealing with 
"United States military surplus [property] located abroad" is exempt 
from section 553 because it involves a "military function" within 
the meaning of subsection (a)(l).111 Less debatable, of course, is 
the assertion that rules "pertaining to access to a secret missile 
base" would be deemed to involve a "military function.''112 
Some of the previous claims as to the scope of the exemptive 
provision in question are at best dubious. As suggested earlier in 
this section, the term "military function" should be construed as 
encompassing only those activities or operations, by whoever per-
formed, that are specially tailored for, appropriate to, or expected 
of the armed forces as such because of their peculiar nature, capaci-
ties, or qualifications. Only rule-making "clearly and directly" in-
106. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 332, 346. 
107, Id, at 324, 
108, Id. at 292. 
109. Bonfield, supra note 7, at 312. 
110. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 278. 
111. Id., pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 128. 
112, S. 166!) Hearings, supra note 104, at 679. 
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volving such activities should be deemed excluded by section 
553(a)(l) as a "military function." There is, however, as illustrated 
by at least some of the examples cited above, disagreement over the 
correctness of this construction by those who are charged with ap-
plying section 553. 
Even if we assume the soundness and acceptability of the con-
struction of "military function" proffered here, promulgation of the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), for instance, 
may arguably be deemed such a function. However, one commen-
tator has suggested that these regulations are not excludable as sec-
tion 553(a)(l) "military functions": 
The ASPR are not peculiar to military functions. They merely 
represent a comprehensive restatement of those policies thought to be 
necessary in applying sound business practices to the acquisition of 
goods and services by the military departments of the Government; 
they are not tailored to the necessities of military operations as such. 
The ASPR are no more entitled to exemption as a "military function" 
than is the rather skimpy State Department Procurement Regulation 
to be excluded from section 4' s requirements as a "foreign affairs 
function."113 
This view seems questionable for several reasons. It is true that 
rule-making for the acquisition, use, and disposal of government 
property generally does not involve an activity specially fitted for, 
appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces as such because of 
their peculiar nature, capacities, or qualifications. However, that 
characterization views rule-making of this type at an unduly high 
level of generalization and abstraction. A more realistic formula-
tion of the relevant question might be: Does rule-making for the 
acquisition, use, and disposal of property and materiel needed by 
the armed forces to perform their admittedly "military functions" 
"clearly and directly" involve such a function? 
The acquisition, superintendence, and disposal of combat weap-
ons, weapons systems, and other materiel peculiarly designed for use 
by combat forces and their support units is unique to the armed forces. 
Acquisition of materiel of this type frequently presents special prob-
lems and peculiar requirements. In many cases, the same may also be 
said about other materiel specifically required by the armed forces 
in their performance of "military functions." No doubt, this is one 
of the reasons for Armed Services Procurement Regulations, rather 
than one single set of General Services Administration regulations 
governing all procurement of property and materiel by every agency 
113. Grossbaum, supra note 1, at 260. 
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of the United States Government-including the armed forces. 
Department of Defense rules tailored to provide for the acquisition 
of these kinds of things seem, therefore, "clearly" to involve an ac-
tivity specially appropriate to, expected of, or fitted for the armed 
forces by virtue of their peculiar nature, qualifications, or capacities. 
The armed forces have special problems in procurement of materiel 
for use in admittedly "military functions"; therefore, they have 
special competence and are specially suited to deal with that pro-
curement process, which means that ASPR may be "clearly and 
directly" involved in a "military function." 
To be sure, an argument to the contrary may be made: The 
acquisition, as opposed to use, of the property and materiel neces-
sary to create and maintain a governmentally organized armed 
fighting force is not specially fitted to, appropriate for, or ex-
pected of the armed forces by virtue of their peculiar capabilities. 
Procurement as such is not a "military function"; nor is procure-
ment for the armed forces generally, or procurement of specially 
designed military hardware specifically, such a function. In fact, the 
performance of none of these tasks requires any special attributes or 
qualifications peculiar to the armed forces. 
This last factual assumption is very dubious, however, especially 
in the context of materiel designed specifically for combat use or 
for other peculiar requirements of the armed forces. It may also be 
dubious, though less so, in the context of procurement for the 
armed forces of materiel generally; peculiar problems with which 
the armed forces are specially fitted to deal may arise out of the 
unusual needs of the armed forces in the acquisition of even com-
mon materials and equipment. The need for special speed and 
peculiarly large quantities are examples. All of the above, however, 
are debatable issues upon which reasonable men may disagree. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that ASPR does not "clearly and 
directly" involve a "military function" is also difficult to accept for 
other reasons-the general terminology of that particular exemp-
tive term, and the very direct involvement of the procurement 
process for materiel in the successful execution of other indisput-
able "military functions." One may agree with the undesirability of 
the "military function" exemption generally, or the exemption of 
ASPR particularly, without necessarily concurring in the optimistic 
conclusion that the courts or Defense Department would, as a re-
sult, construe ASPR as being beyond the scope of subsection (a)(l).114 
114. Grossbaum specifically notes as part of the justification for deeming ASPR to 
be beyond the scope of section 553(a)(l): 
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Of course, the relevant decision makers might conclude that 
ASPR is neither entirely inside nor entirely outside the scope of 
section 553(a)(l). Alternative positions are possible. One view might 
be that such procurement regulations are exempt only when they 
are applied to the acquisition of materiel specially designed for the 
peculiar requirements of the armed forces in the performance of 
their "military functions." The theory here is that only the acqui-
sition of such materiel "clearly and directly" involves a "military 
function" as such, and that section 553(a)(l) operates by its terms 
only "to the extent that" a function of this sort is involved. This 
approach would suggest that public participation could be avoided 
by issuing two sets of Armed Forces Procurement Regulations--one 
set, promulgated without public participation, for the acquisition of 
materiel specially designed for the peculiar requirements of the armed 
forces in their performance of "military functions," and one set, 
formulated with public participation, for the acquisition of all 
other materiel needed by the armed forces. The difficulty with this 
approach is that an ordinary antibiotic pill may be as involved in 
and necessary to the performance of "military functions" as a 
specially designed item of military hardware. 
Another view might be that only those provisions of ASPR-if 
there are any-that are specially designed to handle the peculiar 
problems that arise in the acquisition of materiel for use in "mili-
tary functions," as distinct from those provisions designed to handle 
problems that arise in the acquisition of materiel for the govern-
ment in general, would be deemed to involve "clearly and directly" 
such a "military function." The theory would be that only the 
issuance of those particular sections of ASPR involve an activity 
specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces 
as such due to their special qualifications, expertise, and nature. The 
problem with this view, however, is its underlying assumption that 
if a "military function" is performed by means similar to, or indis-
tinguishable from, those used to execute a nonmilitary function, 
rules involving that function are not exempt under section 553(a)(l). 
Neither the language nor legislative history of the provision exempt-
ing rules involving a "military function" from usual rule-making 
procedures justifies this conclusion. 
Furthermore, to exclude ASPR from the requirements of section 4 would be 
tantamount to locking the barn after the horse had been stolen, since the prepon-
derance of government contract rules are first made by the ASPR Committee and 
subsequently aped by civilian agencies. Imposing the notice and comment require-
ments of section 4 only with respect to proposed civil agency contract rules, rules 
that have already become faits accomplis by incorporation in ASPR, offers neither 
timely nor adequate protection to the public interest. 
Id. at 260-61. 
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Realistically, of course, most of the previous discussion as to 
the scope of the "military function" exemption in general, or its ap-
plication to ASPR in particular, is highly speculative. Comfortable 
or clear solutions with a likelihood of wide acceptance do not 
abound. Furthermore, a meaningful test of these arguments about 
ASPR, for example, will come only after the "contracts" exemption 
of section 553(a)(2) is repealed, since no one questions the exclusion 
of ASPR from normal rule-making procedures under that more 
specific and clear exemption. The exact scope of the "military func-
tion" exemption thus remains unclear. Some things, however, are 
worth noting about it by way of summary. 
Not all rule-making undertaken by the Department of Defense 
involves a "military function." Nor is Defense the only department 
that engages in "military function" rule-making. Although it is not 
certain, the term "military function" probably means "armed forces 
function" rather than "war function" or "defense function." Sec-
tion 553(a)(l) does not exclude all rules involving the armed forces; 
it is only rule-making involving "military functions" that is ex-
cluded. Consequently, only rule-making involving an activity that 
is specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed 
forces as such because of their peculiar nature, qualifications, or 
attributes is exempted. Furthermore, to be excluded under sub-
section (a)(l) the rule-making in question must "clearly and di-
rectly" involve such an activity. But what is "clear and direct" is not 
adequately defined. 
It is apparent that the term "military function" is unduly vague, 
hard to define, and harder yet to apply-especially in marginal 
cases. This alone presents significant problems. It is, for instance, 
not clear to what extent, if at all, rule-making involving procure-
ment for the armed forces is exempt from section 553 by the 
"military function" exclusion. The term "military function" is viewed 
by those who must apply it as being very broad in scope. The 
imputed scope is also likely to increase rather than decrease. The 
Department of Defense, for example, is likely to rely on the "military 
function" exemption as a substitute for the section 553(a)(2) ex-
clusions for rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants, 
benefits, or contracts," if they are repealed. The reason for this is 
that it desires to continue the exclusion from section 553 of a whole 
range of rule-making now clearly exempt under section 553(a)(2), 
and arguably also exempt under section 553(a)(l). 
One last point concerning the scope of the "military function" 
exemption should be noted. As a matter of predictable predilection 
and practical reality, rule-making claimed by the Department of 
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Defense to be exempt from section 553 because it involves a "military 
function" may more easily be treated as such by various other 
governmental authorities-including the courts-than similar claims 
by other agencies. After all, the Department of Defense is the specific 
agency whose reason for being is "to provide for the future [military] 
security of the country."115 Furthermore, the judgment of the De-
partment of Defense on this issue, or for that matter the judgment 
of any agency on this issue, may also be presumed correct as a matter 
of law. Of course, it was argued earlier that, for a number of reasons, 
the burden of proof should probably rest on the agency to prove 
that rule-making sought to be exempted under this provision "clearly 
and directly" involves a "military function." But the law on this 
subject is unsettled, and the presumption of administrative regularity 
deeply ingrained. All of this magnifies the practical significance of 
the "military function" exemption of section 553(a)(l). 
C. "Foreign Affairs Function" 
Rule-making is also exempted by subsection (a)(l) from the 
requirements of section 553 "to the extent that there is involved a 
... foreign affairs function of the United States." Webster's defines 
"foreign affairs" as "matters relating to foreign countries: affairs 
other than domestic; esp: matters having to do with international 
relations and with the interests of the home country in foreign 
countries."116 A "function," it should be recalled, is an activity 
"specially fitted for," "appropriate to" or "expected of" something 
because of its peculiar nature, attributes, or qualifications. A "foreign 
affairs function," then, may be an activity specially fitted for, appro-
priate to, or expected of international relations-the interests of this 
country in foreign countries-due to the peculiar nature or attributes 
of such relations. And all rule-making "clearly and directly" in-
volving such an activity is exempt from section 553_ 
There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the term "foreign 
affairs" was intended to be limited to strictly diplomatic functions-
that is, activities "belonging to or proper to the personnel responsible 
for the conduct of international relations."117 On the one hand, a 
Congressman stated that the "exempted foreign affairs are those 
diplomatic functions of high importance which do not lend them-
selves to public procedures and with which the general public is 
ll5. UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1968-69, at 130-31. 
116. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 889. 
117. Id. at 638. 
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ordinarily not generally concerned."118 More persuasive, however, is 
the argument that "the exemption is not limited to strictly diplo-
matic functions, because the phrase 'diplomatic function' was em-
ployed in [an earlier draft of the AP A] and was discarded in favor 
of the broader and more generic phrase 'foreign affairs function.' "119 
Both the Senate and House reports on the AP A may limit the 
term somewhat, because they took the position that 
[t]he phrase "foreign affairs functions," used here and in some other 
provisions of the bill, is not to be loosely interpreted to mean any 
function extending beyond the borders of the United States but 
only those "affairs" which so affect relations with other governments 
that, for example, public rule-making provisions would clearly pro-
voke definitely undesirable international consequences.120 
However, in light of the more general and unqualified statutory 
language stating the exemption for rule-making involving a "foreign 
affairs function," it is unclear whether the legislative history just 
referred to constitutes an effective or meaningful restriction of the 
term.121 This question will be discussed at greater length later in 
the present section. 
Another bit of legislative history is worthy of note. In a comment 
on an earlier draft of the AP A the following appears: 
It has been suggested that "foreign-affairs functions" should be 
defined and added to section 2 in order to exclude from the opera-
tion of [the entire APA] all passport and visa functions as well as all 
duties of consular and diplomatic officers abroad. However, so far 
as these are not foreign affairs functions "requiring secrecy in the 
public interest," there would seem to be no reason why they should 
not be subject to the simple public information requirements of 
section 3.122 
Although not completely clear, this seems to suggest that "foreign 
affairs function" was intended to encompass at least "all passport and 
visa functions as well as all duties of consular and diplomatic officers 
abroad." Rule-making "clearly and directly" involving those subjects 
is, therefore, exempt under section 553(a)(I) from usual rule-making 
118. LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 358 (remarks of Representative Walter). 
119. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. The earlier bill can be 
found in LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 157. 
120, LEGISLATIVE HlsrORY, supra note 13, at 199, 257. 
121. It is probable, in any event, that it would constitute no greater limitation of 
the exemption than the subsequent specific exclusion found in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) 
(1970) for rule-making in which the required notice and opportunity for public par-
ticipation are found to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest." 
122. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 12. 
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procedures. How much further the exemption goes is another issue. 
It is not easy to determine what rule-making involves activities 
specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of international 
relations as such due to their peculiar nature or attributes. 
No clearer definition of the exact scope of the section 553 "foreign 
affairs function" exemption is supplied by the fact that when Con-
gress amended the freedom-of-information provision of the AP A in 
1967, it expressly excluded from that section matters that are "spe-
cifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest 
of ... foreign policy."123 There is no evidence that the term "foreign 
policy" in section 552 was in fact considered in juxtaposition to the 
term "foreign affairs function" in sections 553 and 554. 
However, even if Congress had expressly considered the term 
"foreign policy" in comparison to the term "foreign affairs function," 
and purposefully chose the former over the latter for use in the 
freedom-of-information section, the message conveyed would be less 
than clear. "Foreign policy" has been defined as "the underlying 
basic direction of the activity and relationship of a sovereign state 
in its interaction with other sovereign states typically manifested in 
peace, war, neutrality, and alliances or various combinations or ap-
proaches to these."124 It might be argued that an exemption for a 
"foreign policy function" would be narrower than an exemption for 
a "foreign affairs function" because the former concerns only activi-
ties specially fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the making or 
formulation of such policy, while the latter includes that and also all 
activities involving the execution of such policy. But it is very un-
likely that Congress intended to permit exemptions from the free-
dom-of-information provision only for matters involving the formu-
lation of foreign policy, as opposed to its execution. In any event, 
Congress did intend to exclude from usual rule-making procedures 
all rule-making "clearly and directly" involved in "foreign affairs 
functions"; and that term certainly includes both the making and 
execution of "foreign policy." 
The "foreign affairs function" exemption may be coextensive 
with our nation's foreign affairs capacity. Since rule-making is ex-
empted from section 553 only "to the extent that" it "clearly and 
directly" involves such a function, however, this exemption may 
apply only to agency rule-making under authority granted it spe-
cially for foreign affairs purposes. If that is the case, an agency would 
123. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970)) (em-
phasis added). 
124. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 889. 
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not be entitled to an exemption under subsection (a)(l) for rule-
making undertaken pursuant to some general nonforeign affairs au-
thority, even though it in fact acted with such foreign affairs con-
siderations in mind. This line, however, may be difficult to draw, 
and also unjustifiable in light of the purpose and general language 
of the particular exemption in question. 
In any case, it is clear that the "foreign affairs" exception is ap-
plicable to many functions of the State Department.125 In 1957, the 
State Department estimated that about forty per cent of its rules in-
volved foreign affairs functions and were, therefore, exempt for that 
reason from section 553.126 Certainly, if strategic foreign policy for-
mulation is deemed to constitute rule-making within the meaning 
of the APA, it is exempt as a "foreign affairs function." Nothing is 
more clearly adapted to, especially fitted for, or appropriate to the 
conduct of our international relations by virtue of its peculiar 
nature than strategic foreign policy planning. Consequently, formu-
lation of all the specific details of our foreign policy toward France 
when she left NATO would be an exempt "foreign affairs function." 
So, too, after the coup in Greece, the determination as to whether 
we should communicate with the new government, what our atti-
tude toward the seizure should be, and whether any action should 
be taken to protect Americans in Greece, would also be exempt as a 
"foreign affairs function."127 Similarly, it has been implied that 
"rules pertaining to . . . methods of subsidizing the military opera-
tions of friendly powers" are exempt as a "foreign affairs function."128 
Presumably, all rule-making directly involving a foreign aid program 
would also be exempt from usual procedures under subsection 
(a)(l).120 
Many other kinds of rules made by the State Department, how-
ever, are allegedly claimed to be exempted by the "foreign affairs 
function" provision of section 553(a)(l). For example, the Depart-
ment considers all rules made by the Educational Exchange Service, 
which "is empowered to promote, facilitate, and conduct programs 
for the exchange of persons between the United States and foreign 
countries," exempt from section 553 by subsection (a)(l) because 
125. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. 
126. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 927. 
127. Hearings on S. 518 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 321-22 (1967) [here-
inafter S. 518 Hearings]. 
128. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 679. 
129. Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreir,n A.flairs Power over Forei[fon Aid1 
1970 DUKE LJ. 453, 454-9¾, 
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they "involve foreign affairs functions of the United States."130 The 
same has been said of all rules involving the relief, protection, and 
regulation of American seamen and ships abroad.131 The Depart-
ment of State also claims that "[a]ll rules made by the Passport 
Office relate to foreign affairs functions of the United States" and 
are, therefore, exempt under section 553(a)(l).132 The reason offered 
by the Department for this view is that "a passport is a formal letter 
issued by the Secretary of State to officials of foreign governments 
attesting to the identity and citizenship of the bearer and requesting 
that certain courtesies and privileges be extended to him."133 In ad-
dition, 
[t]he Visa Office takes the position that all of its regulations involve 
a foreign-affairs function of the United States and, hence, their pub-
lication is considered to be within the exemption from notice of 
proposed rule-making as provided in section 4 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.1a4 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,135 that office makes 
rules dealing with all aspects of immigration into this country and 
the determination of nationality of a person not in the United 
States.136 
The Department has even stated that rule-making involving 
" [ s ]tudies contracted for at the request of the Historical Division," 
which "prepares the foreign relations volumes which date from 1861 
and constitute the only official record of United States diplomacy," 
is entitled to an exemption under the "foreign affairs function" 
provision because those studies "may indirectly affect the formula-
tion of foreign policy on that particular subject."137 And rule-making 
by the Authentications Section, which establishes a schedule of fees 
based on cost of service, is also claimed to be exempt under section 
130. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 928. See also 
id. at 931: "There is no statutory provision relating to any rulemaking function of the 
Educational Exchange Service requiring notice, hearing, or record of the hearing" be-
cause the "Administrative Procedure Act (foreign affairs exemption) does not require 
notice or public rulemaking proceedings concerning" such rules. 
131. Id. at 924-44. 
132. Id. at 946. Consequently, such things as the "determination of geographical 
limitations of general applicability on issuance of passports" are excluded under section 
553(a)(l). S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387. 
133. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 946. 
134. Id. at 952. The Department does claim, however, that it follows usual pro-
cedures in cases of "routine visa procedures." S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387. 
135. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-503 (1970). 
136. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. l) (Departm~nt of State), at 950-52, 
137. Id. itt 93J, 933, 
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553(a)(l) on the grounds that "[a]ll authenticated documents have 
a foreign affairs interest."138 Note also that "[o]f the approximately 
14 pages of rules relating to the tariff of fees" which Foreign Service 
officers are supposed "to collect for [their] official services," the De-
partment stated that "[a]pproximately 10 per cent relate to foreign 
affairs functions."13o 
Of course, the "foreign affairs function" exemption is also ap-
plicable to agencies other than the State Department when they 
engage in rule-making involving such functions.140 Many federal 
agencies other than the Department of State claim to make rules of 
this sort. For example, the Post Office Department asserted that its 
regulations involving the international postal service were exempt 
"foreign affairs functions."141 And the Atomic Energy Commission 
maintained that its "rulemaking relating to Export of Byproduct 
Material . . . insofar as the establishment of export restrictions for 
certain countries [is involved], e.g. Southern Rhodesia . . . [is] ex-
empt under § 553(a)(l) as involving a 'foreign affairs function.' "142 
Similarly, the Federal Power Commission has noted that 
the Commission's power to authorize the export of electricity ... the 
export and import of natural gas ... and to issue Presidential per-
mits authorizing the construction, operation or maintenance of 
electric power and natural gas facilities on the borders of the United 
States ... would appear to be encompassed within the exemption 
of [section] 553(a)(l) relating to foreign affairs.14a 
The Department of Agriculture has also suggested that its rule-
making under the Food for Peace Program,144 which is designed to 
develop and expand markets for United States agricultural com-
modities and combat hunger, is exempt from section 553 because it 
involves a "foreign affairs function."145 So, too, that department has 
1!18. Id. at 936. 
139. Id. at 940-41. 
140. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. See also note 44 supra and 
accompanying text. 
141. Delaney, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Post Office Depart-
ment, in G. WARREN, supra note 47, at 196, 202; 1969 Survey Response: "Rule-making 
by the Post Office Department in implementation of various international postal con-
ventions as authorized by [39 U.S.C. §§ 505-06 (1970)] ••• [is] exempted ••. by 
[section] 553(a)(l)." See also 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 8 (Post Office De-
partment), at 874: "All our regulations concerning our international mail fall within 
••. [section 553(a)(l)J." 
142. 1969 Survey Response. The regulations may be found at IO C.F.R. §§ 36.1-.50 
(1972). 
143. 1969 Survey Response. 
144. See 7 U.S.C. § 1702 (1970). 
J45. 1(169 Survey Respon~~. 
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noted that its "regulations relating to exports and imports under the 
plant and animal quarantine acts, meat and poultry products inspec-
tion acts, and other regulatory laws" may be exempt under section 
553(a)(I) because they "affect foreign relations."146 
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol is responsible for the Foreign Funds Control Regulations,147 the 
Foreign Assets Control Regulation,148 the Transaction Control Regu-
lations,149 the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,150 and the Rho-
desian Sanctions Regulations.151 It reported: 
The kinds of rules [developed in these programs] which are exempt 
from the rulemaking procedures under section 553(a)(l) as involving 
a "foreign affairs function" are ... [g]eneral blocking rules .... [,] 
[g]eneral licenses and authorizations unblocking classes of property 
or persons or authorizing classes or transactions ... [,] and [r]ules 
related to the blocking orders requiring reports and records of 
blocked property and of prohibited transactions.152 
The Department of the Treasury explained: 
All of the above described kinds of rules issued by the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control clearly involve "a foreign affairs function of 
the United States." There can be no question that the blocking 
actions taken under the authority of Section 5(b) of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act and Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act, were taken exclusively because of urgent foreign policy con-
siderations of the United States Government and that they clearly 
have a direct bearing on our relations with foreign countries. To an 
equal degree, the actions in the form of general licenses taken simul-
taneously with the blocking orders or subsequent thereto to exempt 
from or license out certain classes of transactions or persons from 
their prohibitions as well as the related reporting requirements are 
actions involving the foreign affairs functions of the United States. 
It is equally evident that the actions taken by the Treasury De-
partment to prohibit financial and commercial dealings with South-
ern Rhodesia, and the corollary rules exempting or licensing classes 
of prohibited transactions deemed desirable in order to maintain a 
flexible system, involve a foreign affairs function since they form an 
146. 1969 Survey Response. 
147. 31 C.F.R. §§ 520.01-.809 (1972). 
148. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1972). 
149. 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1972). 
150. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1972). 
151. 31 C.F.R. §§ 530.101-.809 (1972). 
152. 1969 Survey Response. See also 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 10 (De• 
partment of the Treasury), at 1017, 
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important part of the United States Government's implementation 
of resolutions of the United Nations.153 
The Department of the Treasury has also claimed exemption under 
the "foreign affairs function" provision for all its rules involving 
"Delivery of Checks and Warrants to Addresses Outside the United 
States, Its Territories and Possessions."154 Similarly, regulations deal-
ing with "International Traffic in Arms" previously issued by the 
Secretary of Statem and now issued by the Secretary of the Treasury 
in "the administration of the firearms import control program pur-
suant to ... the Mutual Security Act of 1954," are deemed in "the 
exempt category relating to foreign affairs."156 
The Department of Commerce has noted that rule-making in-
volving a number of its programs is exempted from the requirements 
of section 553 by the "foreign affairs function" language. More spe-
cifically, all rule-making involving the following is said to be ex-
empt:1157 "The Textile Quota Program," which limits exports of tex-
tiles from foreign countries to the United States;158 the "Implementa-
tion of United Nations Resolution Regarding Trade with Southern 
Rhodesia";159 "Required Reports on Foreign Investments and on 
International Receipts and Payments and Fees";160 and "Determina-
tion of Bona Fide Motor-Vehicle Manufacturers Under the Auto-
motive Products Trade Act."161 In response to a 1957 survey the 
Department also suggested that its rule-making "in connection with 
vessel operations in foreign commerce includ[ing] such matters as 
description of foreign-trade routes ... [and] approval of United 
States Vessels to foreign flag" was an exempt "foreign affairs func-
tion."162 At the same time, it asserted that rule-making pursuant 
153. 1969 Survey Response. On blocking actions, see 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1970); 50 
U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970). 
154. 1969 Survey Response. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.6 (1972). 
155. Exec. Order No. 10,973, 3 C.F.R. 493 (Comp. 1965). 
156. 1969 Survey Response. See 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970). 
157. 1969 Survey Response. 
158. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,052, 3 C.F.R. 253 (Comp. 1962), 
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,214, 3 C.F.R. 122 (Comp. 1965). A similar claim was 
asserted by the Department of Labor, S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 241, when 
that program was under its jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 208 infra. 
159. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. 635 (Comp. 1968), 
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. 442 (Comp. 1968). 
160. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-861 (1970); Exec. Order No. 10,033, 3 C.F.R. 70 (Comp. 
1949), 22 U.S.C. following § 286f (1970). 
161. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-33 (1970); 30 Fed. Reg. 13683 (1965). 
162. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 126. 
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to the Export Control Act of 1949,163 which empowered the Presi-
dent to prohibit or curtail exportation from this country of any arti-
cles, materials, supplies, or technical data "except under such rules 
and regulations as he shall prescribe,"164 involved "foreign affairs 
functions" exempted by section 553(a)(I) from usual procedures, or 
at least, that "[a]pproximately 80 to 90 percent of [those] rules in-
volve[ d] either military or foreign affairs functions.''165 In addition, 
the Department of Commerce has stated: 
It could be argued that rule-making by the Office of Foreign Direct 
Investments is exempt from the requirements of [section] 553(b)-(e), 
since the OFDI program is based on the President's authority under 
section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a "foreign affairs" 
function.166 
Some agencies take a narrower view of the scope of the "foreign af-
fairs function" exemption. For example, the Legislation and Regula-
tions Divisions of the Department of the Treasury jointly issue "rules 
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which affect 
international transactions, including the interest equalization tax 
provisions, as well as provisions under the Income and Estate Tax 
Treaties to which the United States is a party."167 These divisions 
have recently stated with respect to the issuance of such regulations: 
We do not believe this exception [section 553(a)(l)] applies to any 
regulations issued jointly by our offices because none of these regula-
tions affect "only those 'affairs' which so affect relations with other 
governments that, for example, public rulemaking provisions would 
clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences."168 
A recent analysis of the "foreign affairs function" exemption found 
in section 554 of the APA, which governs adjudication, employed a 
similar approach to construction of that provision. It concluded that 
Congress intended the adjudication provision to apply "except 'to 
the extent that' a particular proceeding would interfere with the 
conduct of foreign affairs functions and, as two congressional com-
mittees said, 'clearly provoke definitely undesirable international 
163. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7. 
164. Ch. 11, § 3(a), 63 Stat. 7. 
165. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 138, 
140. 
166. 1969 Survey Response. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1970). In any event, OFDI 
follows usual procedures when it makes rules. See note 40 supra. 
167. 1969 Survey Response. 
168. 1969 Survey Response, quoting ATIORNEY GENERAL'S 'MANUAL, supra note 13, 
at 25-26. See text accom_pan}in~ note 120 supra. 
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consequences.' "169 These narrow readings of the "foreign affairs 
function" exemptions in the rule-making and adjudication provi-
sions are bolstered by the bit of legislative history quoted to support 
them. 
When applied to the adjudication provision, however, the narrow 
reading of "foreign affairs function" proffered above may also be 
justified on a more compelling ground than the legislative history of 
the APA. Denial of an adjudicatory hearing, even on the basis of an 
asserted governmental interest in the unrestrained conduct of foreign 
affairs, may in some instances raise serious constitutional due process 
problems. For example, the argument that enforcement hearings of 
the Office of Foreign Direct Investment "may not have to comply 
with the otherwise applicable constitutional requirement of a trial-
type hearing [of the kind imposed by the adjudication provision] 
because OFDI exercises the plenary power of the President and Con-
gress over foreign affairs [in such cases] seems doubtful.''170 If, how-
ever, the "foreign affairs function" exemption in the adjudication 
provision is read to exclude only those particular compliance pro-
ceedings that would interfere with our nation's conduct of "for-
eign affairs functions" because they would "clearly provoke definitely 
undesirable international consequences," constitutional objections 
would probably be satisfied "[b ]ecause Congress has supplied a re-
sponsible resolution of the competing interests involved."171 Further 
support for this restrictive reading of the adjudication provision's 
"foreign affairs function" exemption might be gleaned from the 
action of the United States Supreme Court when it subjected depor-
tation proceedings to the AP A's adjudication provision despite its 
"foreign affairs function" exemption.172 But the Court did not dis-
cuss the scope of this exemptive language and the holding was seem-
ingly dictated by constitutional concerns.173 These concerns would 
not be present with regard to any effort to define the scope of this 
exemption in the rule-making provision. The Constitution does not 
169. Freedman, supra note 49, at 27, quoting LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, 
at 199, 257. 
170. Freedman, supra note 49, at 26. 
171. Id. at 27. 
172, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
173. The Court appeared worried that if such a proceeding were excluded from the 
statutory requirements of a trial-type hearing imposed by the adjudication provision, 
a serious question of due process would be presented. 339 U.S. at 49-51. This conflict 
between the interpretation of the term "foreign affairs function" in the rule-making 
provision and the interpretation of the term in the adjudication provision is noted in 
Parker, Federal Administrative Regulations: A General Survey, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 324, 
347-48 n.172 (1952). 
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require any public participation in administrative rule-making of 
the sort prescribed by section 553(b)-(e).174 As a consequence, the 
most important consideration supporting such a restrictive reading 
of the term "foreign affairs function" in the adjudication provision 
is absent with respect to a reading of that term in the rule-making 
provision. 
But there are, after all, other very good reasons for a similar 
reading of the term in the two provisions. The language of the two 
provisions is the same; the legislative history of both provisions on 
this question is also the same and would justify this result; and the 
House Report on the AP A specifically noted that "the term 'foreign 
affairs' is used in [the adjudication provision, section 5] in the same 
sense as section 4 [the rule-making provision]."175 Furthermore, as 
noted earlier, the section 553(a)(l) exemptions should be read nar-
rowly anyway. If, therefore, the "foreign affairs function" exemption 
must, in order to satisfy possible constitutional objections, be read to 
exclude from the adjudication provision only cases in which com-
pliance with its requirements would interfere with the conduct of 
foreign affairs by clearly provoking undesirable international conse-
quences, it should be read the same way in the rule-making provi-
sion. A number of possible difficulties with this conclusion exist, 
however. 
As previous discussion has demonstrated, this "undesirable con-
sequences" construction of section 553(a)(l) has certainly not been 
accepted by most of the agencies claiming to issue rules in the for-
eign affairs area. And it is also at odds with the exemptive provision's 
much more general language-all rule-making is excluded from sec-
tion 553 "to the extent that there is involved ... a foreign affairs 
function." No qualifying language of any sort appears in the exemp-
tion. This construction is also inconsistent with the very slight and 
perhaps unreliable judicial authority on the subject. One court 
maintained by way of a very general dictum that "immigration, deal-
ing with the admission and expulsion of aliens, is an exercise of a 
sovereign power in international relations" and, therefore, all rule-
making on that subject is excluded from section 553 by the "foreign 
174. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 6.05, 7.06, 7.08. See also R. LoRCH, DEMOCRAUC 
PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 96 (1969): "Common law does not require a lawmaker 
(by that is meant a statute maker or an ordinance maker or a rulemaker) to listen. Nor 
does the U.S. Constitution. However, the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act does re-
quire agencies in most situations" to follow the procedures specified therein requiring 
agencies to listen before they make rules. 
175. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 261. 
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affairs function" exemption.176 However, the significance of this ju-
dicial language may be small in light of the Justice Department's 
contrary position on the issue.177 
Exemption from section 553 of only that particular rule-making 
which involves "foreign affairs functions," and whose compliance 
with usual procedures would harm the conduct of our international 
relations by producing undesirable international consequences, may 
also be objected to on another basis. Sections 553(b)(B) and (d)(3) 
exclude rule-making covered by section 553 from usual procedures 
when those procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or con-
trary to the public interest." There can be no doubt that any rule-
making which involves "foreign affairs functions," and whose com-
pliance with usual requirements would interfere with these func-
tions by producing undesirable international consequences, would 
be exempted by these provisions. Consequently, it may be argued 
that such a narrow reading of the "foreign affairs function" exemp-
tion would make that provision redundant and unnecessary because 
it would then be virtually congruent with the more specific exclu-
sions of sections 553(b)(B) and (d)(3). Congress, therefore, must have 
intended the section 553(a)(l) exclusions to be broader than 
these more narrowly tailored provisions. Certainly this view is sup-
ported by the fact that, under the language of section 553(a)(l), rule-
making need only involve a "foreign affairs function" to be exempt. 
This argument against the "undesirable consequences" construc-
tion of the section 553(a)(l) exemption is not convincing. Even if the 
subsection (a)(l) exemption were read as suggested by this construc-
tion it would not be redundant because it would be broader than the 
more specific "good cause" exemptions of sections 553(b)(B) and 
(d)(3). Unlike the latter two, the former exemption would apply to 
the right to petition granted by section 553(e) and would not re-
quire any statement of reasons in each case to justify its use. Further-
more, the "undesirable consequences" construction of the "foreign 
affairs function" exemption of section 553(a)(l) has other virtues: 
uniformity with the similar adjudication provision exemption-a re-
sult specifically intended by Congress-and also consistency with the 
specific legislative history of the AP A on this subject. It is worth re-
176. Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Va. 1949). United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), also referred in a general way to 
the exclusion of dangerous aliens as a foreign affair. 
177. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 6 (Department of Justice), at 650 (Im-
migration and Naturalization Service reported that none of its rules "involved" "foreign 
affairs" within the meaning of section 553(a)(l).). 
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iterating that Congress did not intend this phrase "to be loosely in-
terpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the 
United States but only those 'affairs' which so affect relations with 
other governments that for example, public rule making provisions 
would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international conse-
quences."178 
Nevertheless, this construction of the exemption has not been ac-
cepted in practice or theory by most federal agencies making rules 
arguably within its ambit; nor has it been accepted by any court. It 
is, in addition, inconsistent with the broad language employed in 
section 553(a)(l). To complicate matters further, it should also be 
noted that "when the total situations dealt with by the State Depart-
ment [for example] are analyzed in terms of their constituent facts, 
the distinction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' affairs frequently 
turns out to be quite illusory."179 The particular provision in ques-
tion here is, therefore, vague in application under the "undesirable 
consequences" construction or, for that matter, under any broader 
construction. When these points are added to the fact that the burden 
of proof is likely to be on the person who challenges an agency's 
claim to exception under the "foreign affairs function" provision of 
section 553(a)(l), the significance of this exclusion may be fully ap-
preciated. And just as the courts may be particularly solicitous of 
claims made by the Department of Defense for exemption under the 
"military function" language, they may be equally solicitous of 
claims made by the State Department for exemption under the 
"foreign affairs function" language. 
IV. Is SECTION 553(a)(l) NECESSARY? 
Federal agencies that make most of the rules involving "military 
or foreign affairs functions" take the position that this exemption 
is both justified and desirable. It is their view that repeal of section 
553(a)(l) would somehow detrimentally interfere with the perfor-
mance of their responsibilities in connection with such rule-making. 
The specific reasons advanced to justify the exemption of rule-
making involving "military and foreign affairs functions" range in 
character from the purely theoretical to the intensely practical. In 
the following discussion an attempt will be made to enumerate and 
1'78. LEGISLATIVE HisrORY, supra note 13, at 199, 25'7. 
1'79. Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Indi-
vidual in International Economic Regulation, 1'7 AD. L. REv. 159, 164 (1965), citing 
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 591 (D.C. Cir. 195'7) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), quoting 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OUR FOREIGN POLICY 4 (General Foreign Policy Ser. No. 26, 1950): 
"There is no longer any real distinction between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs." 
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evaluate all of the possible reasons for the incorporation of section 
553(a)(l) exclusions in the statute. Only then can it be ascertained 
whether this exemption is justified in light of the important com-
peting policies that favor public participation in rule-making. 
One practical justification for the subsection (a)(l) exclusions 
may be that their elimination would expand agencies' work loads, 
increase the costs of carrying on these functions, and delay and 
thereby generally interfere with the government's performance of 
these particularly vital and sensitive functions. For example, with 
respect to one set of rules that may involve a "military function," the 
Department of Defense claimed: 
The necessity for notice, public hearing, and publication, as well as 
the opportunity for any interested person to petition for change or 
repeal of a rule, would have the effect of so hindering and delaying 
the supplementation and modification of these rules that [they] 
would become unresponsive to the changing needs of both the De-
partment of Defense and [those affected by them].1so 
The Department of Defense has also noted that the purpose of some 
of the acts entrusting to it "military functions" "can be effectively 
implemented by rules promulgated without the expense and ad-
ministrative effort involved in participation by [the] general pub-
lic."181 A comment made by the Department of the Treasury also 
seemed to suggest that subjecting rules involving the subsection 
(a)(l) functions to section 553 "would be unduly burdensome upon 
the agencies."182 It has also been stated as a general proposition that 
adherence to the requirements of section 553 for some rule-making 
involving "military functions" may "interfere unduly with the oper-
ation and administration of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the military department" and, therefore, the "military function" 
exemption is necessary.183 
Elimination of the present subsection (a)(l) exemptions may also 
appear undesirable because it would cause adherence to the proce-
dures of section 553(b)-(e) in many cases where the public has little 
interest in the rule-making or is unlikely to make a significant con-
ISO. Letter from Neil E. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to Senator 
James Eastland, Feb. 20, 1964, in S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 307. 
181. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292. 
182. Letter from Fred B. Smith, Acting General Counsel of the Treasury, to 
Senator James Eastland, Feb. II, 1964, in S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 389. 
183. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 347 (made 
in regard to rules relating to correction of military or naval records). See also id. at 
332-33 (in regard to rules involving the Discharge Review Boards); S. 166J Hearings, 
supra note 104, at 389 (Department of Treasury). 
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tribution to it. So, too, many rules involving one of these functions 
may be so limited in their application or, for that matter, have such 
a minimal public impact, that any solicitation of comment from the 
public would be fruitless. It has, therefore, been argued that the 
section 553(a)(l) exemptions are justified because many such rules 
are not controversial, or would elicit no response from the public. 
The Department of the Treasury has stated, for example, that "many 
rules which must, or normally would, be adopted prior to any public 
participation are not controversial."184 And the Post Office has 
argued that these exemptions are justified with respect to those of 
its rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" because 
"[e]xperience has shown that the bulk of the Departmental regula-
tions relating to management of the mails are not of sufficient sub-
stance or general interest to elicit responses when statutory rule-
making procedures are followed.''185 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the section 553(a)(l) ex-
clusions are justified because there is often no specially interested 
and identifiable public whose views should be solicited with regard 
to such rules, or because the affected members of the public have not 
yet been identified or are not yet identifiable. As a consequence, ad-
herence to the requirements of section 553 in such cases is a waste. 
The Department of State sees this as a justification for the section 
533(a)(l) exclusion, noting that many rule-making decisions involv-
ing such functions "are a matter of general concern to the American 
public, and no one individual has a greater interest than any 
other.''186 (The dubious logic here seems to be that since everyone is 
interested, no one should have an opportunity to participate and 
thereby possibly influence the decision makers!) And the Depart-
ment of Defense has stated in justification for continuance of the 
"military function exemption" that with respect to some rules im-
plementing that function there is "no way of ascertaining, at the time 
rules are made, which members of the public will be affected by the 
rules" ;187 no one, therefore, is likely in such cases to utilize the op-
portunity for participation that would be created by agency ad-
herence to section 553 requirements. It has also been more generally 
alleged that requiring notice and public participation with respect 
184. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 389. 
185. 1969 Survey Response. 
186. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322, 
187. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 292 
(justifying the administration of the resettlement program of reimbursement for mov-
ing expenses to the owners and tenants of land acquired by the military departments). 
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to rules involving a "military or foreign affairs function" would "not 
be particularly helpful or desirable.''188 In this connection the De-
partment of Defense has stated: 
[B]earing in mind the broad definition in section 2 of "rulemaking," 
would it be wise to subject to the requirements of notice, formal 
consultation, and hearing the issuance of regulations governing such 
widely diverse military functions as the operation of the Reserve 
officers' training program in civilian educational institutions, the 
determination and designation of vital industrial facilities in support 
of military mobilization production programs, the implementation 
of the Defense scientific and technical information program, or the 
choice between commercial or military transportation facilities for 
military supplies or personnel? Such regulations govern military func-
tions which do not appear to fall within the exception for "any 
matter relating to internal management or personnel of an agency." 
Yet subjecting the promulgation of such regulations to the formal 
requirements of rulemaking is not likely to be of benefit to anyone 
either within or outside the Department of Defense.189 
Furthermore, if rule-making relating to "military and foreign 
affairs functions" is subjected to the requirements of section 553(b)-
(e), in some cases the agencies involved in such rule-making and 
those members of the public most directly affected may be placed in 
adversary positions, thereby discouraging mutual cooperation to-
ward finding the best solution to common problems. On that basis, 
it may be argued, the present exemption for rule-making involving 
these functions should be maintained. 
Repeal of subsection (a)(l) may also be objected to on another 
general ground. Forcing adherence to the mandates of section 553 
for any subsection (a)(l) rule-making would inevitably result in some 
loss of flexibility for such rule-making. The Post Office stated, as an 
example, that repeal of these exemptions "would be disadvantageous 
in that it would require the following of formalized procedures with 
attendant delays and loss of flexibility without corresponding bene-
fit."1110 A related argument is that elimination of these exemptions 
would discourage agencies from making worthwhile changes in rules 
involving these functions because of the more formal and particular-
ized procedures that would be required. The Post Office also sug-
gested that subjugation of these rules to section 553 "would result 
188. 1969 Survey Response (Commerce Department, OFDI). 
189. Letter from L. Niederlehner, Acting General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense, to Senator James Eastland, July 23, 1964, in S. 166:J Hearings, supra note 104, 
at 492-94. 
190. 1969 Survey Response. 
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primarily in the ... discouragement of desirable changes and would 
result in an overformalization of mail management."191 Other agen-
cies promulgating such rules might well make a similar point. 
Section 553(a)(I) is also said to be justified on the ground that in 
its absence, there would be uncertainty in some cases about whether 
public rule-making procedures must be followed, and thus litigation 
or use of those procedures in inappropriate situations would result. 
The Department of Defense reported, for example, that the primary 
disadvantage to that agency of eliminating the broad exclusions in 
section 553 would be "uncertainty," because the extent to which 
its rule-making fits under the more limited exemptions found 
within section 553(b)-(e) was unclear. This "leads the Department 
of Defense to fear a rash of litigation testing . . . [its] interpretation 
of these [other exemptions]."192 
The current exemptions may also be considered necessary for 
another reason. In some cases, section 553 procedures may be an in-
sufficient means by which to assure that the relevant people partici-
pate adequately in rule-making relating to the exempted subjects. 
Requiring adherence to those procedures in the subsection (a)(l) 
situations, therefore, might sometimes force an agency to follow two 
sets of procedures in order to involve the proper people. In addition, 
it may be alleged that "military and foreign affairs function" exemp-
tions are necessary because some rules involving these functions may 
require joint action by two authorities. In such cases, one may argue, 
the procedures of section 553 may be irrelevant, wasteful, and use-
less. They would only induce communication by the public to an 
agency with respect to proposed rules that the agency does not have 
a completely free hand in shaping. (The dubious logic here seems to 
be that if two agencies have to agree on the rules the public should 
have an opportunity to influence neither!) The Post Office has seem-
ingly accepted this view. It has noted that 
[t]his would be particularly true in the international area where 
Departmental regulations are developed by negotiation with foreign 
postal authorities and are not subject to unilateral variation by the 
Department. Similarly in the administration of the mail service for 
the Armed Forces regulations are developed by or in conjunction 
with the Department of Defense and are not subject to unilateral 
modifications.193 
191. 1969 Survey Response. 
192. 1969 Survey Response. See also S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 307 ("Absent 
a decision by a court of competing [sic] jurisdiction in each particular case, the validity 
of any rule could be subject to challenge •••• "); Letter from Frederick. G. Dutton, 
Assistant Secretary of State, to Senator James Eastland, Dec. 6, 1963, in id. at 385-87. 
193. 1969 Survey Response. 
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There are significant difficulties with all of these general justifica-
tions for the current section 553(a)(l) exclusions. In the first place, 
they do not distinguish rule-making relating to these particular ex-
empted categories as a class from rule-making now subjected to the 
requirements of section 553(b)-(e). Every one of the arguments out-
lined as justifications for excluding subsection (a)(l) rule-making 
from section 553's procedures could also be made with respect to 
those classes of rule-making already subject to the usual rule-making 
procedures. If these exclusionary justifications were found wanting 
with respect to that rule-making currently within the scope of section 
553, should they not be found similarly wanting with respect to the 
kinds of rule-making currently exempt from section 553? 
For example, the complaint that increased cost and work load, 
general delay, duplication, and the like will result if the currently 
excepted rule-making must follow the requirements of section 
553(b)-(e) could also be made with respect to the run-of-the-mill 
rule-making that we have already decided to subject to those pro-
visions.194 The argument that adherence to usual rule-making proce-
dures in these cases will, as a general proposition, reduce needed 
flexibility, cause uncertainty and litigation, be a waste in many cases, 
and discourage needed changes in rules, could also undoubtedly be 
used to support the exemption of all the currently included rule-
making. Similarly, the assertion that subjugation of such rule-making 
to section 553 will, in many cases, be unfruitful, or of no real benefit 
to the agency or the public, could be made about much rule-making 
already included in section 553. If the policy of public participation 
is deemed sufficiently important to risk some of these possible conse-
quences for the rule-making already subject to the AP A rule-making 
provision, it is also worth risking them to bring rule-making involv-
ing "military and foreign affairs functions" within those require-
ments. 
A second major defect with many of the arguments discussed 
above is that they do not apply to all such rule-making. That is, 
arguments seeking to justify an unqualified, across-the-board exemp-
tion for all rule-making involving "military and foreign affairs func-
tions" on the ground that it is unreasonable or unwise to require 
some or even a large part of such rule-making to be conducted in 
accordance with section 553, must necessarily be considered inade-
quate. If public participation is as important as our society seems to 
194. The Administrative Conference has concluded that these burdens are insuf-
ficient to exclude all rule-making relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, 
or contracts" from section 553. See Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8. 
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think it is, exemption should only be granted for those particular 
cases in which the benefit is not worth the burden. Although the 
arguments discussed previously may suggest that the benefit is not 
worth the burden in some or even many cases of rule-making involv-
ing these particular functions, they do not demonstrate that conclu-
sion for all of such rule-making as a class. 
It has been claimed, however, that inclusion within the coverage 
of section 553 of all rule-making involving "military and foreign 
affairs functions" as a class would be more deleterious than the in-
clusion of other classes of rule-making within that provision. The 
Department of State noted specifically that the general "need for 
speed and flexibility in making decisions ... [has] necessarily led 
to different procedures [for foreign affairs function rule-making] 
than would otherwise prevail."195 The Department of Defense would, 
no doubt, take a similar position with respect to rule-making in-
volving "military functions." It has also been claimed that the gen-
eral nature of the subjects involved in this kind of rule-making, or 
the general nature of these functions, justifies the unqualified ex-
emptions found in section 553(a)(l), since rule-making involving 
"military or foreign affairs functions" touches on matters of a pecu-
liarly sensitive and delicate nature. Thus, the Department of State 
has noted that "where foreign policy considerations may be para-
mount . . . it is readily apparent that the Department requires a 
free hand to be able to discharge its missions."196 Application of 
section 553 to rule-making involving "foreign affairs functions" is 
consequently said to he inappropriate. Also of significance is the 
statement that "freedom of executive action has long been regarded 
as necessary and desirable" in any function involving "foreign affairs 
of the United States."191 "[S]uch rules, by their very nature, are not 
generally adaptable to notice or public rulemaking proceedings."198 
More specifically, the Department of Commerce has stated that 
the "processes of international negotiation and the administration of 
international agreements ... simply do not lend themselves to the 
formal rulemaking requirements set out in section 4 . . . ."199 The 
Department of the Treasury has made a similar statement with re-
gard to the operations of its Office of Foreign Assets Control. It main-
195. Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, to Senator 
James Eastland, April 10, 1967, in S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 388. 
196. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387. 
197. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control). 
198. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 927. 
199. s. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 373 (Department of Commerce). 
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tained that section 553 procedures were inappropriate to the "foreign 
affairs functions" of the Office for the following reason, among others: 
[W]hen a partial relaxation of an embargo is contemplated in a par-
ticular area, the basic policy decision is either a foreign policy deci-
sion which it is not practicable to hold hearings on-or it is an 
administrative policy decision that the economic warfare objectives 
of the Control would not be jeopardized by the contemplated relaxa-
tion. In either case, the decision is not one which can usefully be 
subjected to public hearings.200 
The Department of State has similarly suggested that the actual 
formulation of foreign policy as such is a singularly inappropriate 
subject, by its nature, for formal rule-making procedures. The 
Department noted: 
Last year the Government of France made clear that it was no 
longer willing to participate in the military activities of the North 
Atlantic Alliance. This French decision required the United States to 
re-examine its policies toward France and in relation to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. These policy determinations ranged 
from the most specific-such as where NATO headquarters should 
be relocated and what claims the United States and NATO should 
press vis-a-vis France-to the most general-such as how to organize 
and operate an effective NATO without France and how to conduct 
Western relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Could a formal rule-making proceeding have made a meaningful 
contribution to policy determinations such as these? ... [W]e should 
note that there are no statutory standards here to be interpreted or 
developed through rule-making. The problem of the Executive 
Branch in dealing with questions of European security is quite dif-
ferent from that confronting a regulatory agency operating under a 
statutory grant of authority.201 
As a result, the Department concluded, "The inappropriateness and 
impracticability of applying the formal procedures of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to the functioning of the Department of 
State in the field of foreign policy" is clear.202 
On a similar basis it may, of course, be argued that "the inap-
propriateness and impracticability of applying the formal procedures 
of the Administrative Procedure Act to the functioning of the 
Department of" Defense in the performance of its "military func-
tions" is clear. It can be maintained with a vigor equal to that of 
the Department of State that formulation of strategic military 
200. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control). 
201. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 821-22. 
202. Id. at 821. 
278 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:221 
policy, including the drawing up and adoption of battle plans for 
various eventualities, and the organization, deployment, and use of 
the armed forces as part of those plans, is also, by its nature, a 
singularly inappropriate subject for formal rule-making procedures. 
There are typically "no statutory standards here to be interpreted 
or developed through rule-making," just as there are said to be 
none in the foreign policy example offered by the Department of 
State. 
There are a number of difficulties inherent in the above argu-
ments. In the first place, is it a foregone conclusion that merely be-
cause there are no statutory standards to guide an administrator in 
his formulation of policy, public participation is either unsuitable 
or undesirable? The answer to this question seems clearly to be "no." 
One of the chief benefits of public participation is the education of 
the administrator with respect to any and all matters that may be 
relevant to his making a wise rule-making decision. The public's 
ability to do this is in no way diminished by the lack of statutory 
standards ultimately available to guide the decision maker. In-
deed, because of this lack, public participation may be even more 
desirable in such cases than where more detailed strictures are pro-
vided by Congress. 
Second, is it also clear, for instance, that the public would have 
had nothing of value to contribute to foreign policy formulation, 
which the Department of State viewed as singularly unfit for section 
553 procedures? If it had been provided an opportunity to do so, 
might the public have had something worthwhile to contribute to 
the formulation of Viet Nam policy in the early 1960's? Only a firm 
belief in official omniscience and public impotency would dictate a 
negative answer for all such situations. Such a conclusion would 
also be particularly out of place in a country like ours committed to 
the democratic process and sovereignty of the people. 
Nevertheless, section 553 procedures are undoubtedly inappro-
priate in the formulation of armed forces strategic war plans, or in 
the formulation of foreign policy, such as our posture toward France 
when she terminates her association with NATO. But, as will be 
noted shortly, there are other reasons than the mere lack of statutory 
standards or the particular nature of the policy decision in question 
that dictate the unreasonableness of any requirement of public 
participation in "military or foreign affairs" decisions of this par-
ticular type. The fact that these types of policy formulation or "rule-
making" will be shown to deserve exemption from usual section 
553 procedures does not, however, justify the much wider scoped 
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and unqualified exemption of subsection (a)(I). These examples 
prove only that there are specific types of rule-making or specific 
situations-perhaps encountered more frequently in rule-making 
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" than with most 
other kinds of rule-making-in which usual rule-making procedures 
are inappropriate. These examples of situations in which an exemp-
tion from usual procedures is warranted do not, however, prove 
that all subsection (a)(I) rule-making, or even the overwhelming 
bulk of it for that matter, would suffer any more from subjugation 
to the terms of section 553 than other rule-making already included 
therein. Nor do they prove that section 553 procedures are any more 
inappropriate to all such rule-making because of its peculiar nature, 
than to other rule-making currently covered by that section. 
Was the Department of Defense correct when it offered as an 
example of a "horrible" the fact that absent the "military function" 
exemption-which it thought necessary and desirable-its rule-
making involving ROTC programs at civilian universities would 
become subject to section 553? Is the Department of State correct 
when it assumes that all rule-making involving the International 
Educational Exchange Service is necessarily inappropriate for the 
application of section 553 procedures?203 One is hardly shocked by 
the general proposition that rule-making involving these programs 
should be subjected to the normal requirements imposed by section 
553(b)-(e) including, of course, its narrow exceptions for special 
circumstances that will be discussed in more detail later. 
There is no doubt, however, that agencies making rules involv-
ing "military and foreign affairs functions," as with other functions, 
must be able to react quickly in emergency situations, or in any 
other circumstance where the proper performance of their functions 
requires rapid action. There are many such situations, and they 
probably occur with greater frequency in rule-making involving 
subsection (a)(l) functions than in rule-making involving other 
functions. The Treasury Department has stated, as an example, 
that three recent changes in rules involving "foreign affairs func• 
tions" could not have followed usual procedure because they "were 
prompted by the immediately impending effective date of amend• 
ments to social security legislation effecting payments to certain 
alien beneficiaries, and implemented assurances, which had to be 
acted upon expeditiously."204 The same department has also stated 
203. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 931. 
204. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Accounts and 
Treasurer's Office). 
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with regard to the rule-making conducted by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control that "it is often essential in issuing public documents, 
that the Control act without delay."205 Consider also the following 
comment by a Department of State official dealing with the need for 
an exclusion from usual rule-making procedures for the formulation 
of certain foreign policy, based upon the need for speed alone. 
Let us take another, very recent example of a problem situation 
in foreign policy-one in which the speed of developments would 
have made impractical the application of Administrative Procedure 
Act procedures to the decision-making process. I invite the Subcom-
mittee to consider last month's military coup in Greece. 
Immediately upon the occurrence of that coup and in the days 
thereafter the Department of State was confronted with a range of 
issues, some of which required immediate decision. There was the 
question whether to communicate with those who had seized power 
and in what fashion, what attitude to take toward the seizure, 
whether action needed to be taken for the safety of Americans, how 
we might most effectively promote a return to democracy within 
Greece, and a number of other issues. I do not think it can seriously 
be argued that there was time for such a proceeding.2oa 
In order to discharge their obligations properly, therefore, 
agencies making rules involving "military or foreign affairs func-
tions" must be able to respond quickly when the need arises. That 
is, they must be able to alter their rules at once when immediate 
action is necessary to accomplish or preserve the objectives of their 
programs. In such a situation there is no time to publish advance 
notice of the rules in question, to provide an opportunity for pub-
lic participation therein, or to delay their effective date. These re-
quirements must be set aside where necessary speedy action would 
be impaired. The formulation of foreign policy and strategic mili-
tary plans will very often fit within this circumstance because speed is 
frequently of the essence in those particular sorts of policy-making. 
There are also specific occasions involving subsection (a)(l) 
rule-making in which advance public procedures of the type listed in 
section 553 may either cause the very evil that the proposed rules 
are designed to avoid, seriously impair the ability of the agency to 
perform its "military or foreign affairs function," or produce other 
serious undesirable consequences. In those particular circumstances 
an exemption from usual procedures for subsection (a)(l) rule-mak-
205. 1969 Survey Response. 
206. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser, 
Department of State). 
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ing is obviously necessary. An example is furnished by the Depart-
ment of the Treasury: 
In general, rule-making by the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
involves foreign affairs functions of the United States. The chief 
rule-making activity of the Office involves the imposition of a trade 
and financial embargo on quasi-enemy countries. It would be im-
possible to have notice and public hearing prior to imposition of 
such an embargo. For example, if it were publicly known that the 
United States were definitely going to impose a financial embargo on 
a particular country at a certain time, there would within a matter 
of several hours be a virtually complete transfer of all its public and 
private liquid assets to other countries. Obviously, therefore, public 
hearings would nullify the proposed embargo entirely.207 
A similar point may be made about the Textile Program adminis-
tered by the Department of Labor. That rule-making is said to be 
exempt from section 553 because of the "foreign affairs function" 
exclusion: 
The program includes negotiation of international bilateral agree-
ments with foreign countries concerning cotton textiles and cotton 
textile products; requests by the United States that a country or 
countries voluntarily limit their exports to the United States of cate-
gories of cotton textiles or products not to exceed a specific level; 
and, under certain circumstances, unilateral imposition by the United 
States of import controls on such shipments to the United States. 
The program also includes administration of the multilateral agree-
ment (the Long Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade 
in Cotton Textiles, of February 9, 1962). 
Compliance with the notice requirements of section 4 could 
stimulate exports from foreign countries and imports into the United 
States of great quantities of goods which might later be subject to 
ceiling limits. Such action might have an adverse effect on the textile 
program.2os 
Other statements of a more general nature have suggested differ-
ent evils that might be caused if some section 553(a)(l) rule-making 
were required to follow usual procedures. For example, the Depart-
ment of Justice noted that a 
207. 1969 Survey Response. See also S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 392 (De• 
partment of the Treasury): 
If, for example, notice of an order (a rule under the definitions in the bill) 
to block the assets in the United States of certain foreign nationals were given, 
the holders of the assets would have opportunity to withdraw them before the 
action could be taken. If notice were given 0£ proposed regulations restricting 
the export or import of gold or its use abroad by persons under U.S. jurisdiction, 
speculation would be inevitable and the effectiveness of the regulations would 
be reduced. 
208. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 241. 
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requirement of public participation in all proceedings for the pro-
mulgation of rules to govern our relationship with other nations ... 
inevitably would encourage public demonstrations by extremist 
factions which might embarrass foreign officials and seriously preju-
dice our conduct of foreign affairs.209 
This suggestion that the possibility of public protest over proposed 
rules involving our foreign affairs should itself be deemed a suffi-
cient ground upon which to dispense with the normal procedures 
seems, at best, dubious. One need not, however, agree with that con-
clusion to agree with another. Federal agencies making rules in-
volving "military or foreign affairs functions" must be freed from 
the rule-making requirements of advance notice and public partici-
pation when adherence to these requirements would induce serious 
undesirable consequences that the government has a right to avoid, 
such as frustrating the immediate or ultimate purposes for which 
the rules are made. 
Most strategic military policy formulation and most strategic 
foreign policy formulation, if they are "rule-making," will need to 
be exempted from usual rule-making procedures on this basis. Ad-
herence to section 553 requirements for these particular kinds of 
rule-making will usually either cause the very evil sought to be 
avoided, or will frustrate the immediate or ultimate purposes of the 
rule-making involved, or will otherwise seriously impair the ability 
of the agency to perform its "military or foreign affairs functions" 
properly. That is, publication of advance notice prior to the adoption 
of strategic military or foreign policy plans will usually seriously 
interfere with or destroy their utility; such advance publication may 
also cause serious harm to our nation's ability to defend itself 
effectively or to protect its interests abroad. Illustrations of this kind 
of policy-making for which an exemption from usual procedures is 
necessary for the above reasons probably include the State Depart-
ment's examples with respect to France and Greece, cited earlier in 
this section. Other examples are such things as policy formation with 
regard to the military steps we will take in any given circumstance 
if our country, its possessions, or our armed forces or citizens abroad 
are attacked or threatened, and the precise nature of our political 
and military response to the capture of an American ship at sea by 
a foreign power. 
Of course, any rule-making that is exempted from the publica-
209. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 363. See also id. at 392 (Department of 
Treasury). 
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tion requirements of the freedom-of-information provision of the 
AP A because it is "specifically required by Executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy"210 
must similarly be excepted from the usual advance notice and public 
participation requirements of section 553. After all, if the rules in-
volved "should be kept confidential in the national interest,"211 it is 
hardly possible, without violating this confidentiality, to give advance 
notice of the type required by section 553 and to accord the public 
an opportunity to comment thereon. This, too, would have the effect 
of excluding most strategic military planning, most strategic foreign 
policy planning, and some other rule-making that involves "military 
and foreign affairs functions" generally, from usual rule-making 
procedures required by section 553. 
Another situation in which some section 553(a)(I) rule-making 
should be exempt from the usual requirements of public participa-
tion may be posited. In certain instances all of the pertinent or use-
ful information relating to the form and desirability of a given rule 
is necessarily within the exclusive possession of the national govern-
ment because, for example, that information is a military secret 
or otherwise privileged from disclosure. Advance notice of the pro-
posed rule and an opportunity to participate therein would be use-
less and a predictable waste in that situation because the public 
could not, by definition, contribute anything of real value to improve 
the product of the agency's decision-making process. Requiring ad-
herence to usual procedures in such cases would, therefore, be 
unreasonable. Situations of this type undoubtedly occur more fre-
quently in rule-making that involves a "military or foreign affairs 
function" than in rule-making that involves other functions. 
The Department of Treasury, for example, has justified the 
exemption of section 553(a)(I) rules promulgated by its Office of 
Foreign Assets Control on the ground that 
the matters with which the Control deals are almost invariably 
confidential. Frequently, the most important and confidential foreign 
or military affairs activities of the United States are involved. From 
the private viewpoint substantially all activities of the Control cover 
privileged matters.212 
A somewhat expanded version of this last view has been expressed 
by the Department of State as a basis for excluding rule-making in-
210. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970). 
2II. S. 166J Hearings, supra note 104, at 392 (Department of Treasury). 
212. 1969 Survey Response. 
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volving "military or foreign affairs functions" from usual procedures. 
It first notes that "in the making of foreign policy decisions much 
of the information that must be relied upon is not publicly available 
and indeed cannot be made public."213 This has "necessarily led to 
different procedures than would otherwise prevail."214 The rationale 
for the different procedures was more fully explained as follows: 
[F]ormal rule-making procedures seem primarily intended for and 
work best in situations where the rule-maker can be assisted through 
a presentation of the interplay of all interests at stake. In the case 
of a rule-making proceeding in the field of foreign policy, however, 
it seems clear that in many cases the most important considerations 
would fail of representation. Only the Department would be privy to 
many such considerations and often it could be awkward and of 
possible embarrassment to relations with other countries for the De-
partment to bring these considerations to the fore. The result would 
be that the rule-making proceeding, far from affording an elucida-
tion of the reasons behind a policy decision, would provide a dis-
torted picture of the decision-making process.211> 
More specifically, the Department of State noted in 1957 that the 
Passport Office "does not . . . invite public participation in rule-
making. Many of the changes are quickly made as the result of 
confidential information concerning the international situation, the 
disclosure of which might affect foreign relations."216 
One can hardly quarrel with the assertion that exemption from 
usual rule-making procedures should be provided in those particular 
cases where all relevant or useful information necessary to the making 
of the specific policy decision involved is within the exclusive posses-
sion of the government because it is secret "in the interest of the 
national defense or foreign policy,"217 or because it is otherwise 
privileged. However, one may question why normal rule-making 
procedures should also be dispensed with when only some of the 
information relevant to a fully informed policy choice is in the ex-
clusive possession of the government. To the extent that the public 
can, through normal participation procedures, add to the storehouse 
of information maintained by the agency on the subject, the ultimate 
decision may be improved. That is, the mere fact that some informa-
tion directly relevant to the rule-making decision in question is 
·within the exclusive possession of the government does not vitiate 
213. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker). 
214. Id. at 388 (Department of State). 
215. Id. 
216. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 9 (Department of State), at 946. 
217. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970). 
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the usefulness of a section 553 proceeding since other directly rele-
vant information is available to the public. As a consequence, the 
agency still may learn something from the public's participation. 
The fact that the agency may finally make its decision in such a case 
on the basis of that information justifiably held secret does not 
change this conclusion. Public participation procedures were not 
intended to inform the public; rather, they were intended to educate 
the agency. Indeed, under normal section 553 procedures the public 
will not even know the precise content of the materials submitted 
in the rule-making process unless those who make such submittals 
to the agency publicize their contents, or unless some member of 
the public specifically demands to see those materials, as he has a 
right to do under the freedom-of-information provision of the Act.218 
On the other hand, this line of reasoning may be vulnerable on 
the ground that an exception limited to the situation where all of 
the information relevant to the rule-making decision is necessarily 
within the exclusive control of the agency is illusory. In every case 
where a rule involving a "military or foreign affairs function" is 
made, some relevant and important information bearing on that 
decision will be available to the public. More importantly, however, 
the Department of State has made a good point when it asserts that 
public procedures are inappropriate for those cases of rule-making 
where the ultimate decision is likely to be made on the basis of 
information that is necessarily in the exclusive possession of the gov-
ernment. In such cases, opinions expressed to the agency by members 
of the public availing themselves of the opportunity furnished by 
section 553 will usually be of little value since they are based on 
incomplete information. The agency, therefore, is unlikely to give 
them great weight. 
Public participation in such cases might, however, still be of 
value in assuring that the decision maker is fully informed since it 
may induce submission to the agency of some important relevant 
information that is in the public sector and not previously known 
by the agency; or it may furnish the agency with opinion, based on 
information in the public sector, that is of substantial value in mak-
ing the ultimate decision. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis this may 
suggest that public procedures are worth the cost even when some 
of the information directly relevant to the decision is not available 
to the public because it is privileged. On the other hand, those pro-
cedures are not worth the cost when the information that is neces-
218. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1970). 
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sarily the most important or relevant factor in making the final 
rule-making decision is not available to the public. Consequently, it 
may be desirable to exempt rule-making involving a "military or 
foreign affairs function" from normal procedural requirements in 
the latter case but not in the former. 
There is another class of situations involving subsection (a)(I) 
rule-making in which adherence to the usual procedures involving 
advance notice and an opportunity to participate may be deemed 
unreasonable. A situation occasionally arises in which the rule-mak-
ing in question is so insignificant or minor in nature and impact that 
utilization of these procedures may be a complete and predictable 
waste. A rule requiring persons receiving passports to sign them in 
ink or ball point rather than in pencil or crayon surely does not 
require public participation-nor, of course, do technical or other 
purely ministerial amendments to an existing rule. Rule-making of 
this sort should, therefore, not be subject to usual section 553 pro-
cedures. 
Previous discussion demonstrated that in certain types of cases 
rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions" should 
not be required to follow the usual procedures mandated by section 
553. Specific situations exist in which the policies favoring public 
participation in rule-making are outweighed by the conflicting need 
to operate our government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively, and 
inexpensively. These situations, however, break down into a number 
of well-defined classes that can be dealt with individually. They do 
not, therefore, constitute an adequate justification for the exemption 
of all rule-making activity involving the excepted functions; rather, 
they only suggest that suitable, narrowly drawn exceptions be pro-
vided for these particular types of cases. As subsequent discussion 
will demonstrate, a more narrowly tailored exemption already on 
the statute books can deal adequately with those cases of section 
553(a)(l) rule-making that need special treatment. Consequently, no 
persuasive reason appears to justify continuation of the present un-
qualified and across-the-board exemption for all rule-making involv-
ing "military or foreign affairs functions." 
A number of federal agencies making rules of this sort have at 
least tacitly recognized that an unqualified exemption for all rule-
making involving these functions is unnecessary. The Department 
of State, for example, has noted that section 553 procedures are 
appropriate for at least some rule-making involving "foreign affairs 
functions." In the course of congressional hearing-s on administra-
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tive-procedure reform, a spokesman for the Department emphasized 
that 
I want to make perfectly clear that I am not proposing that formal 
procedures are inappropriate to the exercise of all foreign affairs 
functions. I do believe that the Department is already fulfilling the 
underlying purposes of the proposed amendments to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act in those cases where formal procedures are suit-
able.219 
(This last point is, of course, debatable.) Consider also in this con-
nection the following additional statement by the Department of 
State. 
With respect to its regulatory activities, the Department has in 
the past published notice of proposed rulemaking in those areas 
not vitally impregnated with foreign policy considerations. Examples 
of this are found in various routine visa procedures. There are, how-
ever, other areas where foreign policy considerations may be para-
mount. In such areas, it is readily apparent that the Department 
requires a free hand to be able to discharge its mission. Examples of 
this are the determination of geographical limitations of general 
applicability on the issuance of passports and munitions control area 
in toto.220 
Referring to its rules involving "military and foreign affairs 
functions," the Department of the Treasury similarly asserted that 
"in many instances public participation in rule-making would be 
desirable, although not required with respect to the matter specified. 
The determination in any specific case, however, would have to be 
made with reference to the controlling facts and circumstances."221 
The Department of Defense has also tacitly admitted that an un-
qualified, across-the-board exemption for all rule-making involving 
"military functions" is unnecessary by voluntarily following section 
553 procedures for at least some rule-making that may involve a 
"military function."222 
It may be argued that since usual rule-making procedures are 
inappropriate for a substantially larger portion of subsection (a)(l) 
rule-making than for most other kinds of rule-making, the whole 
219. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 322 (Mr. Leonard Meeker). 
220. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 387. 
221. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. IO (Department of the Treasury), at 1017. 
222. Id., pt. 3 (Department of Defense), at 286: "Many of the rules considered 
herein are of military or naval significance. Since the procedures in paragraph 4 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act are followed in all cases, there has been no need to 
characterize particular rules as involving or not involving military or naval functions." 
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class-all "military and foreign affairs function" rule-making-
should be exempted from section 553 without qualification. The 
argument is that the burden of individually excluding, on a case-
by-case basis, each one of those many particular instances of such rule-
making that should be excluded from normal procedures is too great, 
when compared to the benefits obtained from those relatively few 
cases in which such rule-making should follow usual procedures. 
This view ought to be rejected for several reasons. 
First, the number of situations in which rule-making involving 
"military or foreign affairs functions" should follow usual section 
553 procedures is probably much larger than the affected agencies 
would admit. Closer examination reveals that in many of the in-
stances of such rule-making for which agencies claim exemption 
from section 553, the claims are unjustified in terms of actual need. 
What is more, past performance suggests that the overly broad 
exclusionary actions of the agencies with respect to public participa-
tion in these kinds of rule-making are unlikely to change very much 
absent a statutory requirement to the contrary or the credible threat 
of such a requirement. Second, the policy in favor of public participa-
tion is so weighty that it should be rejected only if the burden of 
administering a system of more narrowly tailored exemptions than 
those presently found in subsection (a)(l) is unduly large. As will be 
demonstrated, this is not a problem here. An existing, narrowly 
tailored exemption can exclude appropriate subsection (a)(l) rule-
making from usual procedures without excluding rule-making un-
deserving of that treatment; and it can do so without imposing an 
unduly large administrative burden on those charged with deciding 
whether particular rule-making involving these functions must follow 
ordinary procedures or is exempt from them for good cause. 
One last point should be noted with respect to the undesirability 
of the existing subsection (a)(l) exemptions. Discussion in earlier 
portions of this Article has demonstrated the vagueness of the terms 
"military function" and "foreign affairs function." The unusually 
large difficulty encountered in any effort to define satisfactorily their 
exact scope has meant, in practice, that they are susceptible to very 
wide application by agencies colorably entitled to rely on them. As 
a consequence, section 553(a)(l) is also undesirable because its ex-
cessive vagueness facilitates more widespread evasion of the con-
gressionally willed policy of public participation in rule-making than 
Congress is likely to have intended. At the very least, this suggests 
that subsection (a)(l) should be replaced with terms that are less 
vague and more easily definable in practice. As noted, however, this 
December 1972] Rule-Making 289 
is only an additional reason why section 553(a)(I) should not be 
continued. The chief reason this exemption should be eliminated 
is that it is unqualified and overbroad and, therefore, not justifiable 
on its merits. 
V. ARE EXISTING EXEMPTIONS ADEQUATE To SUPPORT 
A FLAT REPEAL OF SECTION 553(a)(l)? 
Previous discussion has demonstrated that agencies making rules 
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" must have freedom 
to ignore usual rule-making procedures in various types of situations. 
A flat repeal of section 553(a)(I) without more is, therefore, justified 
only if other existing exemptive provisions would satisfactorily ac-
complish this result. The following discussion will examine legiti-
mate agency needs for avoiding usual procedures in rule-making 
involving "military or foreign affairs functions," and determine 
whether existing exemptions, other than subsection (a)(l), can ade-
quately meet these needs, 
A. The Secrecy Exemption of Section 552(b )(1) 
Agencies must be allowed to ignore section 553 in those cases 
where the rule involving a "military or foreign affairs function" 
must be kept secret because of the harm to our "national defense or 
foreign policy" that would occur if it were made public. It seems 
clear, however, that where a rule is required to be kept secret under 
section 552(b)(l), the freedom-of-information section's exemptive 
provision, agencies may properly ignore usual rule-making require-
ments entirely without adversely affecting the validity of the rule in 
question. Similarly, when an "Executive order" under section 552 
(b)(I) mandates that the reasons for a rule, as opposed to the rule 
itself, be kept secret in the interest of "national defense or foreign 
policy," agencies would be excused from the section 553(c) require-
ment that the adopted rules incorporate "a concise general statement 
of their basis and purpose." The point is that in the formulation and 
promulgation of valid rules, agencies may ignore usual rule-making 
procedures to the extent that adherence to those procedures would 
interfere with a lawful secrecy requirement imposed by an executive 
order issued pursuant to section 552(b)(l). 
The present exemption from section 553 for rule-making involv-
ing a "military or foreign affairs function" is in no way necessary 
to accomplish this result. If pursuant to an exemption from the free-
dom-of-information section an agency must keep certain :rule~ secrett 
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or has the discretion to keep certain rules secret, advance notice and 
an opportunity for public comment thereon can be dispensed with 
despite the requirements of section 553. In such cases the effectiveness 
of the rules involved would not be impaired because it seems obvious 
that the publicity requirements of section 553 must be inapplicable 
to rules that are required to be kept secret or may be kept secret pur-
suant to a specific exemption from section 552. Section 552(b)(l) itself 
would, therefore, seem to dictate that if certain rules or the reasons 
therefor are "specifically" required to be kept secret in the interest 
of "national defense or foreign policy" by an "Executive order," 
they are necessarily exempted from all inconsistent requirements of 
section 553. That is, an agency is not required to violate a proper 
section 552(b)(l) executive order to comply with any provision of 
section 553. This reading of section 552(b)(l) against section 553 is 
the only sensible way to reconcile what otherwise might be conflict-
ing demands imposed by the two sections. Furthermore, the only 
situation in which an agency should be able to invoke secrecy as a 
ground to justify avoidance of any usual rule-making procedures, is 
when it may lawfully keep the rule, or the reasons therefor, secret 
under section 552. Otherwise, it would be seeking to use secrecy as 
a basis upon which to avoid usual rule-making procedures in a situa-
tion where section 552 confers upon the public a right to discover the 
contents of the rule or the reasons for it. 
It is clear that the term "secret" in this context means only that 
the relevant matter needs to be kept confidential in order for the 
agency to perform properly the function to which that matter per-
tains. That is, it 
is not intended in the sense of the technical security classification 
"secret" as defined in Section l(b) of Executive Order 10501, Safe-
guarding Official Information, but rather in the broad sense of 
matters which in the interest of [national defense or] foreign policy 
should not be prematurely disclosed, as for example, while interna-
tional negotiations are pending or before restraint determinations 
have been arrived at.22a 
Section 552(b)(l), therefore, insulates from any inconsistent require-
ment of section 553, all facets of section 553(a)(l) rule-making that 
must be kept secret in the broader sense because publicity would 
in some way be injurious to the successful conduct of our "national 
defense or foreign policy." To read section 552(b)(I) and section 553 
223. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 373 (Department of Commerce). See 3 C.F.R. 
306, 307 (1972). 
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differently would be out-of-step with the purpose behind the recent 
addition of the former's language to the AP A. 
Consequently, even if internal agency planning is regarded as 
"rule-making" under the AP A, virtually all strategic "military and 
foreign affairs function" planning would be exempt from the require-
ments of section 553 on this basis. Secrecy with respect to strategic 
planning will invariably be required by executive order because 
revealing such plans will usually interfere with the very purpose 
they seek to achieve-an advantage over our adversaries. As will 
be seen, this is not the only basis under existing law whereby such 
strategic planning, assuming it is deemed rule-making, would be 
exempt from usual rule-making procedures in the event section 
553(a)(l) is repealed. 
B. The Sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) Exemptions 
While section 552(b)(l) may enable agencies to ignore usual 
procedural requirements when they make section 553(a)(l) rules 
that must be kept secret, what provisions may be used to exempt 
the other situations mentioned earlier in this Article? If subsection 
(a)(l) were repealed, would other exemptions assure that agencies 
making rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions" could 
ignore usual procedures when they need to react quickly in emer-
gency situations? Would other exemptions assure that agencies mak-
ing such rules could ignore usual procedures when adherence to them 
would cause the very evil that the rule seeks to avoid, defeat the 
purpose of the rule, or result in other undesirable consequences? 
Are usual procedures for making such rules currently avoidable 
under exemptions other than subsection (a)(l) if the most important 
information relating to the rules' form or desirability is necessarily 
within the exclusive possession of the national government? Are the 
usual procedures currently avoidable under other exemptions for 
rules that are so insignificant or minor that public procedures are 
predictably a complete waste of effort? As subsequent discussion will 
demonstrate, the answer to all of the above questions is "yes." 
According to section 553(b)(B), the provisions of section 553(b)-
(c) are inapplicable "when the agency for good cause finds (and incor-
porates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the 
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are imprac-
ticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." This exemp-
tion from two subsections of section 553 deserves careful examination. 
It may satisfactorily handle all of the problems that would arise if 
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the current exemption for rule-making involving "military or foreign 
affairs functions" were repealed. And it may do so in a manner nar-
rowly tailored to fit the specific problem. Section 553(b)(B) is espe-
cially narrowly tailored because it is qualified and limited, and 
requires an administrative assessment of the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding each case of rule-making to which it is 
sought to be applied. The reports of the Senate and House com-
mittees responsible for the AP A clearly stated: 
The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is not an 
"escape clause" in the sense that any agency has discretion to dis-
regard its terms or the facts. A true and supported or supportable 
finding of necessity or emergency must be made and published.224 
By this, the committees intended to establish a restrictive meaning 
for the phrase "when the agency for good cause finds," which precedes 
the enumeration of the grounds upon which this particular exemp-
tion is available. 
Therefore, the agencies are required under this provision to make 
specific findings, and thus to meet what has been interpreted to be 
a strict standard, before they can avail themselves of the exemption. 
Although some commentators have argued that the courts should 
not examine the accuracy of the required administrative finding 
when the validity of an agency's use of this exemption arises in liti-
gation,225 this finding is clearly judicially reviewable on the same 
basis as any other finding committed to an agency's judgment.226 
Thus, if the finding is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law" or is "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence" based on the whole record, it will, in a proper suit, 
be set aside and the promulgated rule rendered invalid.227 Of course, 
in such cases the presumption of validity will be, as it always is, with 
the administrative agency, and the burden of overturning its finding 
will rest upon the assailant. 
224. LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 13, at 200, 258. See also id. at 358 (remarks 
of Representative Walter). 
225. See R. PARKER, AnMINISl'RATIVE I.Aw 182-83 (1952); Nathanson, Some Com-
ments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 Iu.. L. REv. 368, 384-86 (1946). 
226. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); Durkin v. Edward S. 
Wagner Co., 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), affd. per curiam sub nom. Mitchell v. 
Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955). 
See also National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 
(D.D.C. 1967). In this last case, it is not clear whether section 553(b)(B) or section 
553(b)(A) was involved. 
227. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (2)(E) (1970). See also cases cited in note 226 supra. 
But see Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), discussed 
in text accompanying note 255 infra. 
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There is one interpretation of section 553(b)(B) that should be 
rejected at the outset. It can be argued that an agency seeking to 
come within the section 553(b )(B) exemption must find that it is 
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" for 
the agency to follow the procedures of section 553(b) in each separate 
rule-making case to which it seeks to apply the exemption, and that 
it cannot make that finding wholesale for any narrowly tailored class 
or group of rule-making situations. This interpretation relies upon 
certain somewhat ambiguous language in the provision, "when the 
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief 
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)." It also relies 
upon the supposed intention of Congress to provide a means by 
which individual cases could be separately considered on their own 
merits, and an exemption granted only in those specific cases in 
which it was justified on one of the grounds stated. 
While the above argument has great merit and is a sound general 
rule by which to construe section 553(b)(B), it overlooks two points. 
First, it may be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest" to follow usual section 553 procedures in every instance of 
a specific type of rule-making under a particular statute, when each 
such instance is viewed in isolation. In those circumstances it seems 
a waste to require repetitive and redundant findings and full publica-
tion of those :findings. As will be explained later, strategic military 
planning and strategic foreign policy planning are examples of this 
kind of situation. 
Second, there are also situations where compliance with the pro-
cedures of section 553(b)-(c) is not "impracticable" or "contrary to 
the public interest" as applied to any single instance of rule-making 
on a given subject, but becomes so for a whole class if those require-
ments must be followed for all such similar instances of rule-making. 
For example, so many different rules of a particular type may have 
to be issued within a short time period that affording notice and an 
opportunity to participate in every case would be practically impos-
sible, and would frustrate the proper performance of the agency's 
functions or cause other substantial deleterious consequences. Rules 
promulgated for individual military bases by the commander of each 
base in light of its peculiar conditions and circumstances may pro-
vide an example of this kind of situation. Certainly the day-to-day 
orders of military superiors to inferiors, if they are rules, would serve 
as an example. Procedures of the type specified in section 553 may 
not be "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" with 
respect to any one such determination viewed in isolation; but those 
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procedures may become so when they must be applied to all such 
determinations. 
The exemption contained in section 553(b)(B), therefore, should 
be read to allow an agency to make the requisite finding for a whole 
class of rule-making. But this should be permitted only if the agency 
can make that finding either as to every individual instance of rule-
making within the class considered separately, or as to every individ-
ual instance of rule-making within the class because it would be 
"impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" to impose section 
553 procedures in all instances. Of course, agencies must be required 
to draw classes for this purpose as narrowly as possible so that no 
more is excluded under this exception than is absolutely justifiable 
in terms of the statutory criteria. Overbreadth of any kind in de-
lineating such a class of rules should not be tolerated. Consideration 
might also be given to shifting the burden of proof to the agency 
with respect to such group delineations as opposed to individual cas~ 
delineations, and thus forcing the agency to justify its definition of 
the "class" of rule-making it seeks to exclude from usual procedures. 
Such a limitation, however, may not be necessary and may have some 
undesirable consequences. 
The Administrative Conference of the United States commented 
on this subject when it proposed the "Elimination of Certain Exemp-
tions [found in section 553(a)(2)] From the APA Rulemaking Re-
quirements." The Conference concluded: A section 553(b)(B) finding 
that adherence to usual procedures would be "impracticable, un-
necessary, or contrary to the public interest . . • can be made, and 
published in the Federal Register, as to an entire subject matter 
concerning which rules may be promulgated. Each finding of this 
type should be no broader than essential .... "228 Similarly, while 
in the United States Attorney General's Office, Justice Rehnquist 
stated that "where it is evident to an agency that notice and public 
procedure will always be inappropriate to a particular class of rule-
making, there is no objection to making this finding and basing 
future actions upon it." He suggested, however, that "a boiler plate 
recitation or incorporation by reference [ of the class finding] must 
be published as part of each rulemaking action" because this "is 
more consistent with a literal interpretation of section 553(b)(B) and 
seems to me to be the better practice." Justice Rehnquist was more 
guarded in his response to the question, "whether an agency may 
228. Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8, at 29-ll0. 
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determine that notice and public procedure are 'impracticable' with 
respect to a whole class of cases simply because of the unusually large 
number of cases involved and despite the fact that as to any one such 
case [viewed in isolation] such a procedure might not be imprac-
ticable." After suggesting that this question cannot be "answered in 
the abstract," and expressing some uncertainty about its merits, he 
stated that "the language of section 553(b)(B) is not so clear as to 
preclude the interpretation ... [suggested and] it does not appear 
that there is any authority which would rule out such an interpreta-
tion." Finally, Justice Rehnquist suggested that any doubt on this 
issue could be completely eliminated "by legislative history made in 
the course of the consideration of [an] amendment" of the type being 
considered here.220 
The grounds specified in section 553(b)(B) upon which an agency 
may dispense with the usual rule-making procedures are stated in the 
alternative, so that any one of the three grounds listed is sufficient to 
invoke the exemption.230 The first ground for a qualified exemption 
is when the notice and participation requirements of section 553 are 
found to be "impracticable." Websters defines this term as mean-
ing, among other things, "infeasible," "impractical, unwise, impru-
dent."231 Earlier drafts of the AP A would have made the exemption 
available when the public rule-making procedures were "impractica-
ble because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency,"232 but 
the qualifying language after "impracticable" was subsequently 
dropped. The Senate and House reports on the AP A stated that "im-
practicable" refers to a situation "in which the due and required 
execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented 
by its undertaking public rulemaking proceedings."233 
The term "unnecessary," which is the second exemptive ground 
specified in section 553(b)(B), connotes something that is "not 
necessary: useless, needless."234 The legislative history indicates that 
it must be unnecessary "so far as the public is concerned, as would 
229. Undated letter from William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Jerre Williams, Chairman, Administrative Conference of 
the United States. 
2!10. A1TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at !10. 
231. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 11!!6. 
2!12. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note l!!, at 140, 148, 157. See also id. at 181, a draft 
reading "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency affecting 
public safety or health." 
2!18. Id. at 200,258. Accord, ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 80. 
2!14, WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 2504. 
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be the case if a minor or merely technical amendment in which the 
public is not particularly interested were involved."235 On this basis, 
one court seems to have concluded that "unnecessary" applies to 
situations in which an agency rule is "minor or emergency in charac-
ter,"236 or " 'a routine determination,' 'insignificant in nature and 
impact,' and unimportant 'to the industry and to the public.' "237 
Rule-making is also exempted by section 553(b)(B) from advance 
notice and public participation when adherence to those procedures 
would be "contrary to the public interest." According to the AP A's 
legislative history, this phrase "supplements the terms 'impracticable' 
or 'unnecessary'; it requires that public rule-making procedures shall 
not prevent an agency from operating and that, on the other hand, 
lack of public interest in rule-making warrants an agency to dispense 
with public procedure."288 The Attorney General's Manual takes the 
position that " '[p ]ublic interest' connotes a situation in which the 
interest of the public would be defeated by any requirement of ad-
vance notice.''239 
At some point during their legislative history. all three terms-
"impracticable," "unnecessary," and "contrary to the public interest" 
-were referred to as operating "only where facts and interests are 
such that notice and proceedings are impossible or manifestly un-
necessary,''240 and as exempting "situations of emergency or neces-
sity."241 However, the weight of their legislative history. as well as 
their language, clearly establishes that these terms were not meant 
to be so narrowly limited. At the same time, it must be remembered 
that these are qualified grounds for exemption and are not to be 
construed more broadly than the demands of sound government ad-
ministration and wise public policy require. It is worth repeating 
that the section 553(b)(B) exemption is "not an 'escape' clause in the 
sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the 
facts.''242 An agency can use this exemption only if it has "good 
cause" within the meaning of the AP A. 
A more detailed description of how the section 553(b)(B) exemp-
235. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 258. See also ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S 
MANuAL, supra note 13, at 31. 
236. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969). 
237. 412 F.2d at 743, citing National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v. United States, 
268 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 1967). 
238. l.EcISLATIVE HlsroRY, supra note 13, at 200, 258. 
239. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31. 
240. LEGISLATIVE HISIORY, supra note 13, at 358. 
241. Id. at 200, 258. 
242. Id. See text accompanying note 224 supra. 
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tion might operate in practice demonstrates that it could satisfac-
torily handle all the problems resulting from a repeal of section 
553(a)(l)-and in so doing, rationally accommodate the need for 
public participation in rule-making, on the one hand, with the need 
for efficient, effective, expeditious, and inexpensive government ad-
ministration on the other. Although the terms "impracticable," "un• 
necessary," and "contrary to the public interest" overlap to some 
extent, an effort will be made to examine their applications sepa• 
rately. But in light of the very close relationship between these terms, 
the following analyses of their applications should also be considered 
as partially overlapping. 
Consider, first, the exemption for situations where public pro-
cedures are found to be "unnecessary." This could undoubtedly 
perform the function intended by the exception for "minor revisions 
and refinements of rules," which is found in several bills that sought 
to rewrite section 553.243 Indeed, the existing language can probably 
do so more satisfactorily because it is more narrowly tailored. For 
example, the "unnecessary" exemption seems to cover situations 
where a rule is in fact so minor, such as the rule requiring passports 
to be signed in ink rather than in pencil, that public procedures 
would be a predictable waste. Under this exemption public proce-
dures may also be dispensed with for rules announcing exact rates 
under statutes making the calculation of those rates purely minis• 
terial because, for example, the rate set must be a certain specified 
percentage of another known figure.244 Similarly, usual rule-making 
procedures are also "unnecessary" for mere technical changes in 
regulations. If, for example, the statutory citations contained in a 
regulation must be altered to conform to changes in the numbering 
of the United States Code, or regulations are rewritten or reorga-
nized purely to improve their style, and without altering their sub-
stance, it is obviously "unnecessary" to resort to public procedures. 
Additionally, if all or the most important information relating 
to the form or desirability of a rule is necessarily within the exclusive 
possession of the national government, a section 553 rule-making 
proceeding would seem unwarranted. In this circumstance, the pub-
243. See, e.g., S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b)(2) (1964). 
244. See, e.g., 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 89, pt. 1 (Department of Agriculture), 
at 26·27. The Department may dispense with usual procedures, under the "unnecessary" 
exemption, for rules announcing the exact penalty rates applicable to marketing of 
certain commodities in excess of the farm marketing quota. The Department's action 
in those cases only involved a mathematical calculation, for the rates are set by law 
as a certain percentage of parity or support price of the commodity as of a particular 
date. 
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lie could not contribute anything meaningful to improve the product 
of the agency's decision-making process. Thus, by definition, ad-
herence to usual procedures in situations of this sort would be 
predictably unproductive, and hence "unnecessary." All, or the most 
important, information relating to the form or desirability of a rule 
may necessarily be in the exclusive possession of the national govern-
ment because it is properly kept secret under section 552(b)(l). Ac-
cording to the agencies involved, this is particularly true with re-
spect to a substantial amount of the rule-making involving "military 
and foreign affairs functions."245 To the extent they are right, such 
rule-making may be exempted from usual procedure requirements 
by section 553(b)(B). 
Agencies should not be permitted to decide lightly that public 
procedures are "unnecessary" within the meaning of this qualified 
exemption. In Texaco~ Inc. v. FPC246 the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit considered an FPC regulation promulgated without 
resort to the public procedures of section 553(b)-(c). The regulation 
required natural gas companies to pay a compound interest rate, for 
the first time, on all amounts refunded to their customers because of 
overcharges resulting from new rates subsequently found to be un-
justified. After considering all of the Commission's arguments, the 
court held that the rule was invalid because of the FPC's failure to 
follow the procedures of section 553(b)-(c) in its promulgation. 
The court in Texaco explained that "[t]he rule does not fall 
within the 'unnecessary' exception relied on by the Commission 
since it cannot be classified as either minor or emergency in charac-
ter ."247 The judges refused to accept the argument that the section 
553 procedures were "unnecessary," since they found that "the com-
pound rate would affect numerous jurisdictional gas companies and 
potentially involves large sums of money."248 The court also ex-
pressly rejected the Commission's contention that the procedures 
were "unnecessary" because the new rule imposed no obligation on 
affected parties that could not have been imposed on them by ad hoc 
adjudicatory orders in each case. "The crucial fact is that the Com-
mission elected to proceed in this case by making a general rule and, 
when engaged in rule-making, it must comply with the procedural 
requirements imposed on rule-making by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which it failed to do .... "249 
245. See text accompanying notes 212-16 supra. 
246. 412 F.2d 740 (1969). 
247. 412 F.2d at 743. 
248. 412 F.2d at 743. 
249. 412 F.2d at 745. 
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By holding as it did, the court in Texaco seems to have taken the 
position that the ability of an agency to achieve the same result as 
a rule by another means, such as ad hoc adjudication, does not make 
the requirements of section 553(b)-(c) "unnecessary" when the 
agency in fact elects to achieve that result through rule-making. This 
Article is not the place to explore fully the wisdom of that result.250 
However, a number of general points are worth making here. The 
result in Texaco can be justified in light of the fact that the AP A 
favors public participation in rule-making in all cases except those 
where very good reasons preclude it; the fact that the rule was not 
minor in its effects and had a large financial impact on many com-
panies;251 and the fact that the agency did make a conscious choice 
to proceed by rule-making which would result in an order of general 
applicability rather than by an ad hoc order in each case.252 On the 
other hand, one of the undesirable effects of this decision may be to 
discourage the use of general rules in favor of ad hoc adjudication, 
a result that is usually contrary to the sound administration of regu-
latory policies.25s 
The "unnecessary" exemption should also not allow agencies to 
avoid section 553 procedures on the ground that a rule has only a 
small impact on a very limited segment of the public and is there-
fore "minor" or "unimportant." It is wise to have well-informed 
decision-making and citizen participation in rule-making that has a 
relatively small impact on limited segments of the public, as well as 
in those actions that have a great impact on large portions of the 
public. The size of the group harmed is in no way related to the size 
or nature of the individual interest that may be worthy of the pro-
tection accorded by a right of public participation. And the magni-
tude of the harm inflicted on a class is, as a general proposition, not 
a reliable guarantee of the efficacy or usefulness of public participa-
tion in improving the operation of government or in relieving un-
usual individual pain. A small inconvenience to some may be large 
to others whose circumstances are different or peculiar. At any rate, 
250. Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (agency order issued to a 
party in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding valid and enforceable, even though 
the same requirement announced as a prospective rule in the course of an adjudication 
would be void because it failed to follow the rule-making requirements of section 553). 
See generally Comment, Wyman-Gordon and the Excelsior Rule, 117 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
621 (1969). 
251. 412 F.2d at 743 n.7. 
252. 412 F.2d at 744 n.9. 
253. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); NLRB 
v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Auerbach, Should 
Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 WIS. L. R.Ev. 95; Sha-
piro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of J!Jdminis-
trative Policy, 78 HARv. L R.Ev. 921 (1965). 
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since several very minor inconveniences or impositions by govern-
ment can add up to major ones, government should not be allowed 
to act insensitively toward the former. The "unnecessary" exemption 
should not, therefore, be a vehicle to avoid public participation 
merely because, as a general proposition, the injury worked on in-
dividuals is estimated to be relatively small, or the number of per-
sons involved is few.254 Of course, some of the usual procedures can 
be avoided on other bases when the number of individuals affected 
by a proposed rule is very small. For instance, under section 553(b) 
notice of proposed rule-making need not be published if the persons 
"subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise 
have actual notice thereof!' 
As noted, the term "unnecessary" as it now appears in section 
553(b)(B) probably means that usual procedures may be ignored 
only when they are of no value or help in light of the purposes for 
which public participation is desired. But with the aid of some cor-
roborating legislative history, which could be supplied at the time 
section 553(a)(l) is altered or repealed, the term "unnecessary" could 
also provide an express statutory vehicle by which executive privilege 
may be invoked. This term could be deemed to mean that the usual 
procedures may be ignored when they are "useless" because they may 
not constitutionally be forced on the executive branch. As will be 
noted, there are types of "military or foreign affairs function" rule-
making that may be beyond Congress' authority to regulate even 
on a purely procedural basis because they involve matters vested 
wholly and exclusively in the President by the Constitution. While 
the "unnecessary" exemption is not an essential tool for the invoca-
254. Note the following illustration in this connection: 
One congressional office got a host of complaints from people, not only in that 
area, but throughout the country, on an unimportant rule which an agency had 
made without any public notice or hearing, related to public property. It related 
to how many pounds of pertrified wood you could take off the premises of a 
national reservation of some type. And this agency had thought-well, it is a 
terrible thing to lose all these hunks of stone, so they-within their own internal 
organization, they came up with one pound, or something like that. 
This provoked all this correspondence to Congress. 
So the congressional people involved went down to the agency ••• [which). 
said-"Oh, well, we realize we made a mistake, we will raise it to five pounds.• 
So the congressmen went back and said we solved the problem. The agency said yes, 
very unimportant. 
Well, that provoked ten times more mail than came in the first time, because 
it turned out that five pounds just didn't qualify under the standards by which 
petrified wood is traded in the market of ••• collectors •• , • It has to be a bigger 
poundage. 
Well, the moral of that particular story was that this supposedly minor rule ••• 
turned out to be important to a lot of people in this country, and the fact that 
the agency did not give public notice, and give the public a chance to express 
its opinion, caused a heck of a lot of trouble for an awful lot of people. 
Transcript, ABA Symposium on S. 1386, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1966, at 110-11, 
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tion of executive immunity, it may be desirable to make it a vehicle 
for that purpose--even the exclusive vehicle, if that is constitutionally 
possible. The section 553(b)(B) procedural requirements of a formal 
finding that notice and public participation would be "impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," followed by publica-
tion of the finding with the reasons therefor, would ensure careful 
consideration of the necessity and lawfulness of any claim of executive 
immunity before it is made, and thereby eliminate some legislative-
executive conflict while increasing public participation in rule-mak-
ing. It would also avoid misunderstandings because the fact of the 
immunity claim and its nature are made completely clear to all. 
Of course, an agency's determination on this issue would be 
subject to judicial review. There is certainly no nonjusticiable politi-
cal question involved. The issue is only whether the agency was 
justified, as a matter of law, in determining that adherence to usual 
procedures was "unnecessary" because the rule-making in question 
is a product of exclusive presidential authority. Judicial review of a 
section 553(b)(B) "unnecessary" finding based on a claim of execu-
tive privilege is different from the situation presented in Chicago &-
Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.255 There, the 
United States Supreme Court held unreviewable the merits of an 
administrative determination that certain American air carriers 
should be accorded air routes to foreign countries. The Court did 
not refuse to define the exclusive competence of the executive 
branch. Rather, after defining it, the Court refused only to review 
an administrative determination that was inseparably linked to an 
exercise of that exclusive competence. 
This situation is more like Powell v. McCormack,256 which deter-
mined whether Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority 
when it sought to impose certain qualifications, other than those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, on the election of rep-
resentatives. In reviewing a section 553(b)(B) finding that usual rule-
making procedures are "unnecessary" because the "military or for-
eign affairs function" policy involved is allegedly a product of ex-
clusive presidential powers, the Court need do no more than it did 
in Powell. It need only determine whether or not the particular 
rule-making involved is in fact a product of exclusive executive 
authority under the Constitution, just as the Court in Powell deter-
mined whether the additional qualifications imposed on representa-
255. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
256. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
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tives were in fact a product of exclusive congressional authority. 
Only the Court is in a position to resolve successfully a dispute of 
that sort between the other two coequal branches. 
The "impracticable" exemption could adequately deal with a 
number of different situations in which a requirement of advance 
notice of rule-making and public participation therein would be 
unreasonable. In emergency cases where a rule is needed imme-
diately to avoid injury or frustration of a program's objectives, 
the usual procedures of section 553(b)-(c) can be disregarded because 
they are "impracticable." According to the Attorney General's 
Manual, for example, an agency may learn "that certain rules con-
cerning ... safety should be issued or amended without delay; with 
the safety of the ... public at stake, the ... [agency] could find that 
notice and public rule-making procedures would be 'impracticable,' 
and issue its rules immediately."257 
The Department of Agriculture has properly stated that the 
same rationale is equally applicable when the Department must 
impose or modify animal or plant quarantines promptly to prevent 
the spread of diseases or insect pests; or when the Department makes 
orders under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 192!258 to continue 
temporary rate schedules previously authorized after notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, if prompt action is necessary to avoid a 
reversion to rates and charges that are unrealistic in light of existing 
economic conditions; or when the Department finds under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933259 that last minute changes 
in acreage allotments and marketing quota regulations are necessary 
because farmers must know of such changes prior to planting.260 
To force adherence to the procedures of section 553 in any of these 
situations would be "impracticable" because time is of the essence. 
Consider also the situation presented in Durkin v. Edward S. 
Wagner Co.261 In an earlier decision involving the same parties, 
the court had held that particular workers were not covered by 
certain regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.262 This 
257. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANuAL, supra note 13, at 30-31. See also 195'1 HOUSE 
SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. UC (Independent Agencies-Interstate Commerce Com-
mission), at 1760. 
258. 7 u.s.c. §§ 181-229 (1970). 
259. 7 u.s.c. §§ 601-23 (1970). 
260. 1957 HouSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 1 (Department of Agriculture), at 26-27. 
See also Dighton v. Coffman, 178 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. m. 1959), afjd., 279 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 
1960). 
261. 115 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), afjd. per curiam sub nom. Mitchell v. Edward 
S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955). 
262. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1970). 
December 1972] Rule-Making 303 
holding was contrary to the interpretation and practice of the Ad-
ministrator of the Wage and Hour Division-an interpretation 
known and relied upon by the industry involved. As an immediate 
response to this decision, and without resort to usual rule-making 
procedures, the Administrator promulgated a rule that included 
those workers within the relevant regulations. When the new rule 
was issued, the Administrator stated that it would be "impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" to follow usual rule-
making procedures in the making of this "clarifying" regulation: 
[I]mmediately effective clarification of the regulations is essential 
in order to accomplish the intent of the present regulations to safe-
guard the wage standards in the industry, to eliminate the unfair 
competitive situation, and to provide for adequate enforcement of 
the home work restrictions.2as 
On the basis of this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to 
the contrary, the court held that the rule was properly treated as 
within the section 553(b)(B) exception.264 
The court's result seems justifiable because any delay in promul-
gation of the rule would have encouraged employers to abandon 
their previous adherence to the Administrator's interpretation of 
the earlier rule until a new rule to the same effect was formally 
adopted. This would have hurt countless employees who had come 
to rely on the prior interpretation. It also would have injured those 
employers who chose, despite their competitors' contrary action, to 
keep their wages at the levels demanded by the earlier interpretation 
during the period in which the new rule was being adopted with 
public procedures. 
As noted earlier in this Article, there are many situations where 
agencies making rules involving "military or foreign affairs func-
tions" must be able to act quickly to fulfill their mission properly.265 
In those cases where usual rule-making procedures would unduly 
hinder this necessary capacity for speed they are, of course, "im-
263. II5 F. Supp. at 122. 
264. II5 F. Supp. at 122-23. On appeal, the court said: 
Judge Galston has found that the defendant's operations fall within the 
amended regulations and that the regulations were properly promulgated under 
the Administrative Procedure Act •..• "\Ve see no reason to overturn his well-
reasoned conclusions. "\Vhile there was no advance notice of the amendment, 
yet that was not necessary, both because of its nature as an "interpretive" rule and 
because of the Administrator's finding of "good cause" for immediate action, based 
upon the fact that other employers in general were complying with this inter-
pretation of the Act and defendant had long known of the view held by the 
Administrator. 
217 F.2d at 304. 
265. See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra. 
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practicable" within the meaning of section 553(b)(B). Agencies mak-
ing subsection (a)(I) rules may, as a result, avoid usual procedures 
in such cases by resort to this limited exemption. Proper reliance on 
the "impracticable" exemption because of a special need for speedy 
agency action is likely to be more frequent in cases involving 
"military or foreign affairs functions" rule-making than in cases 
involving other types of rule-making. The peculiar nature of 
"military and foreign affairs" dictates this conclusion. On the basis 
of a need for speed alone, for example, much strategic military and 
foreign policy formulation will be exempt from usual procedures 
under section 553(b)(B). 
Either the "impracticable" or "contrary to the public interest" 
exemption, or both, must be deemed to exempt rule-making from 
usual procedures when adherence to these procedures would cause 
the very evil that the rule seeks to avoid or would sabotage the rule's 
effectiveness. An agency can ignore usual rule-making procedures 
under section 553(b)(B) whenever advance notice would tend to 
defeat a rule's purpose, because in such situations those procedures 
would certainly be "contrary to the public interest."266 In practice, 
usual rule-making procedures have been deemed "impracticable" 
or "contrary to the public interest" when, for instance, there is 
"danger that certain companies might take advantage of the interim 
period to effect transactions which the rule is designed to prevent 
or control and thus escape the intended regulation of conduct 
altogether."261 Normal procedures have also been deemed avoidable 
on those bases in cases where they would "permit speculators or 
others to reap unfair profits or to interfere with the [agency's] 
action taken.''268 A proposed revision of section 553 contained a 
specific exemption for "matters with respect to which notice of 
proposed rulemaking would seriously impair effectiveness of a 
rule."269 There seems little doubt, however, that the function sought 
to be performed by that proposed revision is adequately performed 
by the existing "contrary to the public interest" terminology. 
Other situations that may involve section 553(a)(l) rule-making 
illustrate how the "contrary to the public interest" exemption would 
266. See 1941 Hearings, supra note 20, at 812, See also AnoRNEY GENERA.L's 
MANUAL, supra note 13, at 31. 
267. B. SCHWARTZ, AN !NTRODUcrlON TO .AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE L\W 62 (1958) 
(Securities and Exchange Commission). 
268. 12 C.F.R. § 262.2(e) (1972). See also S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 36'1 
(Federal Reserve Board). 
269. S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h)(6) (1967), 
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properly release an agency from following usual procedures. The 
Department of Commerce has reported, for example: 
In the exercise of priority and allocation functions [under the De-
fense Production Act of 1950] speed in the issuance of orders and 
regulations is often essential as prior notice of proposed govern-
mental action would tend to defeat the purpose intended to be ac-
complished thereby. For example, notice of intention to place 
certain materials under production control or to limit acquisition 
thereof might create panic buying in an effort to get the jump on 
the regulation and on competitors.270 
In such cases the Bureau of Defense Services Administration has 
concluded that the section 553(b)(B) exemption may properly be 
invoked on the grounds that adherence to usual procedures would 
be "contrary to the public interest."271 In the same vein, adherence 
to usual procedures may be dispensed with as "impracticable" or 
"contrary to the public interest" when import controls are imposed 
on textiles, or embargoes are imposed by the Department of Trea-
sury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. In the first of these cases 
arguably involving "foreign affairs function" rule-making-the tex-
tile program--compliance with the advance notice requirements 
could stimulate exports to the United States of the very goods that 
might later be subject to import limitations, thereby causing some 
of the evil sought to be prevented. And "if it were publicly known 
that the United States was definitely going to impose a financial 
embargo on a particular country at a certain time there would, 
within a matter of several hours, be a virtually complete transfer 
of all its public and private liquid assets to other countries. Obviously, 
therefore, public hearings would nullify the proposed embargo en-
tirely."272 
On this basis it is also "impracticable" or "contrary to the public 
interest" to follow usual rule-making procedure in the making of 
most, if not all, strategic military policy and strategic foreign policy. 
Even if the strategic policy involved need not be kept secret after it 
is implemented, utilization of usual rule-making procedures in its 
formulation will usually be disastrous because they will reveal the 
intended scope of such policy in advance of its actual implemen-
tation. If the "other side" is aware of the contemplated policy of this 
270. 1957 HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. 2 (Department of Commerce), at 115 
(in reference to its functions under the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. 
§§ 2061-168 (1970)). 
271. Id. 
272. 1969 Survey Response (Department of the Treasury), See text accompanying 
notes 207-08 supra. 
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country before that policy is actually put into effect in concrete 
public action, the very purposes sought to be accomplished may be 
defeated, the evils sought to be avoided may be caused, or the "other 
side" may be enabled to evade the effects of that strategy. Conse-
quently, adherence to normal procedures in these cases is "imprac-
ticable" or "contrary to the public interest" within the meaning of 
section 553 (b)(B).21a 
There is also no reason why the "contrary to the public interest" 
language of section 553(b)(B) cannot serve as a satisfactory means 
for accommodating the need for public rule-making procedures on 
the one hand, and the need for inexpensive, expeditious, effective, 
and efficient government administration on the other. The function 
performed by exemptive language such as "occasion delay or expense 
disproportionate to the public interest," which appeared in a bill 
introduced several years ago in an effort to revise completely the 
rule-making provision,274 can easily be performed under section 
553(b )(B) by balancing the relevant considerations under the stan-
dard "contrary to the public interest." 
It has been suggested that the "contrary to the public interest" 
terminology should allow the Department of Labor an exemption 
for the wage determinations it makes under the Davis-Bacon275 and 
related acts because of the especially large number of such "rules" 
that the Department must continually make during a limited 
period.276 The factual basis for this conclusion is set forth in the 
following passage: 
[T]he Davis-Bacon Act and some 45 related acts for Federal and 
Federally assisted construction contracts ... provide that the specifi-
cations for all such contracts shall require the contractor to pay to 
his laborers and mechanics at least the prevailing wage as determined 
by the Secretary of Labor. The determinations are made by the 
Secretary at the request of the contracting agency before the bids are 
let. 
Application of the formal rule-making requirements of section 
[553] would require some 500 to 600 notices of proposed rulemaking 
to be published each week in the Federal Register. Interested per-
273. Of course, as noted earlier, reliance on an executive order under section 
552(b)(l) may satisfy the need for an exemption in this situation as well 
274. See S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003(£) (1964). This bill would have com-
pletely revised the rule-making section of the AP A. 
275. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-5 (1970). See also, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970). 
276. Participants in the deliberations of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States at the time Recommendation No. 16 was being considered expressly 
articulated this view on a number of different occasions and relied thereon in adopting 
the Recommendation. 
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sons would have an opportunity ... [to participate in each case]. The 
processing of the submitted data, views, and arguments could result 
in obvious delays and additional personnel and other costs.277 
In this program, the magnitude of the adverse consequences that 
would result from an application of standard rule-making procedures 
to the particular determinations involved were deemed to outweigh 
any positive good that might result from requiring adherence to 
normal procedures. An exemption from usual requirements should, 
therefore, be allowed in this situation under the "contrary to the 
public interest" language. In many other situations the facts may 
dictate the same result with respect to the determination of contract 
specifications, if they are "rules." 
Similarly, rules affecting the public that are promulgated on a 
day-to-day basis for individual military bases by the commander 
of each base, may also properly be exempted from usual procedures 
because of their sheer volume. There are hundreds of armed forces 
bases at home and abroad, and every year the commander of each 
of these bases makes scores of rules affecting the public that are 
tailored to the peculiar needs and circumstances of his base or the 
military property under his control.278 Rules regarding public access 
to the base and use of its facilities are examples. Given the huge 
number of such rules in aggregate that may be promulgated by all 
base commanders every year, a Davis-Bacon Act argument might be 
equally applicable: It may be "contrary to the public interest" to 
require adherence to normal procedures for rules promulgated by 
individual base commanders for their particular bases, as distin-
guished from rules promulgated by the Department of the Army 
for all Army bases generally. Even though it may not be "contrary 
to the public interest" to force adherence to normal procedures for 
each such base rule considered separately, running the aggregate 
of all such rules through that procedure may be so burdensome, time-
consuming, and expensive that it is unjustifiable in light of the 
potential benefits. A class .finding with respect to rules of this par-
ticular type may, therefore, be made on the basis of their huge and 
unmanageable number, just as it may be done in the Davis-Bacon 
Act situation. But the class must be narrowly drawn to satisfy section 
553(b)(B) and the volume of rules involved must in fact be as large 
as here supposed-a point that requires empirical verification. 
The same argument can be made with respect to all everyday 
277. S. !JIB Hearings, supra note 127, at 239-40. 
278. See Department of the Army, Military Reservations, ch. X (Pamphlet 27-164, 
Oct. 1965). 
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command orders issued by one member of the armed forces to 
another, if they are rules within the AP A definition.279 Uncounted 
millions of such orders are issued every year directing the manner 
in which ordinary military duties are to be performed. A narrowly 
tailored finding that rule-making in this category should be exempt 
under the "contrary to the public interest" language of section 
553(b)(B) would, therefore, also be fully justified on a volume basis 
alone. In most situations, resort to usual procedures for such rule-
making would also be "impracticable" or "unnecesary" on other 
bases. However, as will be seen, most if not all of the orders of this 
character are exempt from usual procedures anyway under existing 
exemptions other than section 553(b)(B). They may be exempt, for 
example, as either "general statements of policy" or as rules relating 
to "agency management or personnel."280 
Similarly, the "contrary to the public interest" standard found 
in section 553(b)(B) should permit exemptions for other extra-
ordinary situations. Those extraordinary situations will usually (but 
not always) arise in contexts where the volume of rule-making deci-
sions that must be made is exceptionally large. Where the delay and 
costs involved are of such a magnitude, due to special facts of the case, 
that they outweigh the strong public interests favoring adherence to 
usual rule-making procedures, an exception could be allowed. More 
than just "any" increase in cost or delay will be necessary to justify 
such an exception under this standard. The facts will have to demon-
strate that an atypically large delay or increase in cost will result 
from adherence to normal rule-making procedures, and that the 
extraordinary delay or cost is not outweighed by the benefits of ad-
herence to those usual procedures. Situations of this sort will be 
relatively few. The ordinary costs and delays occasioned by giving 
notice and an opportunity for public participation are properly 
treated by the Act as an acceptable quid pro quo for the important 
benefits achieved. 
Section 553(d)(3) should perform the same function for section 
553(d) as section 553(b)(B) performs for section 553(b)-(c). Accord-
ing to section 553(d)(3), an agency can dispense with the section 
279. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 551(4) (1970). The question is whether all commands 
by a military superior to a subordinate are "agency" statements "designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy." An "agency" is defined as "each authority of 
the Government of the United States whether or not it is within or subject to review 
by another agency." Since each superior may be deemed an "authority of the Govern• 
ment of the United States" their orders may constitute "rules." But see text accom-
panying notes 4-6 supra. 
280. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(2), 553(b)(A) (1970). 
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553(d) requirement of publication or service of a substantive rule 
at least thirty days before its effective date whenever the agency 
decides to do so "for good cause found and published with the rule." 
This "good cause" exemption should give agencies at least as much 
discretion to avoid the application of section 553(d) in appropriate 
cases as the "impracticable, unnecesary, or contrary to the public 
interest" exemption gives them to avoid the application of section 
553(b)-(c). Indeed, the former may give agencies even more dis-
cretion than the latter because the guiding terms "impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" are conspicuously 
absent from section 553(d)(3). 
Nevertheless, to make the requirements of section 553(d) mean-
ingful, the exemption from its terms should be construed to be as 
broad as, but no broader than, section 553(b)(B). If that is so, the 
"good cause" required by section 553(d)(3) must also be predicated 
on a finding that adherence to usual procedures is "impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." The legislative 
history of the "good cause" exception in section 553(d)(3) supports 
the conclusion that the two exemptions should be treated as con-
gruent. The House Report on the AP A states: 
[This] exception-upon good cause found and published-is not an 
"escape clause" which may be exercised at will but requires legiti-
mate grounds supported in law and fact by the required finding. 
Many rules ... may be made operative in less than 30 days because 
of inescapable or unavoidable limitations of time, because of the 
demonstrable urgency of the conditions they are designed to cor-
rect, and because the parties subject to them may during the usually 
protracted hearing and decision procedures anticipate the regula-
tion.2s1 
Previous discussion should demonstrate that if the section 
553(a)(l) exemptions were eliminated, the exclusions found in 
section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) could adequately handle any 
peculiar problems that would arise in rule-making involving military 
or foreign affairs functions. Where a rational balancing of the rele-
vant interests would indicate the desirability of an exception from 
the requirements imposed by section 553(b)-(d) for particular rule-
making, the above "good cause" exemptions could suffice to achieve 
the result. 
No special exemption is needed from the right-to-petition pro-
vision of section 553(e) if the subsection (a)(l) exclusions are re-
281. LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 13, at 260. See id. at 201. See also Buckeye 
Cablevision, Inc. v. FTC, 387 F.2d 220, 228 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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pealed. Interested parties should always have the right to petition 
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. As noted earlier, 
the only obligations that this right imposes on an agency are the 
duty to follow its own rules with respect to such petitions, and the 
section 555(e) duty to respond by giving "[p]rompt notice ... of the 
denial in whole or in part of a •.. petition accompanied by a brief 
statement of the grounds for denial." If the need arises, an agency 
may treat a group of similar petitions as an entity and issue a single 
response. Consequently, except for one situation to be noted later, 
there seems to be no case relating to section 553(a)(l) rule-making in 
which even a qualified exemption from section 553(e) is required. 
Currently no exemption from the right-to-petition requirement is 
deemed necessary for any rule-making already subject to the terms 
of section 553. In light of the importance of that right, and the 
minor burden it imposes on agencies, this position seems fully justi-
fiable. 
If the right to petition continues unhampered by any exceptions 
even after the subsection (a)(l) exemptions are removed, an im-
portant salutary consequence will follow. In every case where usual 
public procedures are dispensed with prior to the promulgation of a 
rule, because the qualified exemptions of section 553(b)(B) are ap-
plicable, interested parties will have an effective opportunity to 
express their views on that rule subsequent to its enactment. They 
can file a petition for the amendment, repeal, or modification of the 
rule in question, including a statement of their reasons therefor. 
The agency will then be obliged to respond, as section 555(e) re-
quires, with "[p]rompt notice ... of the denial in whole or in part 
of [the] petition ... accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds 
for denial." A statement of grounds is not required, of course, if the 
agency merely reaffirms a prior denial, or the denial is self-explana-
tory. 
The section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) exemptions impose 
a special obligation of disclosure on agencies utilizing those pro-
visions. An agency must incorporate in the rules issued without 
following usual procedures the necessary statement of "good cause," 
predicated upon a finding that adherence to section 553(b)-(d) is 
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," and 
must also include a brief statement of the reasons for that finding. 
In cases where the exemption utilized is based on a finding with 
respect to a whole class of cases, only one such full publication ap-
plicable to the whole class should be required. Rules in that class 
subsequently issued without resort to usual procedures would only 
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need to refer to the prior full publication of :findings and reasons 
and to give its citation. To be of value, the reasons listed in the rules 
as justification for the failure to follow usual procedures must, of 
course, be fairly specific. Declarations in the language of the Act will 
not satisfy this requirement and should be inadequate under the 
statute. As noted by the Administrative Conference, "[E]ach :finding 
of this type . . . should include a statement of underlying reasons 
rather than a mere conclusory recital."282 At the same time, the 
required statement of reasons need not be so detailed that it is 
unduly onerous. 
This disclosure obligation will have two salutary effects. First, 
such a requirement will force the agency to consider carefully its 
reasons for each claim to an exemption. Second, by requiring an 
official statement of the agency's reasons for using the exemption, 
judicial review of that decision will be facilitated. If the decision is 
challenged in a judicial proceeding, the court can test its validity 
against the reasons provided in the prior publication. The require-
ment that agencies formally and publicly state the reasons for their 
conduct should, therefore, keep them both thoughtful and honest 
in their use of the exemption. 
In this connection a further point deserves some elaboration and 
explanation. Publication of the specific reasons for avoiding usual 
procedures is required by sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3). Com-
munication of the denial and the specific reasons for the denial of a 
petition is required by sections 553(e) and 555(e). But mere per-
formance of those statutorily imposed obligations may cause serious 
evils in some cases involving "military or foreign affairs function" 
rule-making. However, this does not demonstrate that sections 
553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) cannot adequately handle all of the problems 
that would arise if, without more, section 553(a)(l) were simply 
eliminated. As noted earlier, an agency need not violate a proper 
executive order commanding certain specific matters to be kept 
secret in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy" in order 
to satisfy any requirements of section 553. Of course, this includes 
the requirements of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) and sections 
553(e) and 555(e). No other result seems possible when section 
552(b)(I) is read in conjunction with section 553. If the President 
really believes that the publication of reasons required by section 
553(b)(B), for example, would be harmful to our "national defense 
or foreign policy" in situations involving certain matters, he can 
282. Recommendation No. 16, supra note 8. 
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always order that these reasons be kept secret under section 552(b)(I). 
In these cases compliance with those provisions requiring publication 
or communication of reasons is excused as a matter of law, without 
affecting the validity of the rules ultimately issued. 
On the other hand, if the President does not issue such an order 
applicable to the particular matter in question, and the matter is 
not otherwise exempt from the requirements of section 552, the 
agency should not be able to invoke the need for secrecy as an excuse 
for noncompliance with the statement-of-reasons requirements of 
these provisions. After all, to the extent that the reasons for the 
agency's failure to follow usual procedures, or its reasons for turning 
down a petition, appear anywhere in the government's files, they 
may be inspected by members of the public unless they are somehow 
exempt from public perusal under section 552. So, if the public has 
the right to inspect documents relevant to the rules in question 
under section 552, agencies may not properly claim the need for 
secrecy as an excuse for not complying with the statement-of-reasons 
requirements of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) and sections 553(e) 
and 555(e). 
The 1969 survey283 asked all federal agencies the following 
question: 
Why are the several specific exemptions currently contained in 
§ 553(b)-(e) insufficient to deal with any disadvantages that might be 
encountered by your department or agency if all of § 553(a)(l)-(2) 
was repealed? Among these specific exemptions just referred to is 
that contained in§ 553(b)(B) providing that public notice of rule-
making is not required "when the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in 
the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 
Agencies making rules presently exempted by subsection (a)(l) from 
section 553 responded in various ways to this question. These re-
sponses, and the following discussion of section 553(b)(B), may also 
be considered applicable to the section 553(d)(3) exemption since, as 
noted, the requirements of that exemption are probably congruent 
with those of section 553(b)(B). 
Some respondents insisted that the section 553(b)(B) exemption 
was an insufficient substitute for subsection (a)(l) simply because 
the latter exemption is necessary as it is, and the former is not as 
broad as the latter.284 Responses of this sort are of little help in 
283. See text accompanying note 38 supra. 
284. 1969 Survey Response (Atomic Energy Commission, Post Office Department, 
Department of the Navy). For ex.ample, the Post Office stated: 
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evaluating the impact that the proposed statutory change may have, 
and they in no way detract from the solution previously suggested. 
They amount to no more than unexplained assertions. 
Another objection to section 553(b)(B) as a substitute for section 
553(a)(I) is that making the findings required by the former would 
constitute too great an administrative burden on the agencies.285 The 
Department of Defense stated that 
[a]dmittedly, the exemption is a broad one in which [the Depart-
ment] would rely in issuance of any highly significant rule .... But 
the scope and volume of substantive rulemaking in the Department 
makes impracticable compliance with the unwieldy requirement 
for a "finding and brief statement of reasons" for the "good cause."286 
By way of summary, the Department of Defense has noted that "the 
primary disadvantages" of any reliance on section 553(b)(B) as a 
substitute for section 553(a)(l)-which it prefers-"can be described 
as costly administrative delay and excessive paperwork without ap-
parent compensatory benefit to the public."287 
Since the statement of findings and reasons is required only in 
those cases in which the agency opts out of the usual procedures, 
and it can be made for a whole class of rule-making in the few 
instances where that can be justified on the basis of the special facts 
and circumstances discussed previously, this objection seems un-
sound. The burden involved here is merely that the agency must set 
down a finding that public procedures are "impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest," and a brief statement of the 
reasons supporting this conclusion.288 To some extent agencies 
It is considered that the specific exemptions contained in Sec. 553(b)-(e) are 
not well adapted to serve as substitutes for the subject area exemptions. It is 
believed that the exemption stated in Sec. 553(a) reflects a proper and generalized 
finding that the provisions of Sec. 553(b)-(e) are not appropriate for rulemaking 
in these subject matter areas and that the reasons underlying this will continue 
despite repeal of Sec. 553(a). 
And the Department of the Navy stated: 
It is apparent, then, that the coverage of the exemptions in subsection (b) [of 
section 553] can be very broad. .Beyond this observation, the Judge Advocate 
General is unable to conclude that the Department would not be disadvantaged 
by the elimination of the privilege exemptions in subsection (a). 
285. 1969 Survey Response (Department of Defense). See also S. 166!] Hearings, 
supra note 104, at 307: "[T]he necessity of determining for each such function whether 
public participation is unwarranted or contrary to the public interest would itself prove 
burdensome." 
286. 1969 Survey Response. 
287. 1969 Survey Response. 
288. Thus, the argument of the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign 
Assets Control to the effect that section 553(b)(.B) is an inadequate substitute for 
subsection (a)(l} because its rules "are of an urgent nature with a minimum of time 
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should be doing that in any case-if they are in fact living up to 
their more general responsibilities to accord as much participation 
in rule-making as possible, consistent with their other obligations. 
The burden, therefore, seems to be both of a kind and quantity that 
the agencies should be willing and able to bear in light of the at-
tendant benefits. 
Another reason has been suggested as to why the current ex-
emptions contained in section 553(b)(B) are inadequate substitutes 
for the subject exemptions of section 553(a)(I). It is said that the 
scope of section 553(b)(B) is unclear and uncertain. Reliance upon 
that exemption, therefore, would not clearly handle all the problems 
created by a repeal of section 553(a)(I); and it would probably 
result in much litigation over the scope of the subsection (b)(B) 
exemption, causing undue delay in the execution of agency programs 
and the like. This "[u]ncertainty about the scope of the exemption" 
and the fact that "such a finding [as is required by section 553(b)(B)] 
is subject to challenge in the courts making uncertain the validity 
of any rule issued under this exemption" were specifically noted by 
the Department of Defense.289 
It is true that the terms "good cause" and "impracticable, un-
necessary, or contrary to the public interest" may not be as precise 
as those which categorically exempt all rule-making involving 
"military or foreign affairs functions." While the scope of the latter 
terms may be vague, the former terms may be more difficult to apply 
to a given situation, since they demand resort to a balancing process 
that requires special assessment of the facts in each case. Conse-
quently, on a comparative basis the application of section 553(b)(B) 
may not be as easy or clear as that of section 553(a)(I). 
Nevertheless, as previously noted, the language of section 
553(b)(B) can adequately deal with all of the problems created by a 
repeal of section 553(a)(I). That language also need not be as un-
clear as the opponents of change in this area suggest. If section 
553(a)(I) is repealed, Congress could insert in the legislative record 
a statement that would clarify any ambiguities in the scope of section 
available for preparation of the necessary documents for publication" is specious. 1969 
Survey Response. 
289. 1969 Survey Response. See also 1969 Survey Response of the Department of Com-
merce. The response of the Headquarters, Defense Supply Agency, was that 
the indefiniteness of the terms of section 553(b)(A) would make it difficult to 
determine whether a particular regulation fell within these exceptions and would 
lead to inconsistent application of the act. It is also probable that the courts would 
take jurisdiction to review any challenged determination of an exemption made 
under section 553(b)(B). This, of course, could have a serious adverse effect on 
defense operations. 
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553(b)(B) along the lines described earlier. Moreover, litigation 
with respect to the scope and proper applicability of "good cause" 
and "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" 
is not apt to be any more endless or obstructive here than it is else-
where. And litigation is not in fact likely, in the overwhelming 
number of cases, to have any significant impact on the agencies' 
ability to perform their functions properly. Stare decisis should have 
a substantial effect within a brief time. Also, although wise and 
honest use of the section 553(b)(B) exemption by the relevant 
agencies will not forestall all litigation, it will forestall some. 
In the end, however, it must be admitted that there remains a 
real difference in clarity between section 553(a)(I) and section 
553(b)(B), and that some delays may be caused by litigation over 
the scope of the latter. But this consequence is a price worth paying 
for the largely increased breadth of the guarantee of public par-
ticipation in the particular rule-making involved. After all, no 
showing has been made that such delays will have any serious ill 
effects in the few cases where there is some genuine doubt about 
whether the section 553(b)(B) exemption does in fact apply. If the 
fear really is that agencies will have to be careful in utilizing this 
qualified exemption and that their hands will be tied by it to some 
extent, this fear is justified. Similarly, if the fear is that in close cases, 
the unclear scope of this exemption will cause agencies to utilize 
normal rule-making procedures rather than risk possible litigation 
resulting in invalidation of the rule, that too is warranted.290 Both 
of these results, however, are acceptable in light of the importance of 
the policy favoring public participation in rule-making. 
C. The "General Statements of Policy" and 
"Interpretative Rules" Exemptions 
Two other exemptions from section 553(b)-(d) deserve brief 
examination at this point. They have been recently analyzed and 
found to be justifiable.291 Their continued availability may be 
coupled with the availability of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) to 
illustrate further the point that repeal of the section 553(a)(I) 
exemptions would not be unduly disruptive. According to sections 
290. Although not included in this study because it does not make rules involving 
"military or foreign affairs functions," the Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home 
Administration feared that repeal of section 553(a)(l)•(2), with consequent reliance 
solely upon the section 553(b)(B) exemption, might discourage issuance of rules and 
needed changes in rules. See 1969 Survey Response. This consequence seems highly 
improbable. 
291. See Bonfield, supra note 31. 
316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:221 
553(b)(A) and 553(d)(2), "general statements of policy" and "inter-
pretative rules" are also exempted as a class from all procedural 
requirements of section 553(b)-(d). If the exemption for rules in-
volving "military or foreign affairs functions" were repealed, there-
fore, agencies could also rely on these exemptions for a goodly 
portion of their rule-making.202 
In addition to being excludable from usual rule-making pro-
cedures under the narrowly tailored exemptions of sections 553(b)(B) 
and 553(d)(3), therefore, much strategic military and foreign policy 
formulation, if they be "rule-making," may be excluded from the 
procedures of subsections (b)-(d) as "general statements of policy." 
Admittedly, the term "general statements of policy" is hard to define. 
It has been suggested, however, that 
"general statements of policy" may be rules directed primarily at the 
staff of an agency describing how it will conduct agency discretionary 
functions, while other rules are directed primarily at the public [or 
some segment thereof] in an effort to impose [legally enforceable] 
obligations on it. On this basis statements of policy are said not to 
have the effect of law; they do not alter [the legal rights of members 
of the public] ••. while other regulations do have that effect.293 
The determination as to what our nation's diplomatic policy shall 
be toward a certain foreign country would seem to be an example of 
that sort of "rule-making." So, too, many determinations regarding 
the everyday operations and deployment of the armed forces may be 
of this type, if they are "rules." 
D. The "Agency Management or Personnel" Exemption 
It should be stressed that even after section 553(a)(l) is repealed, 
agencies may still resort to the subsection (a)(2) exemption from 
every provision of section 553 for rule-making involving "a matter 
relating to agency management or personnel." As a consequence, 
the latter provision will be an additional means by which to avoid 
usual procedures £or some rule-making involving "military or foreign 
affairs functions." A brief excursion into the potential scope of this 
exemption will demonstrate that the peculiar nature of the func-
tions, operations, and structure of the military establishment results 
292. The section 553(b)(A) exemption from section 553(b)•(c) for "rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice" might also be mentioned here to make the same 
point. There is, however, great doubt whether this exemption is as worthy of con-
tinuance as the other existing exemptions discussed in this Article. 
293. Bonfield, supra note 31, at 115. On statements of policy generally, see id. at 
113-15. 
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in a larger proportion of its rules being exempted under the "agency 
management or personnel" provision than are exempted in the case 
of most other agencies. Obviously, the reasons for this are the un-
usually large number of Defense Department personnel, which in-
cludes all the personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the 
fact that a very high proportion of the military's efforts is directed 
at managing, on a day-to-day basis, this unusually large staff. 
"Management" means, according to Webster's, "the conducting 
or supervising of something (as a business); esp: the executive func-
tion of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, controlling, 
and supervising any industrial or business project or activity with 
responsibility for results."294 "Personnel" means "a body of employees 
that is a factor in business administration esp. with respect to ef-
ficiency, selection, training, service, and health: the division of an 
organization concerned primarily with the selection, placement, and 
training of employees and their representatives."295 
Presumably, "matter[s] relating to agency management or per-
sonnel" are distinguishable from "rules of agency organization, pro-
cedure or practice" since the former are exempted from all the 
provisions of section 553 by subsection (a)(2), while the latter are 
only exempted from subsections (b)-(c) by subsection (a)(A). "Mat-
ter[s] relating to agency management or personnel" are also presum-
ably distinguishable from "matters relating to public property, loans, 
grants, benefits or contracts." The latter are specially exempted 
from section 553 in a subsequent portion of the same subsection as 
that exempting "agency management or personnel." 
Obviously, the section 553(a)(2) exemption for "a matter relating 
to agency management or personnel" must at least be as broad as the 
analogous exemption for "any matter relating solely to the internal 
management of an agency" found in section 3 of the original AP A, 
and the current exemption for matters "related solely to the internal 
personnel rules and practices of any agency" found in the newly re-
vised freedom-of-information provision.296 It would be absurd to de-
mand advance notice of, and a right to participate in, any rule-making 
expressly exempted from the requirements of public disclosure by a 
provision of the freedom-of-information section.297 On the other hand, 
294. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 1372. 
295. Id. at 1687. 
296. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(2) (1970). 
297. In other words, the Act does not make it clear that all regulations that 
are exempted from the requirement of being published in the Federal Register 
[by the § 3 exemption for "any matter relating solely to the internal management 
of an agency'1 are necessarily also exempted from the quasi-notice and hearing 
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some rule-making subject to public disclosure requirements under 
section 3 of the original AP A, or current section 552, might 
have been exempted from the advance notice and public participa-
tion requirements of the rule-making provision without causing log-
ical or practical difficulties. 
Note that the original APA freedom-of-information provision ex-
empted only matters "relating solely to the internal management of 
an agency" while exemptions from the rule-making provision are 
granted "to the extent there is involved a matter relating to agency 
management or personnel." The language of the rule-making exemp-
tion seems to be broader than that employed in the original freedom-
of-information provision. "[S]olely ... internal management of an 
agency" seems to be narrower than simply "agency management or 
personnel." Nevertheless, the scope of the rule-making and original 
freedom-of-information exemptions have been considered identical, 
despite the fact that their disparate wording could make a substantial 
difference in particular cases.298 The reason for this is that the 
legislative history of the AP A rule-making section indicates that the 
"exception of matters of management or personnel would operate 
only so far as not inconsistent with other provisions of the [AP A] 
relating to internal management or personnel.''299 On that basis, 
Attorney General Tom Clark apparently believed that the exemption 
in section 553(a)(2) was congruent with the analogous exemption for 
"any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency," 
found in the original public information provision of the AP A.300 
Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski3°1 is relevant here. The 
Post Office had promulgated a rule directed at its employees which 
provided that all mail would be "routed abroad by the most expedi-
tious air service, without regard to the type of aircraft used.''302 
Plaintiff air carrier sought to enjoin the Post Office from operating 
requirement of § 4. Yet this is the only possible construction. For if a matter is 
either (because of its confidential nature) to be kept secret from or (because of its 
purely internal character) not sufficiently important to the general public, so 
that not even the regulation itself need be made known, then a fortiori the public 
has no right to be notified of a merely proposed regulation. Thus § 4 does not 
apply where § 3 does not lie. 
R. PARKER, supra note 225, at 178. This argument is obviously as true under the new 
public information act provisions as under those of the original APA. 
298. Id. at 179 n.40; A'n'ORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 27. 
299. LEGISLATIVE H1sroRY, supra note 13, at 199, 257. 
300. "The exemption [in section 4] for matters relating to 'agency management 
or personnel' is self-explanatory and has been considered in the discussion of internal 
management under Section 3." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note l!I, at 27. 
301. 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1964). 
302. 230 F. Supp. at 45. 
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under the new rule on the grounds that no official notice of the pro-
posed rule was published in the Federal Register, and plaintiff was 
not given an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments 
prior to the rule's promulgation. The Post Office Department argued 
that these procedures were unnecessary in this case because the rule-
making involved was exempted from the requirements of section 553 
by the subsection (a)(2) exclusion for "agency management or per-
sonnel." In finding that the new policy was a rule, and that its pro-
mulgation did not fall within this exception, the court stated: 
The Government contends that the second exception is applicable 
in the instant case, that this new rule concerns the duties of the 
Post Office personnel. It is true that the Administrative Procedure 
Act does except any matter relating solely to the internal manage-
ment of an agency. However, the policy involved here, although it 
is directed to the Post Office personnel, substantially affects outside 
parties and is therefore NOT subject to the exception.30a 
This case seems to suggest that a rule specifying the duties of an 
agency's staff is not exempted by the exemption for "agency manage-
ment or personnel" if it "substantially affects outside parties." The 
Gronouski result seems entirely appropriate under the language of 
section 3 of the original AP A to the effect that any matter "relating 
solely to the internal management of an agency" was exempted. It 
also seems entirely appropriate as a matter of policy. But it is not 
necessarily consistent with the actual language used in section 553 
(a)(2) which speaks only of "a matter relating to agency management 
or personnel." If the two provisions were in fact meant to be con-
gruent, however, the result is perfectly understandable. Some agen-
cies, at least, seem to agree with that notion. One stated that "agency 
management and personnel are matters solely the concern of an 
agency itself, and do not affect members of the public to any appre-
ciable extent."304 
Thus, "military and foreign affairs function" rules that are "solely 
the concern of the agency proper and, therefore, . . . do not affect 
the members of the public to any extent'' will continue to be exclud-
able under section 553(a)(2), even after section 553(a)(l) is repealed.305 
So, for example, "rules as to leaves of absence, vacation, travel, etc." 
of the armed forces are exempted by the "agency management or 
303. 230 F. Supp. at 46 (emphasis original). 
804. 1957 HousE SURVEY, supra note 39, pt. UC (Independent Agencies-Housing 
and Home Finance Agency), at 1629. 
305. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 13, at 18. They would undoubtedly 
also be exempt under the more limited "unnecessary" exclusion of section 553(b)(B). 
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personnel" portion of section 553(a)(2).3011 So, too, virtually all armed 
forces rules dealing with such things as record-keeping, financial 
management and accounting procedures, working hours and work-
ing conditions of personnel, safety programs for personnel, the care, 
maintenance, and inventory of armed forces property, and the like, 
would also be exempted under this provision.307 Virtually all com-
mands by superiors to subordinates in the armed forces, directing 
individuals as to the manner in which they are to carry on their usual 
day-to-day activities, and prescribing the nature of those activities, 
probably would also be exempt on this basis, if they are "rules." This 
section 553(a)(2) exemption would, therefore, exclude an unusually 
high proportion of the rules of the military establishment from usual 
procedures because of the peculiar nature of its day-to-day functions, 
operations, and organization. 
But the "agency management or personnel" exemption should 
not permit agencies to avoid usual procedures by merely phrasing 
regulations in terms of directives to its employees: 
[A]Imost any rule may be put in the form of an instruction directed to 
subordinates even though its effect and purpose is to regulate private 
activities; e.g., how customs authorities are to proceed in valuing 
importations of merchandise •.•. In other words, a regulation may 
seem to be for mere housekeeping or procedural purposes and yet, 
in effect, govern the substantive rights of parties.sos 
The key, then, as Seaboard World Airlines notes, is whether the rule 
in question "substantially affects outside parties." If it does, then it 
should not be excludable under this section 553(a)(2) exemption. 
Rules determining the policies of the armed forces with respect 
to the acquisition and disposal of property, or rules governing the 
terms and conditions of public access to and use of armed forces 
property should not, therefore, be excludable from section 553 on 
the basis of this exemption.309 A closer case is presented with respect 
306. Id. 
307. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 374 (Department of Commerce). 
308. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 685 (Professor Carl McFarland, University 
of Virginia Law School). 
309. But see S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 374 (Department of Commerce), 
objecting to S. 518, based on the assumption that the "agency management" exemption 
excludes from section 553 "procurement policies" and "utilization and disposition of 
excess and surplus property." As already noted, rules on these subjects made by the 
commander of each base in light of the peculiar local conditions applicable to his 
situation may be exempt under section 553(b)(B) on the ground that the sheer number 
of such diverse rules involved may make it "contrary to the public interest" to follow 
usual procedures for all of them. This logic would not, however, apply to rules on this 
subject that are service- or Department-wide. 
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to the rules prescribing the terms and qualifications for initial enlist-
ment into the armed forces. Those rules certainly relate to agency 
"personnel"; but they are primarily directed at the public and its 
rights rather than at the rights of existing agency staff. The above 
rules may not, then, relate "solely to the internal management of an 
agency" to use the language of section 3 of the AP A, which is sup-
posedly congruent in scope with the section 553(a)(2) exemption. 
After all, rules of this sort may be deemed to "substantially affect 
outside parties" within the meaning of the Seaboard case. 
It is recognized, however, that there may be substantial disagree-
ment over the precise scope of the "agency management and per-
sonnel" exception in section 553(a)(2), and that agencies may not 
readily accept the delineation of that provision's ambit offered above. 
It should also be reiterated that the definition of the term "agency 
management or personnel" offered here may not be supportable be-
cause the language of that provision is in fact broader than the AP A 
section 3 terminology sought to be superimposed upon it. Repeal of 
section 553(a)(l) may also increase the possibility of over-reliance 
upon this portion of section 553(a)(2), or increase agency efforts to 
expand its scope beyond that described above. If that happens, and 
the scope of this exemption in fact proves to be broader than this 
brief and superficial examination suggests, there will be time enough 
to consider narrowing it. 
E. Conclusion Concerning Existing Alternatives to 
Section 553(a)(l) 
A number of agencies utilizing the section 553(a)(l) exclusions 
have admitted, in varying degrees, that potentially undesirable con-
sequences that may result from a repeal of that exemption could be 
handled by the remaining exemptions contained in section 553. 
While all of the previously discussed provisions were alluded to, the 
most prominently mentioned and most significant were the "good 
cause" exemptions of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3). Even the 
Department of the Navy has concluded that "the coverage of the 
exemptions in subsection (b) [(A) and (B) of section 553] can be very 
broad," and, therefore, much of its rule-making may be excluded 
from usual procedures under those exemptions.310 
The Atomic Energy Commission noted that "[i]n our view the 
'good cause' exemption set forth in [section] 553(b) could be con-
!110. 1969 Survey Response. The Headquarters, Defense Supply Agency, Department 
of Defense, concluded that if "section 553(a)(l)·(2) of the act were repealed, most of 
these agencys' regulations could probably be exempt under section 553(b)(A)-(B)." Id. 
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strued to embrace a number of situations now exempted under [sec-
tion] 553(a)(l)-(2)." But it questioned whether that provision would 
be construed to cover all situations in need of such exemption. How-
ever, the Commission seemed most concerned in its reservation with 
subsection (a)(2) situations rather than with subsection (a)(l) situa-
tions.811 On the other hand, the Federal Power Commission's state-
ment was unequivocal: 
In those instances in which the Commission departed from the 
notice, hearing and effective date requirements of [section] 553(b)-(e), 
it relied specifically on the exceptions set out in 553(b)(A and B) and 
in [section] 553(d). Insofar as the foreign affairs functions of the 
Commission are concerned, we believe that these specific exemptions 
would be entirely sufficient for this aspect of the Commission's reg-
ulatory work.812 
Similarly, the Department of Agriculture noted with respect to its 
Defense Production Act313 responsibilities: 
No disadvantages are foreseen [from repeal of section 553(a)(l)] pro-
vided authority would be continued to omit notice and opportunity 
for public comment in any case of rule-making where this procedure 
is deemed for good cause to be impracticable, unnecessary or contrary 
to the public interest and other exemptions now in [section] 553 
(b)-(d) are retained.s14 
The Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) in the Com-
merce Department also stated that in light of other exemptions con-
tained in sections 553(b)-(d) "there would be no disadvantage to 
OFDI if [section] 553(a)(l) ... [were] eliminated."815 Similarly, the 
Domestic and International Business Bureau (DIB) of the same De-
partment commented: 
We believe that the several specific exemptions contained in [section] 
553(b)-(e) would be sufficient to deal with situations in the DIB area 
involving rulemaking, provided the interpretation given the exemp-
tions is broad enough to exempt agencies from following public rule-
making procedures in situations where this could be internationally 
detrimental to the U.S. (e.g., Implementation of an unpublished 
international agreement).s10 
In the same spirit, the Department of Treasury admitted that 
311. 1969 Survey Response. 
312. Id. 
313. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-168 (1970). 
314. 1969 Survey Response (Regulatory Division, General Counsel). 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
December 1972] Rule-Making 323 
if all of Section (a)(l)-(2) was repealed, in the preparation of regula-
tions which could not be published until announced by the Secretary, 
and in which speed and its requisite corollary, secrecy, are necessities, 
and advanced publicity and public participation opportunities, im-
possibilities, we recognize that we could resort to publication in our 
rule of a finding that notice and public procedures are contrary to 
the public interest.s17 
But its Office of Foreign Assets Control noted that while "a liberal 
recourse to the exception [section 553(b)(B)] would permit the Con-
trol to continue to operate, virtually every public document of the 
Control would have to contain a finding that notice and public pro-
cedure is contrary to the public interest."318 As noted earlier, the 
availability of class exemptions, where justified, eliminates this argu-
ment for retaining 553(a)(I). 
Previous discussion seems to demonstrate that a repeal of section 
553(a)(I) accompanied by a construction of sections 553(b)(B) and 
553(d)(3) along the lines suggested would be an excellent means by 
which to reconcile the conflicting societal interests involved in rule-
making. The exemptive language of sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) 
should not and need not be so broadly construed that it becomes a 
meaningless limitation on agency discretion, forestalling adequate 
public participation in rule-making; nor should it be so narrowly 
construed that it becomes ineffective to deal with the real problems 
which admittedly might be faced by certain agencies, if section 553 
(a)(I) were repealed. 
As noted earlier, this kind of qualified exemption will remove 
from the requirements of the rule-making section virtually all of 
those situations now cited to justify the across-the-board, unqualified 
exceptions presently contained in section 553(a)(I). Unlike the latter 
provision, however, the former has the advantage of excluding from 
the strictures of section 553(b)-(d) only those specific rule-making 
situations in which competing interests of a high order clearly out-
weigh the interests in public participation. 
Furthermore, repeal of the section 553(a)(l) exemptions will also 
be advantageous because the competing values involved will be more 
adequately accommodated in another fashion. Unlike the current 
unqualified exemption of subsection (a)(l) rule-making from every 
provision of section 553, the sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) solution 
would exempt only particular instances of such rule-making from 
the specific subsections whose application in those instances would 
!117. Id. 
!118. Id. 
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be unreasonable. So, even if prior public participation under section 
553(b)-(c) should be eliminated in a particular case of rule-making, 
the agency will still be required in most circumstances, as section 
553(e) unqualifiedly demands, to give persons a right to petition for 
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. As noted previously, 
special exemption from that requirement seems to be justified only 
in the situation where the required statement of reasons under sec-
tions 553(e) and 555(e) must itself be kept confidential. That con-
tingency is already taken care of by section 552(b)(l). 
One final point with respect to the scope of the statutory reform 
proposed here deserves note. Rule-making is defined by the AP A as 
the process for formulating "agency statements of general or par-
ticular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret or prescribe law or policy .... "819 The procedures of section 
553 are better adapted to dealing with rule-making of general ap-
plicability than to dealing with rule-making of particular applica-
bility. Therefore, requiring adherence to the procedures of section 
553 in the case of the latter class of subsection (a)(I) rule-making 
may create larger burdens and smaller benefits than requiring ad-
herence to those procedures for similar rule-making of general ap-
plicability. 
An argument can be made, however, that there is no problem in 
this connection because the rule-making provisions of section 553 do 
not apply to rules of particular applicability. This conclusion as to 
the applicability of section 553 might be justified on the following 
basis. Subsection (a)(l)(D) of section 552, the freedom-of-information 
provision of the AP A, only requires publication of "substantive rules 
of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements 
of general policy or interpretations of general applicability .... " Rules 
of particular applicability need not be published. According to sec-
tion 552(a)(2)(B), agencies need only make them available for public 
inspection and copying. Requiring publication under section 553(b) 
of the terms of a proposed rule of particular applicability or a descrip-
tion of its intended scope, followed by an opportunity for public 
participation therein, when section 552 specifically provides that an 
agency need not even publish such a rule when it is finally adopted, 
would be foolish and inconsistent. Section 553, therefore, must not 
apply to rules of particular applicability. If so, even after the repeal 
of subsection (a)(l) much "military and foreign affairs function" 
rule-making may still be excluded from section 553 on this basis. 
319. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) (emphasis added). 
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After all, a substantial portion of the rule-making involving these 
subjects is of particular applicability. For example, much of this 
nation's foreign policy and many of the orders issued by military 
authorities, if they be rule-making, are rule-making of particular 
applicability because they are specifically addressed to named coun-
tries or persons. 
Despite the above argument, the provisions of section 553 prob-
ably do apply to rule-making of particular applicability, except as it 
is specifically excluded from section 553 by some express provision 
thereof. The distinction drawn in section 552 between rules of 
general applicability that must be published in the Federal Register, 
and rules of particular applicability that need only be made available 
for inspection and copying, does not necessarily compel the conclu-
sion that the latter class of rules is outside the requirements of section 
553. The situation here is different from that where an agency must 
keep certain rules secret under section 552, or has the discretion to do 
so under that provision. It is not possible to argue sensibly that the 
advance public notice requirements of section 553 apply to any rules 
of that sort. But it is possible that advance published notice of pro-
posed rules of particular applicability, with an opportunity for public 
comment thereon, might be a requirement for those rules even 
though when they are adopted, they need not be published but only 
be made available for public inspection and copying. It should be 
recalled that the primary purpose of the section 553 rule-making 
procedures is to assure wiser rules by educating the decision makers 
so that they will be fully informed before any new rules are finally 
promulgated. 
Furthermore, neither the express language of section 552 or sec-
tion 553, nor their legislative history, indicates that the rule-making 
provisions were meant to be inapplicable to rules of particular ap-
plicability. Indeed, the language of section 553 suggests that the rule-
making provisions do apply to such rules. Section 553(b) states 
that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in 
the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and 
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in 
accordance with law." So, if persons to whom rule-making of particu-
lar applicability is addressed are not "personally served" or do not 
"have actual notice thereof," usual publication requirements apply. 
Similarly, the deferred effectiveness provision of section 553(d) ex-
pressly applies to rules that are required to be published under sec-
tion 552(a)(l)(D) and also to rules as to which "service" is required. 
The only rules as to which "service" is ever required are rules of 
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particular applicability. The term "service" in section 553(d) is an 
obvious reference back to "rules addressed to and served upon named 
persons," which section 3 of the original AP A exempted from publi-
cation requirements. Despite the previous argument, therefore, 
section 553 must be deemed applicable to rules of particular applica-
bility as well as to rules of general applicability. Consequently, if 
the "military or foreign affairs function" exemption were repealed 
the effect on such rule-making of particular applicability should be 
considered. Such a consideration would reveal, however, that no 
serious or insurmountable difficulties would be encountered with 
respect to this sort of rule-making after the repeal of section 553(a)(l). 
By using one of two exemptions, an agency can avoid the trouble 
associated with opening too wide the role of public participation in 
rule-making of particular applicability. As noted, section 553(b) per-
mits agencies to avoid prior publication of notice in the Federal 
Register if "persons subject thereto are named and either personally 
served or othenvise have actual notice thereof in accordance with 
law." This means that after the repeal of section 553(a)(l), agencies 
will still not be required to publish advance notice of such rule-
making of particular applicability if they give the persons "subject 
thereto" personal notice and "an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments." This seems to be the result of a reconciliation of the lan-
guage "persons subject thereto" in section 553(b) and "interested 
persons" in section 553(c). 
Furthermore, to the extent that it is more "impracticable, un-
necessary, or contrary to the public interest" to follow normal pro-
cedures for subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular applicability 
than for such rule-making of general applicability, the section 553 
(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) exemptions can adequately handle the 
problem. As a result, one may expect greater resort to these exemp-
tions for subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular applicability 
than for such rule-making of general applicability. The various other 
exemptions now contained in the rule-making provision will also 
adequately deal with any special problems that arise from the applica-
tion of section 553 to subsection (a)(l) rule-making of particular 
applicability, as well as to such rule-making of general applicability. 
VI. OTHER PROPOSALS To MoDIFY SECTION 553(a)(l) 
During the past decade, a number of bills have been introduced 
to reform federal administrative procedure. The most important of 
December 1972] Rule-Making 327 
these were S. 2335 and S. 1663 of the Eighty-eighth Congress, and 
S. 518, S. 2770, and S. 2771 of the Ninetieth Congress. "\\Tith the ex-
ception of S. 2771320 all of these proposals to revise the AP A elimi-
nated the unqualified exclusion from section 553 for rule-making 
involving "military or foreign affairs functions." In its place, they 
substituted varying kinds of narrower qualified exemptions for such 
rule-making. So did a more recent ABA proposal. 
Of all the proposed substitute exemptions for section 553(a)(l), 
only one would have granted a special exemption for this sort of rule-
making on a basis other than a need for secrecy. S. 2770 would have 
entirely excluded from section 553 "rulemaking required by an Exec-
utive order to be exempt from this section in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy."321 This provision obviously would have 
vested authority in the President to exclude any rule-making affecting 
"national defense or foreign policy" from the provisions of the rule-
making section if he thought that would be desirable. Rule-making 
would have been exempt even if it did not "involve" the "national 
defense or foreign policy" as such, provided the President found that 
an exemption was "in the interest of national defense or foreign 
policy." 
The possibility of any effective check on the President in his use 
of such a broad provision is probably remote. Of course, one may 
assume that unless the rule-making excluded from section 553 by 
an executive order was the product of authority vested wholly 
and exclusively in the President, a court might review the determina-
tion that the exclusion was "in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy."322 A court would set aside that determination, how-
ever, only if a clear abuse of discretion appeared. Given the vagueness 
of the standard, almost any determination by the President would be 
upheld. After all, might it not be "in the interest of national defense 
or foreign policy" to avoid usual procedures for subsection (a)(l) 
rules on the ground that such action would make it less likely that 
the rule-making would encounter political opposition or public 
320. S. 2771, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h) (1967). 
321. S. 2770, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 553(h)(l) (1967). 
322. But see EPA v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4205 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973), decided just 
as this Article went to press, holding that in all cases the legislative history of 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(I) (1970) "makes wholly untenable any claim that the Act intended to 
subject the soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review • • • • It 
also negates the proposition that [section 552(b)(I)] authorizes or permits in camera 
inspection of a contested document ••. so that the court may separate the secret from 
the supposedly nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter." A contrary legislative 
history should, however, induce the opposite conclusion. 
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outcry, or that such action would make this rule-making less ex-
pensive and time consuming? 
Thus, the substitute exemption for section 553(a)(l) found in 
S. 2770 is undesirable for the same reasons that elimination of the 
current exemption is sought. Practically, the S. 2770 provision vests 
in the President too much discretion to avoid usual rule-making pro-
cedures when they are not, in fact, "impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest." Yet, the approach of S. 2770 is cer-
tainly superior to current section 553(a)(l) because under this pro-
posal the President must act affirmatively to exempt any such 
rule-making before usual procedures may be ignored. This obviously 
is an advantage over the present situation because the burden is at 
least put on the agencies desiring an exemption for such rule-making 
to convince the President that they should have it. 
The difficulty is, however, that the President is likely to honor 
almost any request by trusted subordinates for an exemption from 
section 553 in these particular areas.323 Past history clearly indicates 
excessive concern by our presidents with safeguarding the supposed 
interests of national defense and foreign policy, even at the expense 
of other important competing societal values, which may, on occa-
sion, properly be considered more important. Executive orders ex-
cusing rule-making from section 553 "in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy" are, therefore, not likely to be difficult 
for agencies to obtain. What is more, under S. 2770 the exempting 
executive order need not even be specific. Agencies may infer that 
they are entitled to such an exemption on the basis of an existing, 
general "Executive order." Even if this were not so, however, the 
ultimate conclusion would remain unaltered. For all of the reasons 
noted above, the solution proposed by S. 2770, while an improve-
ment over current section 553(a)(l), is unacceptable. Outright repeal 
of the exemption for rule-making involving "military or foreign 
affairs functions," without more, seems best. 
Nevertheless, a number of other substitutes for section 553(a)(l) 
have been proposed and deserve careful examination. All of these 
proposed substitutes were qualified exclusions relating in one way 
or another to the need for secrecy of some such matters. More spe-
cifically, S. 2335 provided that the rule-making section "shall not 
require notice of or public participation in rulemaking ... required 
to be kept secret in the protection of the national security."324 S. 1663 
323. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 334 (Mr. Frank Wozencraft, Assistant 
Attorney General, Department of Justice). 
324. S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1003(£) (1964). 
December 1972] Rule-Making 329 
provided that rule-making involving "any military, naval, or foreign 
affairs function of the United States requiring secrecy for the pro-
tection of the national defense" was exempted from every require-
ment of the rule-making provision.325 Neither of these provisions 
expressly demanded that an executive order impose the require-
ment of secrecy. Moreover, neither recognized the need for secrecy 
for "foreign policy" purposes as opposed to "national defense" pur-
poses. And neither expressly demanded any narrow tailoring of 
secrecy needs as would have been the case if the exemption only 
applied to rule-making "specifically" required to be kept secret. 
The Senate subcommittee revision of S. 1663 differed from the 
above exclusions somewhat. It provided that all rule-making involv-
ing "any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United 
States required by Executive order to be kept secret for the protec-
tion of the national defense or foreign policy" was to be exempted 
entirely from the requirements of the rule-making provision.326 The 
addition of the specific requirement of an "Executive order" and the 
use of secrecy for the purpose of protecting "foreign policy" as well 
as "national defense" are notable. 
S. 518 was almost identical to the latter provision, for it would 
have exempted from the rule-making provision all "rulemaking re-
quired by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the 
national defense or foreign policy."327 The recent American Bar 
Association proposal differs only by its addition of the word "spe-
cifically," so that only rule-making "specifically required by Exec-
utive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense 
or foreign policy" is exempted from the rule-making provision.328 
This language is precisely the same as that now appearing in the 
freedom-of-information provision of the APA, section 552(b)(l). As 
the ABA Committee noted, in making its proposal: 
Obviously, sensitive matters of national defense and international 
relations are by their nature· not appropriate subjects for public 
participation. Not all the functions of the Departments of Defense 
and State are of this character, however, and to the extent that [s]ec-
tion 553(a)(l) may be so construed, it is desirable that the provision 
be narrowed to the same ambit circumscribed by the Freedom of 
Information Act. ... The proposed amendment to [section] 553(a)(l) 
would make explicit that it is not enough to exempt a matter from 
rulemaking that it is related to a military or foreign affairs function, 
325. S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1) (1963). 
326. Revised S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1963). 
327. S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(h)(l) (1967). 
328. See Crowther, supra note 9, at 8. 
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in absence of a specific declaration by Executive order that the in-
terest of national defense or foreign policy require that they be kept 
secret. Public participation in rulemaking would then generally be 
the rule rather than an exception in such activities as the formulation 
of Armed Services Procurement Regulations.329 
It has previously been argued in this Article that section 552(b)(l) 
already exempts rule-making from section 553 to the extent an "exec-
utive order" "specifically" requires that the rules or the reasons 
therefor must be kept secret in the "interest of national defense or 
foreign policy." That is, in the formulation and promulgation of 
valid rules agencies may ignore usual rule-making procedures to the 
extent that adherence to those procedures would interfere with a 
valid secrecy requirement imposed under section 552(b)(I). No ob-
jection, therefore, can be urged against adding a provision to the 
rule-making section expressly recognizing this fact. But if such a pro-
vision is added, its language certainly should be congruent with the 
language of section 552(b)(I). This is, of course, the position of the 
American Bar Association. There are a number of very good reasons 
to support that view. 
If special exemptive language to deal with problems of secrecy 
were added to section 553 at the time of subsection (a)(l)'s repeal, 
an anomaly would be created if the wording chosen were substan-
tively broader than that found in section 552(b)(l). Agencies would 
then be authorized to avoid usual rule-making procedures on the 
grounds of secrecy in some situations in which the public would be 
entitled to obtain documents relating to that subject matter under 
section 552. As noted earlier, there is no reason to permit any greater 
resort to secrecy as a basis for avoiding usual rule-making require-
ments under section 553 than there is for avoiding usual freedom-
of-information requirements under section 552. A similar difficulty 
would be encountered if the language of a substitute for section 
553(a)(l) were substantively narrower in scope than that of section 
552(b)(l) because in that case an agency might be forced to reveal 
matters under the requirements of section 553 that it had a right to 
suppress under section 552. 
In addition, it is desirable to have determinations of the necessity 
for exemption from usual rule-making requirements made by an 
"Executive order.''330 The policy of openness of government pro-
329. Id. at 18-20. 
330. "The Department of Justice and the Department of State insisted that the 
requirement of an Executive Order was 'unnecessary,' would add a 'layer' and could 
be better handled by legislative oversight." Carrow, Revision of the Administr11tive 
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ceedings is so important that a final determination to depart from 
it on a purely discretionary basis because of an alleged need for 
secrecy should be made only at the highest level. An excuse based 
on the need for secrecy is, after all, so subject to abuse, and such a 
tempting vehicle by which government officials may seek to hide 
improprieties, that it should be available only after a determination 
of its necessity has been made by the most politically responsible 
official, the President. Of course, it is understood that such an "Exec-
utive order" requirement cannot and will not ensure personal con-
sideration of the merits of each such order by the President if he is 
prepared to rely completely on the advice of his advisors by auto-
matically signing any order on this subject that they put before him. 
In support of this requirement of an "Executive order" it should 
also be noted that courts reviewing the propriety of the use of an 
exemption predicated on a need for secrecy are not likely to probe 
very deeply, if at all.331 That lack of close judicial scrutiny is less 
likely to be disastrous if the decision to avoid usual rule-making 
procedures based on a need for secrecy is made at the highest level, 
because at that level the agency's decision is most likely to be 
responsible and justifiable. 
An executive order that exempts certain rule-making from the 
procedures of section 553 should be reasonably specific as to the 
precise kinds of rule-making covered in the order. Specificity would 
avoid some unjustified reliance on executive orders by subordinate 
officials who wish to dispense with normal rule-making procedures. 
The term "specifically" in section 552(b)(l) is, therefore, very desir-
able and should be imported into any analogous exemption added to 
the rule-making provision. Section 552(b)(l) is also worthy of emula-
tion in section 553 because it recognizes the legitimate use of secrecy 
not only for "national defense" purposes but also for "foreign policy" 
purposes. Secrecy exemptions for either purpose should be available 
because they are, in practice, necessary.832 All of these points militate 
in favor of the ABA proposal-using language identical to section 
552(b)(l) in a special exemption from section 553 for rule-making 
Procedure Act: A Comparative Analysis of Current Bills and a New Proposal, 21 Ao. 
L. R.Ev. 227, 230 (1969), citing S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 332, 318. 
331. They may not probe at all if the Act's legislative history precludes review. 
See EPA v. Mink, discussed in note 322 supra, decided just as this Article went to press. 
But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 3A.16, 
3A.33 (Supp. 1970). 
332. See S. 166:J Hearings, supra note 104, at 354 (Department of Justice); id. at 392 
(Department of the Treasury): id. at 387 (Department of State). 
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which must be kept secret in the interest of "national defense or 
foreign policy." 
However, the ABA proposal is arguably undesirable because it 
may authorize the President to treat the need for secrecy of a subject 
under the rule-making provision in a manner that is inconsistent 
with his treatment of the same subject under the freedom-of-infor-
mation provision. This could not happen if the President were re-
duced to relying solely on section 552(b)(l) for secrecy exemptions 
from both the freedom-of-information section and the rule-making 
section. In that case, rule-making could be exempt from section 553 
on the basis of a need for secrecy in the interest of "national defense 
or foreign policy" only if an executive order also makes the matter 
to which those rules pertain exempt under section 552(b)(l). The 
argument is that if the President does not think that the matter 
involved needs to be kept secret, and, therefore, refuses to issue an 
executive order to that effect under section 552(b)(l), he should not 
be permitted to exempt the matter from section 553 on the basis of 
a special need for secrecy. 
But this objection to the ABA proposal may not be realistic or 
sound. Even under section 552(b)(l), the "Executive order" need 
not be of the all-or-nothing variety, nor should it be. The term 
"matter" as used in section 552(b)(l) admits of executive authority 
to define in any number of different ways exactly what must be kept 
secret. So, the "matter" may include the texts of certain rules them-
selves, but no other documents relating to the subject to which the 
rules pertain, if in fact the President ascertains that secrecy is re-
quired in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy" for the 
rules but not for the other documents. Or, the President may order 
that the reasons for the rules be kept secret but not the rules them-
selves. This is as it should be, since utmost flexibility in this matter 
should properly reside in the President, and is available under the 
ABA proposal and section 552(b)(l). 
For the same reason the following objection to the ABA pro-
posal is spurious: 
If an Executive order makes a finding that the national interest re-
quires secrecy in the case of a particular type of foreign policy deci-
sion-making, there will be an inevitable inhibition on employing 
other, less formal [and hence more secrecy-maintaining] procedures 
of consultation with interested parties, than have been employed in 
the past. 838 
333. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 388 (Department of State). 
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Not sol The executive order requiring rule-making to be exempt 
from section 553 because of a need for secrecy need not interfere 
with those other procedures, if the President so chooses. Neither the 
ABA proposal nor section 552(b)(l) is an all-or-nothing provision; 
they vest discretion in the President to adopt intermediate, qualified, 
or part-way stances in the interest of maintaining the requisite secrecy. 
Another more serious objection to the ABA proposal is that it 
would "thrust too many duties on an already overburdened Presi-
dent,"334 since it would permit exemption of rule-making from sec-
tion 553 on the ground of secrecy only if that secrecy is "specifically" 
required by an "Executive order." According to the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the "course of submitting each proposed exemption to 
the President for ad hoc determination would impose on the Presi-
dent an unreasonable continuing burden."385 
But is this burden any different or greater than that already im-
posed on the President by section 552(b)(l)? Congress made the de-
cision at the time that provision was enacted that in light of the 
important values involved, imposition of this obligation on the Pres-
ident was justifiable. As pointed out earlier, enactment of the ABA 
proposal is unnecessary because the President is already charged 
with making determinations under section 552(b)(l) that would in 
effect exempt certain rule-making from section 553 because of the 
need for secrecy in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy." 
No further burden would, therefore, in fact be imposed on him by 
the ABA proposal because it would only be declaratory of his present 
obligations. Consequently, this objection to the ABA proposal does 
not deserve serious consideration since Congress resolved the basic 
policy question when it enacted section 552(b)(l). 
The Atomic Energy Commission has, however, sought to dis-
tinguish section 552(b)(l) from the ABA proposal for section 553-
deeming the latter unsuitable for the rule-making provision even 
though the former may be suitable for the freedom-of-information 
provision. It said: 
While we recognize that the modified exception [for the rulem.aking 
provision] is the same as that in [section 552(b)(I)] the considerations 
relating to public information and rulemaking are sufficiently di£-
334. S. 166] Hearings, supra note 104, at 679 (Professors Marvin Frankel &: Walter 
Gellhom, Columbia University Law School). See also id. at 480 (Department of Com-
merce). 
335. 1969 Survey Response. 
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ferent as to warrant different treatment with respect to exemptions 
from their requirements.886 
However, the AEC does not explain why the considerations should 
be different with respect to exemptions from these two provisions to 
deal with a unitary problem, the need for secrecy in the interest of 
"national defense or foreign policy." 
Another objection to an ABA type proposal is that "the Exec-
utive order that would be needed if section [553] procedures were 
to be omitted might in itself destroy the very secrecy it was intended 
to enhance." The following illustration is provided: 
Consider, for example, the making of rules pertaining to access to a 
secret missile base or pertaining to methods of subsidizing the 
military operations of friendly powers. Unless the President were to 
issue an Executive order, which, of course, would be immediately 
available for publication, section [553] procedures would have to be 
followed; publication of the absolving Executive order would, how• 
ever, perforce disclose some of the very information sought to be 
withheld "for the protection of the national defense or foreign 
policy."887 
Two points should be made with respect to this argument. First, if 
it is a valid objection with respect to an "Executive order" require-
ment for the rule-making provision, it is equally valid with respect 
to the "Executive order" requirement for the freedom-of-information 
provision. Second, it is based on a misconception concerning the 
precise nature of the executive order required under the ABA pro-
posal for section 553, and under section 552(b)(l). Obviously, the 
required executive order need not be of a nature or specificity that 
would divulge in any way the very matters sought to be concealed 
in the interest of "national defense or foreign policy." With respect 
to the above illustration, for example, all that would be necessary is 
an executive order requiring secrecy for rule-making and documents 
(I) pertaining to access to secret missile bases, or (2) pertaining to the 
methods of subsidizing the military operations of friendly powers. 
The usual requirements of sections 553 and 552 would thereby be 
swept aside for such matters. No more specificity is required to be con-
sistent with the purpose of the ABA proposal and section 552(b)(l).838 
One last objection to the ABA proposal-and more generally to 
the proposal to delete section 553(a)(l)-is that the ABA proposal 
and other similar substitutes would merely interject "new definitions 
336. Id. 
337. S. 1663 Hearings, supra note 104, at 679 (Professors Frankel &: Gellhorn). 
338. See K. DAVIS, supra note 5, §§ 3A.16, 3A.33 (Supp. 1970). 
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which make everybody wonder-what is the difference between na-
tional defense and military affairs, what is the difference between 
foreign policy and foreign affairs, what does the executive order 
really cover?"339 
The difficulty with this line of argument is apparent. At present 
both sets of terms are already in the AP A-"military and foreign 
affairs function" in section 553(a)(l) and "national defense and for-
eign policy" in section 552(b)(I). Neither set of terms is intrinsically 
clearer or more developed by history and practice than the other. 
The differing language of these two sets of terms in the same Act 
also raises unhappy and unnecessary problems of comparative con-
struction. Adding an ABA-type provision to section 553 in lieu ol 
section 553(a)(I) would, however, improve the situation, not worsen 
it. Then, at least, there would only be one set of terms to deal with 
in applying the Act-"national defense and foreign policy." Indeed, 
mere repeal of section 553(a)(l) would be beneficial for the same 
reason. As to the objection that under the ABA proposal construc-
tion of executive orders would be unduly burdensome, it need only 
be noted that this burden already rests on the agencies under section 
552(b)(I). 
It should be reiterated that enactment of an express provision 
permitting exemptions from section 553 for rule-making "specifically" 
required by an "Executive order" to be kept "secret in the interest 
of national defense or foreign policy" is probably unnecessary as a 
matter of law. Enactment of such a provision is, however, desirable 
because it will make agencies feel more secure to have the present 
inferential relationship between sections 552(b)(l) and 553 expressly 
spelled out. But the result will be the same if the only action taken 
is that which is clearly justified and most pressing-simple repeal of 
section 553(a)(I). Agencies are not now required by section 553 to 
violate a proper executive order under section 552(b)(l). To read the 
current provisions any other way would be absurd. 
VII. MAY CONGRESS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT THE 
REFORM PROPOSED? 
Is there any constitutional impediment to the procedural reform 
proposed here? To what extent, if at all, is section 553(a)(l) a recog-
nition of an independent and exclusive executive authority in the 
military and foreign affairs area which may not be regulated by Con-
339. S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 334 (Mr. Wozencraft. Department of 
Justice). 
336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '11:221 
gress?340 The ultimate inquiry, of course, is the extent to which 
Congress may regulate the precise procedure by which the executive 
branch makes rules involving "military or foreign affairs functions." 
To ascertain the answer to these questions, depiction of comparative 
congressional and presidential authority in these fields seems neces-
sary. Happily, the theoretical analyses contained in several recent 
studies are particularly useful here because of the light they shed 
on this question.841 
A. Scope of Congressional Power To Dictate 
Procedure for These Functions 
In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer342 Justice Jackson 
suggested that there are three zones of constitutional power with re-
spect to legislative and executive authority in the military and for-
eign affairs area. The first is a zone of constitutional power that is 
exclusively presidential. In that zone the Executive may act lawfully 
even against the clearly expressed command of Congress. The second 
is a zone of exclusive congressional authority in which the legislature 
340. Some comments with regard to foreign affairs functions suggest a con• 
gressional incapacity based on the Constitution's distribution of such powers among 
the several governmental branches: 
The Department of State in its daily functions is, in most cases, carrying out 
on behalf of the President the exercise of his constitutional power to conduct the 
foreign relations of the United States. The Constitution gives the President an 
unusually large degree of authority in conducting foreign affairs •••• 
The Department of State thus functions primarily in a different capacity from 
that of other departments and agencies. Most executive business entails the exe-
cution by the departments and agencies concerned of the laws Congress has passed. 
Rules are made and individual cases considered with a view to applying the 
mandates of Congress with respect to regnlation of various fields of activity and 
expenditure of appropriated funds. 
The conduct of foreign policy, by contrast, is generally not dictated by statu-
tory standards. 
S. 518 Hearings, supra note 127, at 387-88 (William Macomber, Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations, Department of State). 
Generally speaking, the conduct of foreign affairs is not a part of the adminis-
trative process. 
In most cases foreign affairs are conducted by agents of the President carrying 
out his responsibilities in this field under the Constitution. 
Id. at 318 (Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State). 
Thus, there are good reasons why the foreign affairs exemption should have 
been placed in the Administrative Procedure Act at its original enactment 21 years 
ago. Those reasons remain valid today. 
Id. at 321. 
341. Pollack, Black &: Bickel, The Congressional and Executive Roles in JVar-
Making: An Analytical Framework, 116 CONG. R.Ec. 16478 (1970) [_hereinafter The Yale 
Paper]; Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign Aid 
(pts. 1-2), 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 453 [_hereinafter Wallace, Foreign Aid]; C. ZINN, EXTENT 
OF THE CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, House 
Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1962). The 
following brief theoretical discussion in the text relies mainly, though not exclusively, 
on these secondary studies. 
342. 348 U.S. 579, 635-88 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
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may act lawfully even against the clearly expressed command of the 
President. In between these poles of exclusive executive and exclu-
sive legislative power is a third "zone of twilight in which [the Pres-
ident] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain."343 Either of these branches of the national 
government can act without the other in this twilight area. But 
Justice Jackson did not clearly indicate what would happen if con-
gressional action in the twilight zone conflicted with the presidential 
will. 
There is no doubt that under the Constitution Congress and the 
President each have their own exclusive powers involving "military 
and foreign affairs functions." Similarly, there should be no doubt 
that there is a large twilight zone involving "military and foreign 
affairs functions" in which the Constitution grants authority con-
currently to both the President and the Congress. If nothing else, 
an enumeration of the various broadly worded constitutional pro-
visions conferring powers on Congress and the President in these 
areas illustrates this point. 
Congress has the express constitutional authority to levy taxes, 
including import duties, and to spend "for the common defense"; 
"define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
seas, and offences against the law of Nations"; "declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and Make Rules concerning Cap-
tures on Land and Water"; "raise and support Armies"; "provide 
and maintain a Navy"; "make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces"; "provide for calling forth the 
militia" and "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed 
in the Service of the United States."344 The Constitution also states 
that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States."3411 In addition to vesting in Con-
gress the above powers, and all authority "necessary and proper for 
carrying [them] into Execution,"346 the Constitution provides that 
two thirds of the Senate must concur in any treaty between the 
United States and another nation. The Senate must also concur in 
ambassadorial and major military appointments.347 
On the other hand, article II specifies that "[t]he executive Power 
343. 343 U.S. at 637. 
l!44. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. 
l!45. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § l!. 
l!46. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. 
l!47. U.S. CoNsr, art. II, § 2, 
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shall be vested in [the] President of the United States." Additionally, 
the President is designated as the "Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States." He also is 
expressly given the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make treaties . . . [ and to] appoint Ambassadors"; to 
"receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers"; and to "take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed."348 
The fact that there may be a residuum of power in the military 
and foreign affairs areas that is vested in the national government 
"as a necessary concomitant of nationality," rather than by the ex-
press language of the Constitution, also supports the view that there 
is a twilight zone involving "military and foreign affairs functions" 
in which authority rests concurrently in both the President and 
Congress. By definition, the Constitution does not expressly allocate 
that power between Congress and the President. But such residual 
"powers must vest somewhere, and there is nothing-nothing in the 
Constitution, nothing in history, nothing in the case law, and nothing 
in common sense-to suggest that the entire residuum vests exclu• 
sively in one or the other branch."349 
A logical scheme has been posited with respect to clashes of au-
thority in the twilight zone, as well as with respect to clashes of 
authority in the zones of exclusive power: 
I) In the zone of exclusive executive power, any legislation attempt-
ing to restrict presidential action is void and can be ignored by the 
President, even if it is "passed" over his veto. 2) In the zone of exclu-
sive congressional power, any presidential action is illegal and can 
be prevented or ended by action of Congress. 3) In the twilight zone 
of concurrent power, either the President or Congress can act in the 
absence of initiative by the other. If both attempt to act in ways 
that bring their wills into conflict, the deadlock. must be resolved 
in favor of congressional action through valid legislation, which in-
cludes legislation passed over a presidential veto.8 ~0 
That is, either branch of government is entitled to block efforts by 
348. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, §§ 2-3. 
349. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16480 (emphasis original), citing the fact 
that article I, section 8, of the Constitution makes it clear that some residual power 
vests in Congress rather than the President. See id. at 16480 n.11. By that provision, 
Congress is given power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof" (emphasis added). The Yale Paper also states that "the lesson of history is 
that the President and Congress haYe shared the residual power." Id. at 16480 n.12, 
citing Bickel, et al., Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis, ll6 CONG. REC. 15409 (1970). 
350. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. 
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the other to interfere with its exercise of military or foreign affairs 
powers vested exclusively therein. However, Congress may properly 
seek to regulate exercises of presidential authority in the twilight 
zone. When it does so, Congress' will should prevail over that of the 
President. The reasons for this are as follows. 
Under our Constitution there is a distinct bias toward vesting 
national power in Congress, since "Congress is closer to the electorate 
and represents a greater diversity of views than the President."351 
Its power, therefore, is more "basic" than that of the Chief Executive 
in the sense that it is a more democratic institution. Another reason 
why congressional will should prevail over that of the President in 
the twilight zone may be found in the text of the Constitution. The 
Constitution nowhere expressly provides a means by which the Pres-
ident can impose his will over Congress' objection. It does, however, 
specifically provide a way for Congress to impose its will over the 
President's objection: It makes a bill that is passed over the veto of 
the President as much law as one that he has signed.352 The Presi-
dent is, therefore, obligated to enforce the enactment unless, of 
course, Congress did not have the power to enact it in the first place. 
"But, in the twilight zone, Congress has power by definition."353 
It should also be noted that Youngstown directly supports the 
proposition that in the twilight zone any conflict between Congress 
and the President must be resolved in favor of the former. Youngs-
town seems to suggest that the power of the President to order seizure 
of the steel mills under the specific circumstances of that case was 
in the twilight zone. The reason the President could not lawfully 
do so there was that Congress had specifically rejected presidential 
seizure as a means for maintaining operation of vital industries dur-
ing labor disputes.354 A clear intimation may be gleaned from a 
majority of the Justices in Youngstown that absent this congressional 
rejection of the seizure device, the President might properly have 
acted under his own independent authority to engage in such a 
seizure.81111 
One may briefly speculate about the nature of those "foreign 
affairs functions" delegated exclusively to the President. Certainly, 
"[a]mong the principal exclusive powers of the President is the power 
351. Id. 
352. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7. 
353. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. 
354. 343 U.S. at 586. See also The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479, 16480 n.8. 
355. 343 U.S. at 588-89 (Black, J.), 602 (Frankfurter, J.), 631 (Douglas, J.), 637-39 
CTackson, J.), 656-59 (Burton, J.), 662 (Clark, J.). 
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to recognize foreign governments and states ... [which] 'includes the 
power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of 
recognition.' "356 Similarly, the power to "commence, maintain and 
sever diplomatic relations ... is exclusively the President's.''357 The 
precise "content and mode" of this nation's diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries may also be considered exclusive.358 "[H]e 
alone negotiates. . .. 'The President is the sole organ of the nation 
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions.' "859 The President, then, is vested with the whole authority 
to make strategic foreign policy in our diplomatic relations with 
other nations, and the whole authority to conduct that policy. It has 
been suggested that 
the traditional core would seem to embrace all diplomatic and Com-
mander-in-Chief foreign affairs decisions, except for the following 
particular classes: 
1) Certain matters affecting foreign commerce, including such 
derived matters as immigration and passports; 
2) Certain matters of administrative detail; 
3) The withholding of appropriations altogether; 
4) Declarations of war; 
5) Senate advice and consent to treaties and appointments. 
Thus, the Constitution, as it has developed, has struck a balance. On 
one side is exclusive executive power with respect to foreign affairs; 
on the other, congressional participation.360 
Under this balance, however, Congress cannot, for example, properly 
use its power not to appropriate funds "to prevent the President from 
recognizing a state or government, dispatching an emissary to it, or 
specifying the rank of such emissary.''861 
356. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 315, quoting United States v. Pink, 
315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
357. Id. at 316. 
358. Id. at 317 (emphasis original). 
359. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), 
quoting John Marshall in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). See also Wallace, The War-
Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 734 (1972) [hereinafter 
Wallace, War-Making]. 
360. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321 (emphasis original). 
361. Id. at 326. But see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 
at 432 n.57 (4th ed. 1957), quoting an 1864 report from the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs that concluded with the following resolution: 
"Resolved, That Congress has a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in 
declaring and prescribing the foreign policy of the United States, as well in the 
recognition of new powers as in other matters; and it is the constitutional duty 
of the President to respect that policy, not less in diplomatic negotiations than 
in the use of the national forces when authorized by law; and the propriety of 
any declaration of foreign policy by Congress is sufficiently proved by the vote 
which pronounces it; and such proposition while pending and undetermmed is not 
a fit topic of diplomatic explanation with any foreign power." ••• 
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One may also speculate briefly with respect to some of the exclu-
sive "military functions" conferred on the President by his Com-
mander-in-Chief authority. It has been suggested that while "Con-
gress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it alto-
gether .•. as long as we have a military force Congress cannot take 
away from the President the supreme command."362 This proposition 
has been elaborated more fully by the Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Milligan, 363 where the Court stated: 
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern 
armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by 
law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legisla-
tion essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except 
such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct 
of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as 
Commander-in-Chief. Both these powers are derived from the Con-
stitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent 
must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our 
institutions.864 
On this basis, it has been concluded that as Commander-in-Chief, 
the President "has sole charge of the day-to-day conduct of military 
affairs in theatres of battle, and Congress cannot control it."865 Pre-
sumably, on the same basis, the President has exclusive control over 
strategic military planning or preparation for hostilities. It has also 
been suggested that the President may have exclusive power with 
respect to the selection of weapons systems. 366 Of course, Congress 
can refuse to appropriate funds. As Senator Borah once noted: 
Undoubtedly the Congress may refuse to appropriate and undoubt-
edly the Congress may say that an appropriation is for a specific 
purpose. In that respect the President would undoubtedly be bound 
by it. But the Congress could not, through the powers of appropria-
tion, in my judgment, infringe upon the right of the President to 
command whatever army he might find.367 
Any effort to define precisely or to catalogue all of those "mili-
tary and foreign affairs functions" that are beyond congressional 
control because they are vested exclusively in the President, and those 
The resolution passed the House in a somewhat diluted form, but failed to 
come to a vote in the Senate. 
362. Swain v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), affd., 165 U.S. 553 (1897). 
363. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
364. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139. 
365. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 320. 
366. Wallace, War-Making, supra note 359, at 735 & n.85. 
367. 69 CoNG, R.Ec, 6760 (1928), 
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that are within congressional control because they are vested concur-
rently in both Congress and the President, or exclusively in Congress, 
is not required by this Article. For present purposes it is enough to 
demonstrate that Congress may properly narrow or eliminate sec-
tion 553(a)(l), or, stated differently, that Congress may, if it wishes, 
subject a significant portion of rule-making involving "military or 
foreign affairs functions" to reasonable procedures of its own choosing 
-even if the President objects. If there be doubt concerning the 
authority of Congress to impose mandatory procedures in particular 
instances of such rule-making, that may be worked out on a case-by-
case basis under a statutory provision that is valid on its face. 
Any effort to define precisely or to catalogue all of those "mili-
tary and foreign affairs functions" vested wholly or exclusively in the 
executive branch also seems futile.868 The language of the Constitu-
tion delegating power in these areas to the Congress and to the 
President is of little help because it is opaque and overly general at 
best. So, too, no help is furnished by the sparse litigation on this sub-
ject. For example, while United States v. Curtiss-Wright states that 
the President is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations,"869 it does not deal with the questions as 
to which branch or branches of the national government have the 
authority to make that policy, and under what circumstances; and 
which branch or branches have the authority to define how such 
policy is made, and under what circumstances. One study does sug-
gest, however, a working principle by which those exercises of presi-
dential power in the military and foreign affairs fields that are beyond 
congressional reach can be differentiated from those exercises of such 
power that are within Congress' capacity to regulate. "[T]he power 
appropriate to each branch" should be analyzed in light of "(l) the 
special competences of each, and (2) the probable internal conse-
quences of external actions."370 
The presidency's special competence "is its capacity for fast, 
efficient, and decisive action." "Power in the executive branch is 
hierarchical; in Congress it is diffuse. The essence of the legislative 
process is deliberation and compromise; in the executive process, at 
least in theory, it is command."871 Another special competence of the 
368. See Wallace, War-Making, supra note 359, at 731-33. 
369. 299 U.S. at 320. 
370. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. On the comparative competence of 
the executive and the legislature, see id. at 16479; Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 
341, at 455-64. 
371. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. 
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Presidency is the ability to act secretly and to keep matters confiden-
tial. 372 This, too, is a product of the hierarchical and unitary nature 
of executive power, since only one person need be privy to any deci-
sion on the executive level while on the legislative level 535 people 
must necessarily be privy to any decision. The consequences of this 
have been a congenital inability on the part of Congress to keep 
controversial matters confidential.373 On the other hand, Congress 
is "closer to the People and reflects the diversity of their views.''874 
Because of its size and the fact that it "acts through deliberation, 
compromise, and consensus" it is also likely to be a more prudent 
body than the President. Congress' special capacity is, therefore, "a 
unique legitimacy to commit the resources and will of the nation."375 
In light of these special competences of the President and Congress: 
(1) When a decision in foreign or military affairs demands speed and 
decisiveness, [or, it may be added, secrecy,] there is a presumption 
that it is within the exclusive power of the President. (2) All other 
decisions are within the power of Congress. Some of that congres-
sional power is in the twilight zone and held concurrently with the 
President. [The remainder is within the exclusive powers of Con-
gress.]376 
The presidential veto of the Military Authorization Act of 1965377 
is consistent with this view of congressional authority, and relevant 
372. See Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 458 (emphasis added): 
In recognizing the superior knowledge and information of the executive, the 
Supreme Court has said, "[the Presidentl, not Congress, has the better op-
portunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries • . • • 
He has his confidential sources of information • • • Secrecy in respect of infor-
mation gathered by them may be highly necessary •••• " 
The speed, secrecy, and flexibility of the executive-qualities often cited as 
necessary for the effective conduct of certain aspects of foreign affairs-frequently 
have been noted. 
Quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
373. Consider, for example, Senator Gravel's public issuance of the "Pentagon 
Papers," which the Defense Department attempted to keep confidential. Gravel, Intro-
duction to THE PENTAGON PAl'ERS at ix (Gravel ed. 1971). 
374. The Yale Paper, supra note 341, at 16479. 
375. Id. See also id. at 16480 n.14: 
The competence of Congress to commit the resources and will of the nation 
is reflected in the allocation of enumerated Constitutional powers. It can commit 
the human and material resources of the nation by laying taxes, borrowing money, 
and raising an army. It can commit the will of the nation by declaring war. And, 
perhaps most significantly, it can change the VC!'f character of the nation by estab-
lishing standards for naturalization. All these thmgs, furthermore, Congress can do 
over the President's veto. 
376. Id. at 16479 (emphasis original). The Yale Paper omits mention of a special 
need for secrecy as a basis for exclusive executive authority under the Constitution, 
and also fails to mention the special capacity of the Executive to act in secret and to 
keep matters confidential. 
377. H.R. 8439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See 111 CONG. R.Ec. 21244-45 (1965); 
H.R. Doc. No. 272, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
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to the ultimate inquiry being pursued in this section of the present 
Article. That Act provided that no military installation or facility 
of any kind "shall be closed, abandoned or substantially reduced in 
mission until 120 days after reports of the proposed action are made 
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
Representatives."878 Reports of this type could only be filed with the 
appropriate committees between January I and April 30 of each 
year. "If Congress adjourns sine die before 120 days pass, the report 
must be resubmitted to the next regular session of the Congress."879 
President Johnson vetoed the bill on the ground that it was uncon-
stitutional. 
According to the President, this Act was an improper effort by 
Congress to regulate the procedure by which he could exercise mili-
tary and foreign affairs powers conferred exclusively upon his office 
by the Constitution. In his veto message, the President relied on the 
need for speedy action in determining matters within the Act's pur-
view as the basis for his exclusive authority over that subject. Con-
gress could not impose this procedure on the President in the per-
formance of those particular military and foreign affairs functions 
because: 
We cannot commit ourselves, for the prolonged period required 
by this bill, to delay action necessary to meet the realities of the 
troubled world in which we live. 
By the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the Presi-
dent. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 
The President cannot sign into law a bill which substantially in-
hibits him from performing his duty. He cannot sign into law a mea-
sure which deprives him of power for 8 months of the year even to 
propose a reduction of mission or the closing of any military installa-
tion, and which prohibits him from closing, abandoning, or substan-
tially reducing in mission any military facility in the country for 
what could be a year or more and must be 120 days. The times do 
not permit it. The Constitution prohibits it . 
. . . The President must be free, if the need arises, to reduce the 
mission at any military installation in the country if and when such 
becomes necessary.sso 
The President indicated that his veto did "not mean to imply 
that a reasonable reporting provision, consistent with the legislative 
powers of the Congress, would warrant a veto."881 It is unclear, how-
378. H.R. 8439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6ll(a) (1965), 
379. Id. 
380. 111 CONG. REc. 21244 (1965). 
381. Id. at 21245. 
necember 1972) Rule-Making 345 
ever, whether the President meant that congressional imposition of 
such a reporting requirement with respect to the particular type of 
rule-making involved there would be valid and, therefore, binding 
on him even if he opposed it. The President probably intended to 
suggest only that he would approve a bill containing such a simple 
reporting requirement because it would not unduly interfere with 
the proper performance of his duties. There is, of course, a very large 
difference between these two possible constructions of the veto 
message. 
According to one view, Congress may lawfully obligate the Presi-
dent to follow a particular rule-making procedure in the performance 
of those "military or foreign affairs functions" vested exclusively in 
the executive branch so long as the procedure prescribed in no way 
interferes with the merits of the President's substantive decision or 
his ability to perform that function as expeditiously or confidentially 
as necessary. If Congress has such authority, it may impose rule-
making procedures of its own design on the performance of all "mili-
tary and foreign affairs functions," and the Executive would be 
bound to follow these procedures in all cases, subject only to the 
qualifications noted above. According to the contrary view, how-
ever, the very need for reflexive or secret executive action in certain 
military and foreign affairs situations demonstrates that the particu-
lar rule-making involved is being executed pursuant to an exclusive 
presidential power. Congress may not, as a consequence, interfere 
with the Chief Executive's exercise of that authority in any way. 
It may not, therefore, prescribe the procedures by which that func-
tion is performed, even if those procedures do not interfere with 
his substantive decision or with his capacity to act as swiftly or con-
fidentially as is necessary. 
As a matter of policy, both views described above may be able to 
gamer some support because functionally they end in the same place. 
Under either theory the President is assured freedom to act as 
quickly and confidentially as necessary to perform those "military 
and foreign affairs functions" whose peculiar nature demands such 
a special capacity. The only difference is that under one of the 
theories Congress may impose some procedural requirements of its 
choosing on the President in the performance of these duties-re-
quirements that would not interfere with the executive's substantive 
decision on its merits or ·with his capacity for speedy or confidential 
action. Under the other theory Congress could impose no procedural 
requirements when the President makes rules involving a "military 
or foreign affairs function" whose peculiar nature requires an ability 
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to act reflexively or secretly. The President would obviously contend 
for the latter theory and Congress for the former. 
In support of the former view it has been suggested: 
Related to the congressional power to create programs is the power 
to specify many matters of administrative detail. These run the 
gamut from the establishment of agencies, offices, and positions, 
through the control of many personnel matters, to the disposition 
of property and the specification of operating procedures. Thus, it 
would appear that Congress' discretion is virtually unlimited in 
"prescribing the organization, procedure and business practices of 
an administrative agency .... "as2 
The assumption is that "[t]his kind of administrative detail which 
may be common to both domestic and foreign programs, is to be 
distinguished from the 'detail' of conduct and policy which forms 
part of the core area of foreign affairs [ or military functions] that is 
immune from congressional control."388 So, for example, it is sug-
gested that even with respect to those "military and foreign affairs 
functions" vested wholly and exclusively in the Executive, Congress 
can check and balance the President by "reports which the executive 
can be required to make."384 
This conclusion is qualified, however, by the observation that 
the extensiveness of these powers over "administrative detail" and 
administrative procedure "is not well defined."3811 Consequently, it 
is admitted that this power of Congress to force the President to 
make reports is limited by the doctrine of executive privilege, which 
originates in the residuum of independent and exclusive presidential 
powers.386 So, too, note the response to the following question: 
While Congress can normally prescribe operating procedures, should 
it be completely free to do so if the same have a considerable impact 
on the effect of United States ... programs abroad [or on the exercise 
of military functions]? The burden which this might place on the 
conduct of foreign affairs [or military functions] suggests that Con-
gress should not possess such freedom.3s7 
Nevertheless, on occasion Congress has attempted to impose require-
382. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 307, quoting L. l\lERIA."d: & L. ScHMECKE• 
BRIER, REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: 'WHAT DOES !T INVOLVE? 125 
(1939). 
383. L. MERIAM & SCHMECKEBRIER, supra note 382, at 125. 
384. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 492 citing C. ZINN, supra note 341, 
at 19. 
385. Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 307-08. 
386. Id. at 475-76, 492 n.425. 
387. Id. at 481. 
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ments of administrative detail or procedure on the Chief Executive 
even where the particular "military or foreign affairs function" 
being executed is arguably vested wholly in the President.388 In doing 
so, it claimed to be acting under one of the powers expressly delegated 
to the legislature in this area. 
A logical objection may be raised to the broader view of congres-
sional power. To the extent that the Constitution vests authority 
over certain "military or foreign affairs functions" wholly or ex-
clusively in the Executive, Congress may in no way interfere with or 
regulate their exercise-substantively or procedurally. Even a pro-
cedural regulation that does not hinder the Executive's capacity to 
make any decision on the merits he sees fit, or to react as swiftly or 
confidentially as he deems necessary in such cases, should be invalid. 
By enacting such a procedural regulation Congress is, after all, at-
tempting to impose its will on the performance of a particular 
function delegated by the Constitution wholly to the President. 
Why should Congress have more authority over the procedure than 
the substance with respect to matters whose substance admittedly 
lies within the zone of exclusive executive power? Certainly, no 
such distinction is drawn in the language of the Constitution or in 
any known judicial opinion. 
Furthermore, it can always be argued that any procedural limita-
tion that is imposed by Congress on rule-making in an area of exclu-
sive executive authority will, by definition, hinder at least to some 
extent the Executive's ability to act as speedily or secretly as he may 
deem necessary in such cases. On the other hand, a suitable response 
may be that the precise nature of the particular procedure Congress 
seeks to impose will in fact determine whether or not the Executive's 
ability to act as speedily or secretly as necessary is impaired. An 
analysis of the actual procedure involved is, therefore, a prerequisite 
to any conclusion on this subject. 
B. Section 552(b)(l)) the ABA Proposal) and Section 553(b)(B) 
It may be argued that Congress has already acted upon the 
belief that it has some authority to prescribe the procedures em-
ployed in the exercise of all "military and foreign affairs functions," 
including those demanding a special capacity for speedy or confiden-
tial executive action. When the new freedom-of-information provi-
sion was added to the AP A, Congress did not follow the model of 
section 553 and unqualifiedly exempt all records involving a "mili-
388. Id. at 480-82, 
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tary or foreign affairs function." Instead, in section 552(b)(l), Con-
gress stated that the freedom-of-information section "does not apply 
to matters that are ... specifically required by Executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." 
This statutory provision may not, however, be used to dem-
onstrate the existence of any assumed congressional authority to 
impose on the executive branch rule-making procedures for the 
performance of those "military and foreign affairs functions" ex-
clusively delegated to the President. In the first place, the President 
concurred in the freedom-of-information provision. This generally 
applicable provision does not, therefore, demonstrate a congressional 
belief that it may force section 552(b)(l) on the President's exercise 
of any exclusive executive authority over a veto based on constitu-
tional grounds. Furthermore, it is doubtful that presidential con-
currence in such a general statute at the time of its enactment would 
later disable the Chief Executive from disavowing it in those par-
ticular instances where it is seen to trench upon the Executive's 
exclusive power. In such a case the President and Congress only 
agreed to a law that was valid on its face. And the President and 
Congress cannot, either singly or in concert, agree to bind the Presi-
dent to follow a certain procedure in those particular cases where 
the Constitution delegates to him sole and exclusive authority to 
make a decision and to act upon it as the occasion demands.889 
Secondly, it may be argued that section 552(b)(l) does not, in 
£act, impose any procedure on the Executive in cases of exclusive 
presidential power because the particular procedure imposed is so 
devoid of substance that it is no limitation at all. It is a totally 
empty command to order the Executive to follow certain open 
records requirements for all public documents except those "specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
the national defense or foreign policy," since the only procedure 
required by that provision is that the President must indicate that 
he does not want to follow the usual requirements when he does 
not want to do so-a limitation of doubtful significance or substance. 
389. "The President has on occasions vetoed legislation with such [unconstitutional] 
provisions [in congressional acts infringing on his exclusive powers]; in more recent 
years he has at times approved the legislation but indicated he will treat the pro-
vision in question as unconstitutional. Attorneys General have supported this ap-
proach." Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321-22 n.191. "[T]he President has 
increasingly indicated in signing messages that he will ignore certain provisions in 
legislation or treat them in such a way as to avoid constitutional problems." Id. at 493. 
See also Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions 
and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REv. 569 (1953); Newman and Keaton, Congress and the 
Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALIF. 
L. REv. 565 (1953). 
December 1972] Rule-Making 349 
However, this view of the effect of section 552(b)(l) may be 
unduly narrow. If usual public record requirements are to be 
dispensed with, an "Executive order" must be issued, and the mat-
ters exempted must be done so "specifically." No precise definition 
of "Executive order" is provided in the AP A. Common language 
usage and historical practice would suggest, however, that the term 
"Executive order" means that the President must personally issue 
or sign the command for exemption.390 This constitutes a procedural 
limitation of some substance because it suggests that the final deci-
sion on this subject cannot be delegated by the President to any 
other official.391 
The term "specifically" may also constitute a procedural limita-
tion of some substance because it suggests that the President must 
indicate with a fair degree of particularity the precise records affect-
ing "national defense or foreign policy" that are to be exempted 
from usual public records requirements. He cannot vest unduly broad 
discretion in subordinate officials by issuing an exemptive command 
phrased in vague or overly general terms-leaving it to his sub-
ordinates to determine in their completely unfettered discretion what 
should and what should not be exempted.892 
There is yet a third reason why section 552(b)(l) does not dem-
onstrate any congressional belief that it may impose rule-making 
procedures on the executive branch in the performance of those 
"military and foreign affairs functions" exclusively vested therein. 
The freedom-of-information provision, and in particular section 
552(b)(l) thereof, is generally worded and open ended. It may, 
therefore, be applied to all sorts of "national defense and foreign 
policy" matters. The provision is undoubtedly constitutional on its 
face because Congress has the authority to impose procedural re-
quirements on the Executive in his performance of many "national 
390. The Federal Register, for example, clearly draws this distinction between exec-
utive orders and other regulations. 
391. Of course, as noted earlier, it is understood that such an "Executive order" 
requirement cannot and will not ensure personal consideration of the merits of each 
order by the President if he is prepared to rely completely on the advice of his 
advisers by automatically signing any order on this subject that they put before him. 
392. But see EPA v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4204 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973); Epstein v. 
Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd., 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 965 (1970) (Army order, specifying certain files as "Top Secret" under general 
guidelines designated by President, sufficient to exempt those files from freedom-of. 
information provision pursuant to "Executive order" excluding all "Top Secret" 
information from the Act's requirements). They only prove that the "specifically" re-
quirement will be read in light of the practicalities of any situation to ensure that on 
the one hand, the President is not forced to make an impossible number of indi-
vidualized judgments, and, on the other hand, that he does not subvert the purpose 
of the requirement of an "Executive order" "specifically" exempting certain documents 
by delegating to subordinates more authority than is reasonably necessary. 
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defense and foreign policy" matters. But Congress is presumably 
aware that such a general statute may still be unconstitutional as 
applied to any particular situation in which the Constitution vests 
exclusive authority in the President.393 The theory would be that 
Congress may in no way control executive conduct, substantively or 
procedurally, when the Executive is exercising a power vested wholly 
or exclusively in his office. A consequence of this argument would 
be that when the President exercises such authority he need not 
adhere to the requirements of section 552(b)(l). He need not exempt 
records from the freedom-of-information provision by "Executive 
order"; nor need he do so "specifically." Indeed, the President or 
his designate may do so very generally, leaving it to subordinates to 
decide in any particular case, without guidelines, whether an ex-
emption is necessary or desirable. 
On the other hand, even if the requirement that any exemption 
from the freedom-of-information section for matters involving "na-
tional defense or foreign policy" be accomplished "specifically" and 
by "Executive order" does constitute a "meaningful" procedural 
limitation on the President, and even if the Congress may not gen-
erally impose procedural limitations on the Chief Executive when 
he executes powers vested wholly in his office, these particular pro-
393. It seems clear that under his exclusive constitutional powers, the President 
may assert executive privilege even as against a congressional demand for information. 
"The executive has long asserted the power to withhold documents from Congress in 
the name of executive secrecy, and the Congress has to some extent acknowledged this 
power." Wallace, Foreign Aid, supra note 341, at 321-22 n.191, citing Bishop, The Exec• 
utive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 
(1957); Kramer 8c Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960 (pts. 
1-2), 29 GEO. WASH. L. RJ:.v. 623, 827 (1961); Younger, Congressional Investigations and 
Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PrIT. L. RJ:.v. 755, 771 
(1959). See also E. CORWIN, supra note 361, at 110-16. Consider, too, the following 
statement by Wallace: 
As already noted, executive secrecy may be equally applicable to domestic and 
foreign affairs, but it has been especially asserted with respect to the latter. Section 
624(d)(7) of the Foreign Assistance Act [22 U.S.C. § 2384(i:l)(7) (1970)] requires the 
delivery of certain documents and information to certain committees of Congress 
or the General Accounting Office. Upon failure to do so, disbursements to the 
Inspector General for Foreign Assistance-an official in the State Department-are 
to cease, although the President may "personally" waive this. For fiscal year 1960, 
section 533A(d) of the Mutual Security Act [of 1954, added by the Mutual Security 
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, § 40l(h), 73 Stat. 253], a predecessor, did not contain 
this waiver authority •••• [The Attorney General said that] the section in question 
was "plainly invalid" and "unconstitutional" [because it did not contain the waiver 
provision]. The Attorney General implied that the involvement of foreign affairs re-
inforced the President's right [to withhold information]. Senator Robertson, in ex-
plaining a proposed but unsuccessful amendment to the above statutory provision 
which would have permitted the President to withhold information in certain cir-
cumstances, stated: "If the President, in keeping with the well-established principle 
under the Constitution of the right of the President to handle foreign policy, 
decides that the disclosure of some phase of foreign policy would be against the 
public interest, he can so certify, and the Congress will not be able to get the 
information." 
Wallace, supra, at 475-76, quoting H.R. REP. No. 818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1961). 
See 41 OP. ATTY. GEN. 507 (1960). 
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cedural requirements of the freedom-of-information provision are 
almost certainly constitutional as applied to such exclusive presi-
dential powers. The only requirements imposed on the Chief Ex-
ecutive by section 552(b)(l) are that when he seeks to resist the 
imposition by Congress of any open records requirements on his 
exclusive powers, the President must do so personally and with 
some specificity. Since those exclusive powers are vested only in the 
office of the President, it seems reasonable to require that he per-
sonally invoke their immunity from any alleged congressional in-
terference. This is especially so since the confrontation is between 
two coequal branches of the national government; a presumption 
of validity attaches to this congressional action as with any other; 
Congress is closer to the people in a democratic sense than is the 
President; and the line delineating the zone of exclusive presidential 
powers is uncertain and highly debatable at best. 
On the same basis, when the President claims freedom from con-
gressional interference on the ground that he is exercising power 
vested exclusively in his office, he may reasonably be required to 
indicate "specifically" that for which he claims such freedom. This 
requirement would assure careful consideration by the Chief Exec-
utive as to the precise scope of the exclusive powers claimed in a 
particular situation and, thereby, minimize the confrontation be-
tween the two branches. Indeed, given the serious nature of the direct 
confrontation between two coequal branches, one may argue that 
personal action by the President "specifically" indicating the matters 
for which executive privilege is claimed is the only appropriate con-
stitutional means for invoking the exclusivity of presidential powers 
against the legislature. Of course, the particular requirements of an 
"Executive order" and fair specificity are minimal procedural im-
positions and will in no way interfere with the President's ability to 
exercise his exclusive powers expeditiously and confidentially. As a 
consequence, the particular procedural requirements embodied in 
section 552(b)(l) may be imposed on the President in the execution 
of his exclusive powers even if such exclusive powers are otherwise 
wholly free from congressional interference substantively or pro-
cedurally. 
As noted, the American Bar Association proposal is to substitute 
for section 553(a)(l) an exemption from the rule-making provision 
couched in the same language as that found in section 552(b)(l). 
Rule-making involving "military or foreign affairs functions" would 
be entirely exempt from section 553 only when it is "specifically 
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy." This proposal is obviously con-
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stitutional on its face. It would certainly be constitutional as applied 
to all "military and foreign affairs function" rule-making that is a 
product of authority vested jointly in the President and Congress, 
or solely in Congress. On the basis of previous discussion regarding 
the constitutionality of section 552(b)(l) as applied to powers vested 
wholly in the President, the ABA proposal would probably also be 
constitutional as applied to rule-making derived from such powers. 
As a result, the provision proposed by the ABA probably may 
be made the exclusive means by which executive immunity based 
on a need for secrecy can be properly asserted against normal rule-
making requirements. What of rule-making involving "military or 
foreign affairs functions" that is a product of authority vested wholly 
in the President for reasons other than a need for secrecy? May 
Congress similarly designate section 553(b)(B) (and section 553(d) 
(3)) as the sole and exclusive means by which executive privilege is 
to be asserted for all other rule-making constitutionally exempt from 
section 553 because it is a product of authority vested wholly in the 
Executive? Or may the Chief Executive completely ignore section 
553(b)(B) when he chooses to avoid usual rule-making procedures 
based on an assertion of such constitutional immunity that is 
grounded on a need, as an example, for speed alone? As noted earlier, 
through a reconstitution of the term "unnecessary," section 553(b) 
(B) could become an effective and desirable formally structured 
means by which executive immunity from usual rule-making pro-
cedures can be asserted in cases where it is not assertable under the 
proposed ABA provision. 
The findings requirements and publication requirements of 
section 553(b)(B) (and again, section 553(d)(3)) could be constitu-
tional as applied to "military and foreign affairs function" rule-
making involving exclusive presidential powers, even though the 
same may not be said of the usual procedures mandated by section 
553(b)-(e). If this is so, it is on the same basis that the requirements 
of section 552(b)(l) were deemed constitutional even as applied to 
matters delegated wholly to the executive branch. Within limits, 
Congress may define the means by which the President must assert 
the exclusiveness of his power against a contrary claim of congres-
sional authority under a general statute. So long as that definition 
does not impair the President's ability to act as speedily and secretly 
as necessary, or interfere on the merits with the invocation of his 
constitutional immunity, the Executive must employ the congres-
sionally defined means to assert effectively constitutional privilege 
against a generalized legislative policy. 
In support of this view it should be reiterated that Congress is 
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"closer to the people than the President," and its action must be 
presumed constitutional. Furthermore, the requirement of a formal 
finding of executive immunity followed by publication of that con-
clusion and its justification along with the rules involved is a 
minimal imposition on what otherwise may admittedly be the 
exercise of an exclusive executive power. This minimal imposition 
is also very helpful: the requirement of such a formal and public 
invocation of executive privilege against an imposition by a coequal 
branch of the national government may minimize legislative-ex-
ecutive conflicts and increase public participation in rule-making by 
inducing careful consideration of the desirability and lawfulness of 
a claim prior to its assertion. It also may minimize or avoid mis-
understandings because the fact of the claim and its specific nature 
are made clear to all. 
Of course, there may be some disagreement with the above con-
clusion as to the constitutionality of the ABA proposal and section 
553(b)(B) when applied to those cases involving exclusive executive 
authority. Should the above view be in error, every provision of 
section 553, including the requirements of the proposed ABA provi-
sion and section 553(b)(B), would be invalid as applied to "military 
and foreign affairs function" rule-making that derives from powers 
vested entirely in the President. The theory would be that all "mili-
tary and foreign affairs function" rule-making vested wholly in the 
President, for whatever reason, is likely to be immune from every 
sort of congressional regulation, substantive or procedural, including 
efforts by Congress to define the exclusive means by which executive 
immunity may be asserted in such cases. 
C. Conclusion as to Congress' Power 
Previous discussion demonstrates that Congress may impose the 
procedures contained in section 553(b)-(e) on most rule-making in-
volving "military or foreign affairs functions." Every requirement of 
section 553(b)-(e) would certainly be valid as applied to any "mili-
tary or foreign affairs function" vested exclusively in Congress, or 
vested concurrently in both Congress and the President. And, of 
course, the President can agree to abide by the procedures desired 
by Congress when he exercises particular "military and foreign 
affairs functions" delegated exclusively to him. The mere existence 
of a general congressional act of this type, meant to apply to all rule-
making, including that involving these particular functions, may be 
persuasive to the President in this connection. 
Congress has not previously hesitated to enact general, open-
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ended statutes regulating administrative procedure that are valid on 
their face merely because they might be invalid as applied in some 
cases. For example, the freedom-of-information provision of the 
original AP A contained no special exemption of any kind for records 
involving "military or foreign affairs functions" as such, even 
though that provision was probably invalid as applied to the exercise 
of those functions delegated wholly to the President. No constitu-
tional impediment seems, therefore, to stand in the way of a simple 
congressional repeal of section 553(a)(l), which would result in sec-
tion 553(b)-(e) becoming applicable to all "military and foreign 
affairs function" rule-making. Of course, as noted, the usual rule-
making procedures contained in section 553(b)-(e) are likely to be 
invalid as applied to those "military or foreign affairs functions" 
vested wholly in the President; but the ABA proposed provision 
and section 553(b)(B) are likely to be found valid as definitions of 
the exclusive means by which the President must assert his constitu-
tional immunity from usual rule-making procedures when exercising 
powers vested wholly in his office. 
Which of these functions are delegated exclusively to the Presi-
dent and are therefore otherwise beyond congressional control, and 
which are not, may be resolved on a case-by-case basis. As noted, how-
ever, those particular "military and foreign affairs functions" whose 
successful performance normally requires a special ability for speedy 
or secret action are more likely than others to be deemed vested 
exclusively in the Executive and beyond congressional authority-
substantively or procedurally. Most "military or foreign affairs func-
tions" are, however, not likely to be of this genre. Most authority in 
this area is vested concurrently in both the executive and legislative 
branches, or exclusively in Congress. 
A large part of the rule-making undertaken by the executive 
branch that clearly or colorably may involve "military or foreign 
affairs functions" should be and may be subjected by Congress to 
usual rule-making procedures. Presidential authority over passports, 
for example, is certainly concurrent with that of Congress. Zemel 
v. Rusk894 held that the Passport Act of 1926395 embodied a grant of 
authority to the Executive to impose area restrictions on the right to 
travel. Implicit in the case is the notion that Congress could, if it 
desired, prohibit the imposition of any such area restrictions on the 
issuance of passports. By analogy, is there any doubt that Congress 
could require most or all rule-making involving passports to adhere 
394. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
395. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970). 
December 1972] Rule-Making 355 
to the section 553 procedures? At present, relying on the unqualified 
exemptions of section 553(a)(l), the State Department totally ignores 
usual rule-making procedures when it makes policy relating to pass-
ports. Similarly, Congress and the President have, in most cases, 
concurrent authority over the acquisition, use, and disposal of mili-
tary property.396 The times, circumstances, and conditions under 
which the public may use such military property, acquire such mili-
tary property, or sell property to the armed forces, may, therefore, 
be subjected by Congress to usual rule-making procedures. Yet, the 
Department of Defense almost always ignores section 553 when it 
makes such rules on the basis of the unqualified exemption found in 
section 553(a)(l). The Constitution certainly does not compel these 
results save in a small number of narrowly circumscribed situations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In 1970 the American Bar Association adopted a resolution to 
the effect that the AP A should be improved by 
[b Jroadening the coverage of provisions for notice and opportunity 
for public participation in rule-making where formal procedures 
are not required by limiting, in appropriate instances, exemptions 
now included in the Administrative Procedure Act so far as it may 
be done without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to 
the public interest.307 
The resolution was not utopian; it realistically called for the limita-
tion or suspension of current exemptions from section 553 only 
where "it may be done without occasioning delay or expense dis-
proportionate to the public interest." 
Another critic of section 553(a)(l) has recently noted that 
[i]n this era when the biggest undertaking of the federal government 
is military, and when the biggest department of government is De-
fense, there is reason to believe that democratic procedures (of the 
kind provided for in section 553] should more than ever be insisted 
upon in all rulemaking or policy making [involving military func-
tions] that does not have to be kept secret-namely, most of it.398 
The same is true of rule-making involving "foreign affairs functions." 
The need for democratic procedures of the kind found in section 
553 is also especially great with regard to that sort of rule-making 
because the effects of this nation's foreign affairs so dominate our 
396. In regard to Congress' authority, see U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 3. 
397. Comment, Current ABA Proposals for Amendment of the Administrative Pro• 
cedure Act, 23 Ao. L. R.Ev. 67, 72-73 (1970). 
398. R, LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND A.Il!IUNISIRATIVE LAW 104 (1969). 
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whole society today, including the direction in which it moves in-
ternally, that we all have a very large stake in rule-making involving 
that subject. The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
has thus concluded that 
the Military Establishment is so large and its reach so universal, and 
the rights of private citizens that its actions affect so numerous, that 
a general exception of its rulemak.ing from any procedure require-
ments can no longer be justified. The same observation can be made 
to a large degree with respect to the exercise of what the present act 
described as foreign affairs functions-by the Department of State, 
by the Treasury and by other agencies of the Federal Government 
having such functions.399 
The Senate Committee is undoubtedly correct. 
The reasons advanced to justify the current exemption from 
section 553 for all rule-making involving a "military or foreign 
affairs function" are insufficient. At most, those justifications dictate 
the need for a more narrowly tailored exemption from usual rule-
making proceedings than is currently found in section 553(a)(l). The 
existing "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public in-
terest" provision found in section 553(b)(B) and the "good cause" 
exemption found in section 553(d)(3) provide such an exclusion 
from the requirements of section 553(b)-(d). They would work an 
adequate accommodation of the competing interests involved, care-
fully balancing the need for public participation against the need for 
effective, efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive government admin-
istration. And an exemption from the right to petition conferred by 
section 553(e) seems no more necessary or justifiable for subsection 
(a)(l) rule-making than for rule-making already covered by section 
553. When a special need for secrecy appears in cases of rule-making 
involving a "military or foreign affairs function," it can adequately 
be handled by section 552(b)(l). If this is not sufficient, the language 
of section 552(b)(l) can be expressly carried over and incorporated 
into section 553. That is the ABA proposal. It seems wise because 
it will reassure the agencies involved that their legitimate needs for 
secrecy will in no way be interfered with by the repeal of section 
553(a)(l). 
The solution proposed here to the difficulties arising from the 
repeal of section 553(a)(l) is bound to put some additional burden 
on the agencies that will have to implement it. But the burden in-
volved is not likely to be very large-especially in light of the avail-
ability of narrowly tailored class exemptions-and that burden would 
399. S. REP. No. 1234, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966) (a report on S. 1336 amending 
the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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seem clearly outweighed by the benefits obtained from the repeal 
of section 553(a)(l) because it will guarantee increased public par-
ticipation in rule-making of the kinds currently excluded from usual 
procedures by that provision. 
The proposal made in this study would only affect the section 
553(a)(l) exemptions for rule-making involving "military or foreign 
affairs functions.,, It would not affect, in any way, the existing section 
553(a)(2) exemption for rule-making relating to "agency manage-
ment or personnel." Similarly undisturbed would be the exemption 
from section 553(b)-(d) of all "interpretative rules" and "general 
statements of policy" found in section 553(b)(A) and section 553 
(d)(2). When combined with section 553(b)(B) and the "good cause" 
exemption found in section 553(d)(3), the above exemptions should 
provide adequate leeway for agencies to meet their responsibilities 
properly. 
Several desirable consequences would flow from repeal of section 
553(a)(l). It would eliminate an unqualified exemption that is 
susceptible to wide application and misapplication, which may defeat 
the policy of public participation in rule-making. Repeal would also 
make more effective the previously proposed elimination of the 
section 553(a)(2) exemption for rules relating to "public property, 
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Even after the elimination of 
these exclusions, rules relating to those subjects that also involve 
"military or foreign affairs functions" will be free from usual rule-
making requirements under section 553(a)(l). Repeal of the former 
exemption accompanied by repeal of subsection (a)(l) would close 
this gap. It would assure that all rules relating to "public property, 
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" will clearly, and without ques-
tion, be subject to the requirements of section 553, and that they will 
be excused from those requirements only where particular justifica-
tions under more narrowly tailored exemptions dictate that result. 
On a practical level, elimination of section 553(a)(l) would mean 
that most substantive400 rules involving the acquisition and disposal 
of all sorts of military property would clearly be subject to usual 
advance notice and public participation requirements. This includes 
substantive rules describing the terms and conditions of such acquisi-
tion or disposal and the particular circumstances under which it shall 
take place. Most rules determining whether, and under what condi-
tions, the public may utilize the property, facilities, and services of 
400. The exemption for "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" 
found in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970) should not be forgotten, It is dubious, however, 
whether that exemption deserves to be continued. 
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the armed forces would also be clearly subject to usual advance notice 
and public participation requirements. The same may be said of 
most substantive rules involving the terms and conditions upon 
which persons may join the armed forces or receive loans, grants, 
benefits, or contracts from the armed forces. Repeal of this exemp-
tion would also mean that usual procedures will have to be followed 
in the making of substantive regulations governing such things as the 
conduct of ROTC programs, the issuance of passports and visas, 
and the administration of the immigration laws and foreign exchange 
programs. Rules issued to control imports or exports or otherwise 
involving foreign trade would also clearly be subjected to usual 
procedural requirements in most cases. The same may be said for 
most rules implementing the regulation of American seamen and 
ships abroad and the regulation of American business abroad. Rule-
making implementing foreign aid programs would also be clearly 
subjected to advance notice and public participation requirements 
in most cases. The above examples are only illustrative. 
A discouraging discovery made in the course of preparing this 
Article is that a number of agencies opposing modification of section 
553(a)(I) have apparently not re-examined their position seriously 
during the past few years. Statements opposing repeal of these exemp-
tions that were prepared as long as five or ten years ago are still used 
by some agencies as the principal basis for articulating their position. 
The language of a few such statements has sometimes not even been 
modified to reflect subsequent changes in the law, or obvious changes 
in circumstances, when they were issued in light of a new inquiry 
on this subject. It is hoped that this re-examination of the exemption 
can at least provoke these agencies into conducting a careful re-
consideration of their position on this question. That reconsideration 
should result in a realization that repeal of the exemption for rule-
making involving "military or foreign affairs functions" need not 
seriously disadvantage them, in light of existing exemptions con-
tained in other portions of section 553. The national interest must 
not be compromised. Repeal of section 553(a)(l) will not do so. The 
danger is that the mere involvement of "military and foreign affairs 
functions" will make the matter so politically sensitive that it will 
not be able to receive a fair hearing on the merits by the Congress 
or the agencies that make such rules. It is to be hoped that this will 
not occur. 
